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 1 
 Introduction 
 
―In Britain we know how much we owe to America. We understand how close 
our countries are. America’s cause is, and always will be, our cause.1 
 
― We share a lot in common. Although our cars, or our automobiles, may drive 
on opposite sides of the highway, our people generally move in the same 
direction. And we share, or at least attempt to share, a common language. 
Sometimes we don’t succeed. But in the most important things, we do see issues 
and ideas, challenges, hopes, and expectations in the same way.2 
 
 
The above quotes mirror the romantic notions of the Anglo-American relationship which 
Margaret Thatcher has long propagated in her writings and public speeches. Thatcher’s 
rhetoric echoes the sentiments of another British prime minister, Winston S. Churchill 
(British prime minister 1940-45; 1951-55) who declared in 1946 that the English Speaking 
Peoples shared a common heritage which obligated both countries to work together to 
maintain international security in the post-war world.3 This book explores crucial aspects of 
the Anglo-American strategic and diplomatic relationship during the presidency of Jimmy 
Carter, 1977-81. Throughout this book a rather different impression of the Anglo-American 
relationship emerges than the one suggested by the opening quotations. Whilst the subsequent 
chapters reveal a relationship that was indeed characterised by strategic and diplomatic 
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cooperation, it was also a relationship afflicted by strategic, political and economic 
competition and rivalry. 
Several interconnected topics and questions are addressed throughout the work. 
Included is an analysis of both American and British policies towards Carter’s international 
human rights agenda and efforts to improve NATO’s defence posture. More specifically, the 
study sheds new light on Anglo-American cooperation and competition as it related to 
implementing a majority rule settlement in Rhodesia, the taking of American hostages in Iran 
and finding a joint response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. The subsequent 
diplomacy pertaining to possible economic sanctions against the Soviet Union and the 
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games is also explored. The study is also concerned 
with what has hitherto been regarded as the most sacrosanct areas of the Anglo-American 
‘special relationship,’ that being nuclear and intelligence cooperation between the two states. 
Special emphasis is afforded to the 1980 agreement whereby the Carter administration 
officially agreed to sell Trident C4 to the United Kingdom to replace its ageing Polaris force. 
The study of Anglo-American relations during the Cold War has been dominated by 
the idea that a special relationship exists between the two countries by virtue of the close and 
unique cooperation undertaken between London and Washington.4 Of course, reference to a 
special relationship immediately begs the questions, special in relation to what and special to 
whom? Commentators highlight the nuclear cooperation and intelligence sharing between 
America and Britain as clear examples of this special relationship in practice. No two other 
sovereign states cooperated to the extent that London and Washington did throughout the 
Second World War and subsequent Cold War in these highly sensitive areas of national 
security. It is these two areas that are often regarded as the central props of the special 
relationship.5 Various explanations for this special relationship abound with some scholars 
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highlighting the shared cultural bonds which morphed into a mutual understanding of how 
international security would be upheld following the end of the Second World War.6 Others 
suggest more practical motivations explain the special relationship. As David Reynolds notes, 
the special relationship ‘grew out of a sense of shared threat and mutual need.’7 
Certainly, from the perspective of elite foreign policy makers in London, it was this 
perception of international threats and Britain’s serious economic challenges which 
encouraged them in their efforts to sustain a special relationship with Washington. Indeed, 
the fighting of the Second World War had been extremely costly for the British state which 
was effectively bankrupt by the end of the war. Britain had emerged victorious from the war 
but it had lost somewhere close to 25% of its national wealth and accumulated a sovereign 
debt of nearly 250% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).8 At the end of the war the British 
government owed approximately $31 billion to the U.S. Treasury alone.9  To be sure, the 
United Kingdom would only re-pay $650 million of the total $31 billion borrowed, and 
would receive additional loans in the post-war period, but the British economy remained in a 
perilous situation.10 The British government could simply not afford to maintain a significant 
military presence all over the world and could not face alone the perceived growing menace 
posed by the Soviet Union. Sustaining and enhancing close relations with Washington now 
became the cornerstone of British security policy, which would aid British ambitions of 
containing the Soviet Union and provide greater influence over America foreign policy. 
Closer ties could also help the United Kingdom win better financial terms from the United 
States for future borrowing and trade agreements. The Attlee government (1945-51) was 
successful in this pursuit as shown by the establishment of an official intelligence sharing 
agreement and staff talks between the United Kingdom and United States. As Richie 
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Ovendale has noted, the efforts of Ernest Bevin, British foreign secretary, 1945-51, led to the 
creation of ‘an informal military alliance”’ between the two states.11  
In sum, a special relationship was needed to shore up Britain’s dwindling 
international power. Harold Macmillan, (British prime minister 1957-63) typified this type of 
thinking when he referred to Britain playing the role of Greece to the American Roman 
Empire.12 Implied in such a statement is that Britain would utilise its well-practiced 
diplomacy, its remaining global bases, along with its military and intelligence capabilities, to 
exercise a decisive influence over U.S. foreign policy for the promotion of British interests. 
Robert Cecil, First Secretary in the British Embassy in Washington during the early years of 
the Cold War, explained how the special relationship was ‘a means of making sure that if this 
little British gunboat was following in the wake of the American battleship…on the 
bridge…the Americans would be receiving messages from the British who had this long 
experience of international affairs and knew so much more about things than the Americans 
did.’13 To this day such attitudes persists amongst British foreign and national security policy 
making elites as illustrated during one recent interview with the former head of Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Sir David Omand. When quizzed by the BBC’s 
Today programme about the nature of the Anglo-American intelligence relationship, Omand 
explained that ‘We have the brains. They have the money. It's a collaboration that's worked 
very well.’14 
Whether the British government ever exercised the level of influence over U.S. policy 
that they sought is questionable. Regardless, as Henry Kissinger, U.S. secretary of state, 
1973-77 perceptively noted: ‘Whatever the “reality” of the “special relationship,” Britain has 
tried hard to give the impression to the outside world that American policy is strongly 
influenced, if not guided, by London.’15 As Kissinger appreciated, the perception of power 
and influence is critically important in the conduct of international affairs and thus explains 
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why successive British governments sought to perpetuate the idea of significant British 
influence over U.S. foreign policy. 
For British policy making elites maintaining influence over Washington’s foreign 
policy became increasingly difficult as the Cold War progressed because of the obvious 
decline in British economic, military and international power.16 As early as 1946, American 
intelligence assessments concluded that the United Kingdom was a much diminished global 
power and that the United States would have to be the principal world power to contain the 
mutual threat posed by the rise of Soviet international power.17 Throughout the first decade 
of the Cold War there was a growing sense that the scales of power within the Anglo-
American relationship were tilting decisively in Washington’s favour. No clearer 
demonstration of Britain’s diminished power is evidenced than during the Suez Crisis of 
1956 when U.S. political and financial pressure forced the government of Anthony Eden to 
withdraw embarrassingly from the military action it had undertaken against Nasser’s Egypt. 
The disparities in American and British power was so marked that the likes of Harold Caccia, 
the British Ambassador to Washington (1956-61), remarked that talk of a ‘special 
relationship’ between London and Washington was an ‘embarrassment.’18  
By the 1960s, Britain’s economic difficulties were so pronounced that the 
governments of Harold Wilson (1964-66; 1966-70) decided that crucial vestiges of Britain’s 
remaining global power would be disbanded. The Wilson government announced in its 1967 
Defence Review that the United Kingdom would withdraw from its military obligations that 
lay ‘East of Suez.’19 As such, the idea that Britain could have a decisive influence upon U.S. 
global strategy became simply untenable. The advent of superpower détente, and other 
American ‘special’ relationships (with the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel and others), 
meant there was less scope for intimacy in Anglo-American relations.20 These altered 
circumstances, however, did not prevent Wilson from promoting the idea of an Anglo-
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American special relationship. Whilst aware that that Britain held less importance with 
Washington’s policy makers, the British Prime Minister still believed he could exercise 
decisive influence in regards to international economic policy, promoting superpower 
détente, finding nuclear arms control agreements and in helping to promote a peace 
agreement in Vietnam. However, Wilson was largely ineffective as President Johnson by and 
large ignored the British Prime Minister on many of these key subjects. Only on the subject 
of nuclear weapons diplomacy did Wilson exert meaningful influence over Washington.21 
From the 1960s onwards, ‘Europe’ became the solution to Britain’s twin problems of 
economic malaise and international decline. Membership of the European Economic 
Community (EEC), when it eventually came at the third time of trying in 1973 proved not to 
be the magic elixir that its adherents had claimed it would be. Persistent economic difficulties 
and the humiliation of the IMF Crisis of 1976-77 only cemented the growing impression in 
American circles that the United Kingdom was no longer a first rate ally capable of 
promoting global U.S. interests. In the assessment of some senior U.S. policy makers the 
United Kingdom had become a ‘parasite’ and a ‘scrounger.’ State Department officials even 
debated the ‘British problem.’  Given such assessments, it became increasingly difficult for 
British policy makers to sustain even the image of a special relationship between the two 
countries.22  
By the time Carter assumed the U.S. Presidency in 1977, the Anglo-American 
relationship was no longer of first rate importance to Washington or to international affairs 
more broadly. The Carter administration’s decision to re-evaluate the nature of the 
intelligence relationship between London and Washington, which included limiting the 
United Kingdom’s access to ‘extremely sensitive intelligence material,’ was indicative of the 
diminished importance that U.S. policy makers attributed to the Anglo-American 
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relationship.23 For one commentator writing in the mid-1980s, the conclusion was reached 
that ‘since the 1970s Anglo-American relations, considered entirely by themselves, have 
ceased to be very important or very interesting.’24 
Yet the period under analysis here does reveal some ‘very important’ and ‘very 
interesting’ matters once the Anglo-American relationship is contextualised within the 
framework of how superpower détente morphed into the ‘Second Cold War.’25 Moreover, as 
demonstrated in subsequent chapters, there were a number of significant processes that 
materially affected both the Anglo-American relationship and the course of international 
events. As argued throughout, the relationship became steadily more important to both 
powers and to international relations more broadly as the Carter administration progressed. 
This shift in perception can largely be attributed to outside factors, not least the international 
economic and energy difficulties confronting the United States which required multilateral 
solutions. The challenges to America’s global position throughout the Persian Gulf and 
Africa coupled with the onset of the Second Cold War following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 further encouraged closer cooperation. London and Washington shared 
perceptions of international security threats ultimately encouraged closer relations. Anglo-
American relations became more important for both countries and for international relations 
during Carter’s presidency.26  
Yet it is also important to note that whilst the Anglo-American relationship became 
more important it did not necessarily lead to warmer diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. Nor did increased diplomatic cooperation always run smoothly. As seen 
throughout chapters 5 and 6 in this book, Anglo-American tension, disagreement and 
antagonism persisted even as outside factors stimulated closer cooperation. It is the purpose 
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of these chapters to analyse why such disagreements existed, what were their principal causes 
and how resolutions to these differences were found.    
The recent declassification of government records in the United States has allowed for 
a re-assessment of the Carter presidency. A central feature of this research highlights how in 
spite of only occupying the Oval office for one term, Carter’s presidency had a number of 
long term and profound consequences for U.S. national security and foreign policy. For 
instance, it was under Carter that normalisation of relations with the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) was established, that the Camp David Peace Accords between Egypt and Israel 
were signed and that the modernisation of the American nuclear arsenal began. As 
highlighted in one recent study, Carter’s efforts to ‘harden’ U.S. defense policy pre-dated 
those of Ronald Reagan who is usually associated with increasing U.S. defense expenditure 
and strengthening America’s nuclear weapons capability.27 And in the context of the Anglo-
American relationship, Carter presided over a number of important events and agreements 
which had long term consequences for both countries and for international relations more 
broadly. The most pertinent example is the 1980 agreement between the two governments to 
sell the U.S. Trident C4 submarine launched ballistic missile to the United Kingdom. This 
guaranteed that London would remain a nuclear power and helped sustain the consequent 
unique defence collaboration between the two countries. As Peter Jay, the British 
Ambassador to Washington (1977-79) contemporaneously argued: 
the quality that makes the Anglo-US relationship so crucial is 
defence. The defence relationship is by no means one-sided. We have 
received, and continue to receive, considerable American assistance 
in the military nuclear field which has enabled us to maintain our 
strategic deterrent. This reflects a degree of cooperation in military 
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nuclear matters which is unique between any two powers…The 
Americans recognise that our contribution to the conventional forces 
of the Alliance remains substantial and indispensable.28   
 
In addition to security collaboration Anglo-American diplomacy was vitally important in 
bringing about a majority rule settlement in Rhodesia and the discourse of human rights 
promotion which persists to this day as a central element in American and British foreign 
policy was cemented under the Carter presidency.  
The book makes three main interlinked observations and arguments. The first of these 
is that the Anglo-American relationship became steadily more important to both countries 
and to international relations more generally as the breakdown of superpower détente 
encouraged closer cooperation between the two countries. Second, considerable cooperation 
between the two countries existed in this period as demonstrated most clearly with the 
decision in 1980 by the Carter administration to sell Trident C4 to the British government. 
Intelligence sharing and security cooperation within the context of the NATO alliance also 
continued. It is demonstrated how the long established security cooperation central to the 
Anglo-American security relationship were able to largely transcend political differences and 
endured in spite of the decline in Britain’s international status. Political cooperation was also 
a central characteristic of the relationship as both James Callaghan (prime minister 1976-79) 
and Margaret Thatcher (prime minister 1979-90) sought to promote Carter’s international 
security and foreign policy objectives with other allies, especially namely with Helmut 
Schmidt’s West Germany. By doing so, both Callaghan and Thatcher believed they could win 
Carter’s confidence and thus shape the president’s policies along paths deemed appropriate 
for promoting British interests. By and large such influence was fleeting and limited in its 
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success. Whilst sustained diplomatic cooperation took place in regards to settling the question 
of majority rule in Rhodesia, it was largely the American opinion on how to solve the 
question that won through. It is this example which serves to demonstrate that London’s 
ambition of exerting ‘soft power’ over Washington clearly had its limitations.29 
Third, the book also reveals a considerable amount of political and strategic 
competition and disagreement between the two countries which is generally underappreciated 
within the extant literature. For instance, the Callaghan government sought to persuade Carter 
to downplay his emphasis on promoting international human rights but to little effect. 
Considerable disagreement between the two countries persisted in relation to solving 
international economic and energy problems as both Washington and London sought to 
influence the make-up of joint solutions. Finally, during Thatcher’s short political 
relationship with Carter, considerable Anglo-American disagreement affected the course of 
diplomacy as it related to the creation of finding mutually agreeable policies in reaction to the 
Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. Thus, this study demonstrates that there existed 
levels of cooperation, competition and antagonism within the Anglo-American relationship 
which existing studies do not emphasise or have fully explained. The chapters that follow 
seek to provide a more nuanced and fuller understanding of the Anglo-American relationship 
during the Carter presidency.  
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2 
Détente, human rights and Anglo-American relations 
The era of détente 
The period preceding Carter’s presidency was a difficult one for the United States. 
Undoubtedly, the Nixon administration had accomplished a number of significant things in 
the international realm but with the Watergate scandal forcing Nixon to resign his office in 
August 1974 and America’s eventual evacuation of Vietnam in April 1975 it is with good 
reason that Henry Kissinger termed this period as the ‘Years of Upheaval.’ Given these 
circumstances, it is little wonder that the American electorate in 1976 wanted an ‘outsider’ to 
assume the presidency and to bring a fresh approach to the conduct of foreign affairs. Carter’s 
election brought a president to the White House determined to promote a post-Vietnam 
foreign policy that would not be dictated solely by Cold War considerations.1  
For the United Kingdom the 1970s was a time marked by continued relative economic 
decline, industrial unrest, political uncertainty and global military retrenchment. The decision 
by the Heath government in 1970 to endorse Wilson’s East of Suez withdrawal meant that by 
1977 the United Kingdom would no longer retain significant global military bases. The 
outbreak of the fourth Arab–Israeli war in October 1973 and the subsequent Arab oil 
embargo added to Britain’s significant economic problems. Such were these problems that by 
the middle of the 1970s the United Kingdom was being described by political commentators 
as the ‘sick man of Europe.’ The extent of this sickness was highlighted in 1976 as the British 
government had to resort to the ignominy of accepting a financial bailout from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Further damaging British sensibilities was the fact that 
the British government had been treated by the IMF as ‘just another’ country.2  
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The immediate years prior to Carter’s election had also been difficult ones for the 
Anglo-American relationship. Disagreement, antagonism and discord appeared to be the 
main characteristics of the relationship during the government of Edward Heath (1970-74). 
Anglo-American disagreement was so severe that the likes of Nixon and Kissinger even 
spoke about the end of the ‘special relationship.’ Both showed what this meant in practical 
terms as the Nixon administration temporarily suspended both nuclear and intelligence 
collaboration with the British government in 1973-4 because of on-going political 
disagreements. The governments of Harold Wilson (1974-6) and James Callaghan (1976-9), 
whilst never quite hitting the lowest points witnessed during the Heath years, also found 
themselves facing the ire of Washington on a number of occasions.3 Nevertheless, diplomatic 
flashpoints were the exception, rather than the rule, for Anglo-American relations during the 
presidencies of Nixon and Ford.4 A case in point is illustrated by the decision of the Nixon 
administration in 1974 to approve additional assistance to the British nuclear programme. 
Though the Anglo-American relationship had diminished in importance, such cooperation in 
the nuclear field guaranteed that it would remain relevant for years to come. But when the 
British government sought to exploit its special relationship with Washington for its own 
interests during the IMF Crisis London found U.S. support lacking. Crucially then, events 
during the IMF Crisis demonstrated the lack of influence which London had over 
Washington when it really mattered. There were limits to just how much leverage the British 
government could exercise over Washington and on this occasion the consequences of this 
limited influence were to have profoundly negative consequences for the government of 
James Callaghan.5 London was not oblivious to its diminished position with Washington. 
One briefing memorandum for David Owen, (appointed foreign and commonwealth secretary 
in February 1977) articulated this very point: 
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During the last administration our relations with the US were 
generally good, due both to mutual interest and to the close 
relationship which Mr Callaghan and later Mr Crosland developed 
with Dr Kissinger…But even at the height of the good relationship 
with Dr. Kissinger, the relationship was no longer an exclusive one: 
the FRG now matters as much to the US as does the UK, and even 
US-French relations are on a firmer setting.6 
This then was the context for the Anglo-American relationship at the beginning of the Carter 
presidency. The Carter administration, if not as candid in their judgment of British decline as 
their immediate predecessors had been, shared the same basic assessment that the Anglo-
American relationship could no longer be expected to promote U.S. interests to the degree 
that it once had. Rather, as far as the Carter administration viewed things, the United 
Kingdom was deemed an important European power within the framework of a broader 
democratic alliance which would tackle global problems on a multilateral basis.7 As one 
report supplied to Cyrus Vance, U.S. secretary of state, 1977-80, noted in February 1977, 
‘The British government is beset with troubles’ which meant a special relationship was 
difficult to sustain.8 Vance’s personal assessment of the United Kingdom mirrored this type 
of analysis. As he outlined for the president, Callaghan’s government was faced with ‘serious 
economic problems and mounting political problems. Trade balances are off, inflation has not 
been brought under control, and the Labor [sic] Party is fighting to keep itself in office.’9  
British officials clearly understood this shifting perception of the United Kingdom in 
Washington. Peter Jay informed London in February 1979: ‘Britain is not anywhere near 
central to the American world vision. We are not big enough as a friend and ally to share a 
really large part of the US’s military and economic burdens nor strong enough as an 
24 
 
adversary to threaten seriously the key American interests, nor bad enough as a problem to 
demand more widespread or constant attention.’10 
Yet the Anglo-American relationship, even if it could never return to its level of 
importance during the years of the Grand Alliance in the Second World War, or even to the 
‘Golden Days’ of Macmillan and Kennedy, progressively regained ground during  Carter’s 
term in office as Washington sought to reenergise its international alliances in the face of 
mounting international challenges.11 Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
(December 1979), the onset of more bellicose U.S.–Soviet relations, the coup in Iran by 
Islamic fundamentalists (February 1979) and the steadily worsening U.S. economy, 
cooperation between the two countries intensified. British and American policy makers 
undertook intensive negotiations regarding how to respond to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Cooperation in NATO was given a boost as U.S. Ground Launched Cruise 
Missiles were dispatched to Britain as part of the Dual Track decision of September 1979. 
And the Anglo-American nuclear relationship was re-affirmed in 1980 as Carter agreed to 
sell Trident C4 to the British government. It is in the chapters that follow that the changing 
nature of the Anglo-American relationship during Carter’s presidency is analysed. 
Jimmy Carter 
As Peter Rodman, the long-serving advisor to multiple American presidents noted: ‘Jimmy 
Carter...came into office determined to avoid what he saw as the errors of his predecessors.’12 
For Carter, the biggest error of the Nixon and Ford administrations was the lack of weight 
afforded to human rights considerations in formulating U.S. foreign policy.13 Of course, 
Carter’s presidency was not the first to be concerned with international human rights. Since 
the foundation of the American republic there had been a struggle between those that 
believed U.S. foreign policy had to pursue realistic foreign policy objectives as opposed to 
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those which argued that idealistic objectives should be promoted. Throughout U.S. history 
there have thus been intermittent swings between individual presidents that have sought to 
pursue a foreign policy premised to varying degrees upon idealistic or realist motivations. As 
Nancy Mitchell has suggested ‘Carter did not initiate the discussion of human rights; he rode 
a wave that had been growing since the end of World War II and that had gained momentum 
in 1975 when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the countries of Europe, East and 
West, signed the Helsinki Accords.’14 
Whilst it was politically opportune for Carter to attach his political fortunes to the 
cause of human rights, his own religious and moral beliefs (Carter is a born again Baptist and 
to this day still teaches Sunday school classes in Plains Georgia) convinced him that the 
promotion of human rights would underpin his foreign policy.15 As Andrew Preston has 
argued, religion mattered to individuals and expressions of public piety were not merely 
‘cynical window dressing that obscures the “real” political of strategic motives behind [U.S.] 
foreign policy.’16 Such epithets certainly applied to Carter as his conduct in office was 
affected by his religious beliefs as evidenced throughout his efforts to bring a resolution to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.17 Carter’s religious and moral beliefs also affected Anglo-American 
relations. This was clearly demonstrated, for instance, in convincing the president to 
resolutely pursue a majority rule settlement in Rhodesia. Carter’s religious beliefs also 
influenced his decision to not proceed with the development of the Enhanced Radiation 
Warhead [ERW] in 1978.18  
Care, however, needs to be taken when analysing the extent to which Carter’s 
religious beliefs affected the conduct of his foreign policy. First, Carter’s Baptist faith 
explicitly separated Church and State. As one of Carter’s closest advisers recalled, the 
president never once cited his religious convictions as a reason to pursue any course of 
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action.19 Similarly, one historian has suggested, Carter ‘should have been the ideal Social 
Gospel president’ but he in fact ‘stringently [sought] to separate religion from politics.’20 
Secondly, any president faces a myriad of pressures which stem from structural forces within 
the international system, economic influences, military factors, domestic political pressures 
and bureaucratic political calculations that all have a bearing upon the course of foreign 
policy. Carter’s religious beliefs cannot simply be applied on a reductive basis to explain his 
foreign policy choices. Rather, Carter’s religious beliefs should be weighed as another factor 
when assessing his foreign policy.    
The ideas that Carter developed as a member of the Trilateral Commission were 
important in influencing the central tenets of his foreign policy. Established originally in 
1973, the Trilateral Commission brought together individuals who were keen to foster a post-
Vietnam U.S. foreign policy.21 No longer would all aspects of U.S. foreign policy be 
conditioned by concerns about the Soviet Union. It was, according to the members of the 
Trilateral Commission, the zero sum logic of the Cold War that had needlessly dragged the 
United States into the unwinnable war inside Vietnam. A new foreign policy was required to 
avoid repeating such major strategic follies in the future. Matters surrounding energy, 
economics, and nuclear proliferation would be afforded a far more prominent position within 
U.S. foreign policy.22 The key foreign policy players within the new Carter administration, 
including the secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
secretary of defense, Harold Brown, and U.S. Treasury secretary, W. Michael Blumenthal, 
had all been members of the Tri-lateral commission. Now in positions of power, the ideas 
that they had all debated theoretically could be put into practice.  
Domestic political considerations further encouraged the president to adopt a new 
foreign policy course. The previous eight years of a Republican held White House had seen a 
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number of foreign policy achievements but were also tarnished by political scandal in the 
domestic sphere. Watergate, along with the collapse of America’s position within Vietnam 
and the increasingly hostile opinion of the American public to the ‘Washington 
establishments’ domination of national politics, gave an opportunity for a Washington 
‘outsider’ to assume the presidency.23 Carter exploited his background as a former Naval 
Officer and southern farmer to add credibility to his outsider status. The Democratic 
candidate persuasively argued that he was not a member of the ‘Washington establishment’ 
in stark contrast to his election opponents of Gerald Ford, the current president and a 25 year 
veteran of the House of Representatives, and Bob Dole, who had served in the House of 
Representatives since 1960. Carter utilised these factors to his advantage during both the 
Democratic nomination process and the presidential election campaign throughout the 
summer and autumn of 1976.24  
During the presidential campaign, Carter vehemently criticised the Ford 
administration’s lack of regard for human rights in the conduct of its foreign policy. Yet 
simultaneously Carter attacked the Ford administration for its apparent weakness towards the 
Soviet Union which he alleged had allowed Moscow to obtain a dangerous advantage in 
nuclear armaments. Carter essentially latched onto many of the criticisms that were being 
targeted at the entire détente project and signalled his intention to take a firmer line with the 
Soviet Union. During one presidential debate between Carter and Ford, the Democratic 
nominee suggested that the president had legitimised the Soviet Union’s domination of 
Eastern Europe.25 In a damning critique of the Ford administration Carter lambasted:  
The prime responsibility of any president is to guarantee the security 
of our nation, with a tough, muscular, well-organized, and effective 
fighting force. We must have the ability to avoid the threat of 
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successful attack or blackmail, and we must always be strong enough 
to carry out our legitimate foreign policy. This is a prerequisite to 
peace. Our foreign policy today is in greater disarray than at any time 
in recent history.26 
Further yet, the United States had compromised its ‘moral authority’ and had ‘been out traded 
in almost every instance’ of U.S.-Soviet diplomacy.27 ‘It must be the responsibility of the 
president to restore the moral authority of this country in its conduct of foreign policy’ Carter 
argued. In his memoir Carter concluded that ‘Our country has been strongest and most 
effective when morality and a commitment to freedom and democracy has been most clearly 
emphasised in our foreign policy.’28  
Carter’s future national security team was just as scathing of the Ford administration’s 
legacy. Walter Mondale, who would serve as Carter’s vice-president, provided a damning 
critique of the Nixon-Ford policy of shunning multilateralism in favour of pursing narrow 
‘national interests’ to the detriment of all other considerations.29 ‘The idea of national 
security has militarized our foreign policy to the point of being virtually helpless when 
confronted by major economic problems such as energy…I believe the fog of national 
security helped to lead us into the tragic swamp of Vietnam, into the morass called 
Watergate’ he claimed  soon after America’s evacuation from Vietnam.30 Failing to promote 
international human rights and to ‘simply allow your national self-interest to subordinate all 
other values’ leads to ‘a Hobbesian world of evil motives and worse behaviour’ Mondale 
asserted. As such, it was the Carter administration’s intention to ‘show the world a different 
America.’31 According to Brzezinski, the Nixon-Kissinger détente policies were ‘too 
compartmentalised’ and that they needed to be ‘more reciprocal.’ Moreover, the Nixon-
Kissinger approach to foreign policy had ‘elevated amorality to the level of principal.’32 
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William Odom, who served as Brzezinski’s principal military adviser, noted that ‘the detente 
policy that Kissinger had designed was based on very fallacious assumptions about the nature 
of the Soviet Union and East-West relationships.’33 Carter’s critique of détente was so 
powerful that President Ford actually banned his staff from using the word ‘détente’ to 
explain his foreign policy ambitions during the election campaign. As one journalist put it, 
‘détente’ had become a ‘dirty word.’34 
The promotion of improved human rights may have been ‘the soul of Carter’s foreign 
policy’ but this did not obviously translate into meaningful policies.35 From the outset of 
Carter’s administration there was a clear disconnect between the theory of advancing 
international human rights and how U.S. foreign and international economic policy 
manifested. Indeed, even before entering the White House Carter placed important limitations 
upon the scope and ambition of any human rights foreign policy. As he told one audience 
‘We must be realistic. Although we believe deeply in our own system of government and our 
own ideals, we do not and should not insist on identical standards or an identical system in all 
other nations.’36 Human rights concerns would be balanced by broader geopolitical factors 
and finding this balance was the task of a newly established inter-agency body, the Policy 
Review Committee.37 It is apparent from the minutes of the Policy Review Committee that 
human rights considerations had to complement broader security, economic and political 
objectives and that this meant a ‘zealous’ pursuit of the promotion of international human 
rights had to be tempered.38 Illustrative of such problems was the issue of supplying 
armaments to U.S allies. In Latin America, arms embargos were enacted against Argentina 
for alleged human rights violations practised by the Argentine government yet in East Asia 
and the Middle East, there was little change in policy in spite of human rights violations 
being practised by allies such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Anthony Lake, the 
Director of the Policy Planning Staff, acknowledged this contradiction at the centre of 
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Carter’s foreign policy: ‘Human rights considerations have become perhaps the dominant 
factor in arms transfers in Latin America … [however] the great bulk of our arms 
transfers…are to East Asia and the Middle East, and they have been only marginally affected 
by human rights considerations.’39  
Carter’s effort to promote what two scholars have termed a ‘post-Cold War foreign 
policy’ was therefore restricted from the outset by the president’s understanding of 
geopolitical realities.40 Mondale retrospectively outlined that Carter’s foreign policy 
‘reflected this twin commitment to human rights and a strong defense.’41 It was Brzezinski, 
though, that articulated Carter’s ambitions most clearly: 
The public clearly understands that the Carter foreign policy is 
derived from an affirmative commitment to certain basic human 
values…Starting from that moral basis, your basic priorities for our 
foreign policy…are coherent and consistent: (1) we will seek to 
coordinate more closely with our principal allies in order to provide 
the foundation for a more stable international system; (2) we will 
engage in a North-South dialogue in order to deal with wider human 
needs; (3) we will seek accommodation on the East-West front in 
order to avoid war and to widen trans-ideological cooperation. In 
addition, we will seek to halt the spread of arms, both conventional 
and nuclear.42 
 
Carter’s human rights agenda was a sincere undertaking but it also offered additional 
leverage through which to exercise influence against certain foreign powers. Amongst all of 
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the president’s advisers it was Brzezinski that most clearly understood this point. As he 
suggested to the president, the United States was ‘morally justified’ in promoting better 
human rights but it provided ‘American foreign policy additional influence’ because it 
associated ‘America as a society with a vital human concern. Otherwise, America runs the 
risk of being perceived only as a consumption-orientated society, making us the focus both of 
envy and of resentment.’43 Promoting human rights would provide the United States with 
greater international legitimacy which, in turn, would deflect many of the criticisms that U.S. 
foreign policy encountered throughout the Third World. Given the intensification of the Cold 
War into the Third World at this juncture, such considerations were far from insignificant.44  
In a sign of Carter’s determination to promote human rights concerns, the president 
looked at ways in which transgressors could be punished, including the implementation of 
economic embargos and the suspension of arms sales. All of this was a particularly sensitive 
point for Soviet leaders given that they were under the impression that they had a tacit 
understanding with the previous U.S. administration that the internal politics of both the 
United States and Soviet Union were to remain outside of the purview of superpower 
competition. As Anatoly Dobrynin (Soviet ambassador to Washington, 1962–86) recalls, the 
strength of Nixon and Kissinger ‘lay in their ability to approach problems conceptually and 
not be distracted by minor questions or subordinate fragments. The diplomatic game and the 
imperatives of realpolitik appealed to both of them.’ Dobrynin was rather less complimentary 
about Carter’s approach to foreign policy.45 Likewise, Carter’s emphasis on promoting 
international human rights was to impact the Anglo-American relationship. As shown in 
subsequent chapters, this was most clearly felt in regards to the issue of majority rule in 
Rhodesia, the on-going strife in Northern Ireland and in relation to the Soviet Union. Anglo-
American relations were to be profoundly affected by the president’s desire to champion the 
cause of international human rights. 
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Nevertheless, Carter was fully aware of the difficulties that pursuing a human rights 
agenda would generate for his administration. The challenges posed by the need to balance 
human rights considerations with geopolitical calculations created intense inter-departmental 
feuding amongst the president’s closest advisers. As Carter early into his term in office 
complained, the lack of uniformity in U.S. foreign policy presented ‘conflicting positions’ 
that had already ‘hurt us’ with congressional actors and foreign intermediaries.46 From the 
outset of the Carter presidency there was no coherent grand strategy which was to be pursued 
because every facet of U.S. policy was to be individually analysed as to how much emphasis 
would be placed upon human rights considerations. James Schlesinger, who served as 
Carter’s energy secretary and was a former Director of the CIA (1973) and secretary of 
defense (1973-5) was positively scathing about Carter’s supposed naivety in foreign policy. 
As he recollected: ‘on substance [Carter] came, by and large, with some very clear moral 
convictions, and very little understanding of the obstacles represented by the established 
interests—lethargy, inertia, and the like. This was particularly true in international relations. 
Carter’s greatest weakness as a President was in the field of international relations, which he 
approached with a degree of missionary zeal and innocence that was in some sense attractive, 
but was bound to be unsuccessful.’47 Yet, as other influential advisers to the president later 
recounted, they never believed a ‘grand strategy’ could be pursued anyhow. Vance explained 
that it was better to deal with situations on a case by case basis and the concept of a grand 
strategy was ‘baloney.’ Warren Christopher, the deputy secretary of state, likewise claimed 
that the ‘best policy was a non-policy.’ Of course, this contrasts with the ideas advanced by 
Brzezinski who in 1979 would finally convince the president to assume an overarching grand 
strategy as enunciated within the ‘Carter Doctrine.’48 
Carter was also unimpressed with the fashion in which the Nixon and Ford 
administrations had conducted its diplomacy with America’s allies. During his presidential 
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campaign, Carter blamed the Nixon and Ford administrations for the antagonism that had 
afflicted U.S.-European relations in the 1970s.49 Carter’s key policy advisers were as equally 
unimpressed with America’s alliance diplomacy. Brzezinski, for instance, noted in 1970 that 
U.S. policy had led to a position where ‘for Europeans, contemporary America is doubtless a 
less certain protector, a less committed partner.’50 Whether or not U.S.-European problems 
were generated as a result of the style of foreign policy practiced by the Nixon administration 
is largely a moot point. In Carter’s assessment, U.S.-European friction would be lessened by 
the re-energising of summit conferences, personal diplomacy, and increased communication 
and consultation.51  
During his inauguration Carter hinted that America’s alliances would be even more 
important during his presidency when he declared that the United States had ‘recognized 
limits’ and it alone could not ‘answer all questions or solve all problems.’ Ultimately, the 
United States had to foster improved cooperation with its allies if U.S. interests were to be 
promoted.52 In office Carter translated this rhetoric into a firmer strategy and tasked 
Brzezinski with devising the course to take. Carter’s national security adviser duly 
recommended that U.S. policy had to ‘engage Western Europe, Japan and other advanced 
democracies in closer political cooperation through the increasing institutionalisation of 
consultative relationships, and to promote wider macro-economic coordination pointing 
towards a stable and open monetary and trade system.’ It should become the ‘foundation 
stone of U.S. policy’ to establish ‘genuine collaboration with these states’ Brzezinski further 
advised.53 Such advice resonated as Carter sought to galvanise relations with America’s 
European allies. This enthusiasm for alliance cooperation, however, would create just as 
much antagonism as witnessed during the Nixon-Ford years when the European allies had 
supposedly been ignored. It is the Anglo-American dynamic to this process that is examined 
in the subsequent chapters.  
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Callaghan and Thatcher 
On becoming prime minister, James Callaghan followed the long tradition of British Cold 
War prime ministers in seeking to maintain a close relationship with Washington. Much like 
his predecessors, Callaghan believed that this was necessary in order for the United Kingdom 
to sustain its unique security cooperation with Washington and to better influence U.S. 
foreign and international economic policy. Such a strategy had clearly failed during the IMF 
Crisis but Callaghan continued to pursue the Atlanticist policies he had adopted ever since 
being appointed foreign and commonwealth secretary in 1974.54  
Callaghan’s key foreign policy advisers agreed with the general approach that 
retaining strong links with Washington was critically important for the promotion of British 
interests. ‘The U.S. relationship, however one describes it, is the most crucial one for the 
prosperity and security of our country’ was David Owen’s candid assessment. And like 
Callaghan, Owen was to ‘remain a blue-water diplomatist’ and wanted ‘our reach to go out 
from Europe across the oceans of the world.’55 Fred Mulley, as the secretary of state for 
defense, consistently interacted with U.S. policy makers and officials as he discussed the 
update to the British nuclear deterrent and the strategic overhaul of the NATO alliance. Denis 
Healey, as the chancellor of the Exchequer, met frequently with his American counterparts to 
negotiate international monetary and economic reforms.56 
British ambitions of influencing Washington were considered to rest in part upon 
establishing good personal relations with the most important actors within the Carter 
administration. These were indeed quickly established and maintained by the Callaghan 
government.57 Vance, for example, would describe working with David Owen as ‘both 
delightful and stimulating.’58 Owen would reciprocate such assessments, recalling that ‘We 
35 
 
soon developed as close a working partnership and friendship as I suspect existed between a 
U.S. secretary of state and British foreign secretary.’59 As Brzezinski recalled in his memoirs:  
 
President Carter soon established a good working relationship with 
his foreign counterparts. British Prime Minister James Callaghan, for 
example, displayed remarkable skill in cultivating Carter personally. 
In fact, I was amazed how quickly Callaghan succeeded in 
establishing himself as Carter’s favorite, writing him friendly little 
notes, calling, talking like a genial older uncle and lecturing Carter in 
a pleasant manner on the intricacies of inter-allied politics. Callaghan 
literally co-opted Carter in the course of a few relatively brief 
personal encounters.60 
  
Carter’s experience with Thatcher is traditionally viewed as having been less warm.61 As 
shown in chapter 5, the president and prime minister certainly never warmed to one another 
on a personal level; Carter found Thatcher ‘overbearing.’ For Thatcher, Jimmy Carter was 
too indecisive and too liberal for her tastes. As one observer has noted, Carter and Thatcher 
were never ‘kindred spirits.’62 ‘Her relationship with Jimmy Carter, though correct, was not 
close…The two respected one another, but they did not particularly like one another’ 
Thatcher’s official biographer has concluded. It would take the election of Ronald Reagan in 
November 1980 before the British prime minister found a U.S. president disposed of a similar 
world view.63   
But, personal relationships, be they good or difficult, are rarely determinate in 
international affairs. As one former U.S. Ambassador to London noted ‘A good relationship 
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at the top works at the margins of decision-making, not at the centre.’64 As a case in point, 
Thatcher may have agreed with Reagan’s philosophical outlook but this did not prevent 
serious disagreements from occurring.65 Likewise, Jimmy Carter’s visit to Newcastle upon 
Tyne in 1977 was certainly popularly received by the British press but this did not prevent 
British policy makers worrying about how U.S. foreign policy was damaging British interests 
in relation to European security or Rhodesia.66 The Anglo-American relationship is largely 
driven by national interests’ not by good personal relations. Intelligence, nuclear, and wider 
defence cooperation are at the core of the special relationship, and are undertaken and 
sustained because they suit the interests of each power. As Peter [Lord] Carrington – British 
secretary of state for defence, 1970–74 and foreign and commonwealth secretary, 1979–82 – 
bluntly suggested in one recent interview: ‘It’s always been national interests. People like to 
bang on about the special relationship but it’s always interests.’67 Personal relations were 
ultimately subordinated to broader material concerns. And it was how these broader national 
interests were interpreted by each power that largely explains the course of Anglo-American 
relations during the Carter presidency. It is to the first year of Carter’s term in office that we 
now turn.  
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3  
Embracing the special relationship, 1977-78 
A new administration 
The advent of a new U.S. president provokes apprehension in foreign capitals as diplomats 
and foreign leaders hypothesise how the public statements set forth by a candidate in the 
presidential campaign will translate into actual policies once the president-elect assumes 
office. Carter’s election provoked a number of specific concerns for British policy makers of 
which the most troubling aspect had been Carter’s allusion that the United States would 
become involved in the on-going difficulties in Northern Ireland. This constituted a complete 
break from previous presidential rhetoric concerning Northern Ireland and created 
considerable unease in London. Carter’s stern statements about the Soviet Union coupled to 
his promise to promote human rights within America’s relationship with Moscow caused 
further apprehension in British policy making circles.1 Detailed studies of the president-elect 
were thus undertaken but one report supplied by Michael Palliser, the permanent under-
secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, advised Callaghan that there were 
grounds for optimism. As the prime minister was informed in November 1976 following 
Carter’s elections victory, the president-elect was believed to hold the United Kingdom in 
‘special esteem.’2 Quite what this meant in real terms was unclear but the implication was 
that somehow this emotional attachment could be exploited for the promotion of British 
interests.   
Peter Ramsbotham, the British Ambassador to Washington, provided a fuller 
appraisal once Carter had assumed office.3 In his estimation, Carter seemed at ease in his new 
role and was determined to pursue his ambitious foreign policy agenda in spite of his limited 
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experience in foreign affairs. Ramsbotham, however, struck a note of warning, notifying 
London that Carter operated on a ‘short fuse’ and had a level of ‘obstinacy’ about him which 
he found ‘mildly disturbing.’ The British Ambassador provided a more detailed explanation 
of the president’s policy objectives and how this would have a bearing upon British interests. 
As London was subsequently informed in March 1977, Carter had set himself a series of 
ambitious objectives which he would enthusiastically pursue in the opening months of his 
presidency. Amongst these included finding a new SALT agreement with the Soviet Union; 
promoting his international human rights agenda; continuing the Middle East peace talks 
between Egypt and Israel which had begun under the auspices of Henry Kissinger, as well as 
seeking to improve the military posture of the NATO alliance.4 
Carter’s national security team also came under close scrutiny in London. And on this 
front, the British were optimistic. Kissinger’s replacement as secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, 
was received especially well. As the British Ambassador reported to London ‘The president 
has in Vance, Brzezinski and Young-the skilled operator, the ideas man and the idealist-a 
team whose qualities complement each other and should be able to work effectively together 
under Mr Carter’s leadership.’5 In an effort to establish good relations with the president’s 
new national security team, a number of letters congratulating them on their appointments 
were dispatched by the British government.6 All of this reflected Callaghan’s desire to 
galvanise strong personal relations with Washington in order to better influence U.S. policies 
which could affect British interests. Ramsbotham followed the lead set by London and 
arranged to be the first Ambassador to meet with President Carter. Callaghan’s efforts, 
superficially at least, had immediate results as Carter wrote to the prime minister stating that 
he wished to ‘strengthen the ties of friendship between the people of your country and ours.’7  
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Yet beneath this surface cordiality a number of matters remained unresolved and 
continued to cause unease in London. From the British viewpoint there were two key issues. 
The first revolved around how much influence the British could now have upon Washington 
given Britain’s diminished global power.8 The second area of major British concern related to 
Carter’s public declaration to emphasise human rights in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. 
For many in London, Carter’s idea to promote international human rights was considered 
somewhat naive and ultimately dangerous. In particular there was a concern that Carter’s 
determination to advance the cause of human rights in his diplomacy with the Soviet Union 
would cause tenser superpower relations and undermine the prospects of further international 
nuclear arms agreements (which the British ultimately determined to be in their interest). 
Coupled to this, a more confrontational Cold War would threaten British economic and 
commercial interests were it to lead to a restriction on trade with Moscow or result in the 
NATO alliance having to spend more on defence. In sum, the British concluded that Carter’s 
human rights agenda would actually contradict his stated ambition of sustaining superpower 
détente and lead to a far more unstable and dangerous international environment.9  
These doubts about Carter’s foreign policy further encouraged the prime minister in 
his quest to maintain as close a possible relationship with the new president in order to better 
guide the course of U.S. foreign policy. An opportunity for the prime minister to establish 
closer relations with the new Carter administration presented itself in January 1977 when 
Walter Mondale agreed to meet with Callaghan in London.10 British suspicions that the new 
Carter administration would be unwisely idealistic in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy were 
confirmed during the Mondale visit. On discussing Carter’s broad foreign policy objectives, 
the U.S. vice-president emphasised that the ‘realist’ policies of the Nixon-Ford years were a 
thing of the past. No longer would the United States conduct its international affairs solely 
according to the dictates of power politics. Instead, the Carter administration was determined 
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to promote international human rights and its interaction with other states would be 
conditioned by this factor. On the subject of the Soviet Union, Mondale explained that Carter 
would be looking to speedily conclude a strategic arms limitation agreement with the 
Vladivostok agreement that had been struck in 1974 under President Ford being utilised as 
the basis for the new Treaty. From here the United States would look to push ahead with a far 
more wide-ranging agreement with the Soviet Union.11 
On the subject of NATO, Mondale spelled out that the president wanted the British to 
support his plans for increasing NATO’s defence expenditure to better face the growing 
superiority of the Warsaw Pact’s conventional forces. However, the vice-president sounded a 
note of warning when he told his hosts that Washington would only increase its own levels of 
defence expenditure if other members of the alliance did likewise. On bilateral matters, 
Mondale brought with him the news that the Carter administration would maintain existing 
defence and security cooperation with the United Kingdom.12 
Mondale’s confirmation that bilateral security cooperation would be maintained under 
the Carter administration calmed anxieties in London. The main reason as to why Callaghan 
had agreed to meet with Mondale in the first instance was to obtain official confirmation that 
existing Anglo-American security cooperation would be maintained by the Carter 
administration. At the conclusion of the Mondale meeting this notable British objective had 
been achieved. However, the meeting also confirmed many of the fears that British policy 
makers held about Carter’s international policy with regards to U.S.-Soviet relations and the 
promotion of human rights. Perhaps more concerning was Mondale’s insistence that Carter’s 
efforts to improve NATO would require additional resources from all members of the 
alliance. Given the recent difficulties with the British economy, such demands were naturally 
enough met with a lukewarm response.  
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Aside an unfortunate report in the press, the Mondale meeting was of significance 
because it confirmed to the British government that Carter’s foreign policy approach would 
differentiate from that of his predecessor in some quite important ways.13 First, Mondale 
confirmed that Carter had begun to raise human rights concerns with the Soviet leadership 
and would continue to do so in the months ahead. In the weeks that followed, Mondale would 
prove true to his word as both Carter and Vance gave lengthy speeches that emphasised the 
importance to which the United States attached to the promotion of international human 
rights. In March 1977, for example, before the UN General Assembly Carter placed the 
promotion of improved human rights at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy ambitions and 
advocated that the UN’s Human Rights Commission should take a far more robust approach 
to improving international human rights. As the president argued ‘Strengthened international 
machinery will help us to close the gap between the promise and performance in protecting 
human rights.’ Vance would further emphasise the message a month letter in a lengthy 
address before the Law School at the University of Georgia.14 Even if the reality of U.S. 
foreign policy under Carter fell short of these idealised declarations the fact that these 
statements were made forced other states, London included, to engage in the discourse of 
human rights promotion. As a case in point, David Owen issued a statement endorsing the 
Carter administration’s stance on promoting international human rights even though in 
private British reservations about the wisdom of this course persisted.15 
Coupled to this, it also became clear from the Mondale meeting that the Carter 
administration remained committed to improving NATO’s force posture and would look to 
convince the alliance to provide the necessary additional funding to achieve this. Once again 
the president went on the public offensive and gave a number of speeches whereby he 
emphasised his determination to improve the force posture of the NATO alliance to 
counterbalance the Soviet Union’s increasing military strength.16 London concluded that the 
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Carter administration was implementing its own distinctive foreign policy that coupled 
together traditional security concerns with the promotion of idealistic objectives. The first 
meeting between Carter and Callaghan in March 1977 would provide an opportunity for the 
prime minister to galvanise his relationship with the president and better appreciate Carter’s 
foreign policy intentions. 17 
Callaghan in Washington 
Callaghan attached enormous significance to his visit to Washington for he believed it 
afforded him the chance to better understand Carter’s foreign policy ambitions and duly 
influence them in ways more amenable to British interests. The meeting would also provide 
Callaghan the opportunity to discuss a number of outstanding bilateral matters such as on-
going intelligence and nuclear cooperation, Anglo-American cooperation with regards to the 
situation in Southern Africa, the proposed improvements to NATO’s force posture, U.S. 
SALT II objectives, and U.S. trade proposals.18 
Callaghan arrived in Washington on 9 March 1977 and held a meeting with the press 
before proceeding to Blair House to convene discussions with Carter’s national security 
adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. Southern Africa, reforming NATO’s defense posture, and 
ensuring the continuation of superpower détente, were all areas that Brzezinski suggested 
would benefit from increased Anglo-American cooperation. It appeared as if Brzezinski was 
proposing the types of cooperation that Callaghan sought with Washington.19 Such positivity 
was, however, rather short lived. On meeting Harold Brown, the U.S. defense secretary, 
complaints about Britain’s lack of military spending surfaced. Brown suggested that Britain 
needed to reverse the policy trend of the past two decades and make an increased 
commitment to the NATO alliance. Callaghan took unkindly to such pressure and responded 
with the now almost standard British retort that the British government spent more on 
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defence as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than the other key members of the 
NATO alliance, America included.20   
From here, the discussion moved on to the on-going U.S.-Soviet negotiations over the 
contents of the proposed SALT II agreement. Callaghan raised the issue of a No Transfer 
agreement being struck between the two superpowers and warned that such a condition could 
have ramifications for the continuation of Anglo-American nuclear cooperation. As the prime 
minister further cautioned, a No Transfer agreement could complicate the process of updating 
Britain’s strategic nuclear deterrent and could well lead to the British government having to 
find additional funding for the already spiralling costs involved in the Polaris improvement 
project. Subtly, the British prime minister was suggesting that without U.S. support for 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent, there was little probability that the United Kingdom would 
increase its spending upon conventional forces which Washington desired. In spite of 
Callaghan pressing the issue, Brown spoke only in the most general of terms and refused to 
offer any assurances about a No Transfer agreement. This was not necessarily a sleight upon 
the special relationship. In large part, Brown’s refusal to enter into more detailed discussion 
reflected the fact that the Carter administration remained undecided as to what they would 
agree to in a SALT II Treaty. Nevertheless, Callaghan was left only with a platitude that the 
U.S. government would keep the British informed of any developments.21 
The next day Callaghan met with the president in the Oval Office. None of the 
disagreements evident during the previous day’s talks surfaced in this forum. Thus, in a 
similar fashion to statements made by Brzezinski, Carter emphasised how he believed that 
Anglo-American cooperation would be necessary for tackling a number of international 
problems of mutual concern. Whilst matters related to the on-going SALT discussions 
provoked slight disagreement between the two sides, Carter was prepared to announce at the 
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end of the discussions that the United Kingdom was one of the ‘closest friends and allies’ of 
the United States.22 
Such rhetoric has encouraged commentators to conclude that Callaghan had managed 
by the end of his Washington talks to have ‘established an ease of communication and a 
surface cordiality’ with the new president.23 Contemporaries shared a similar assessment. 
Peter Ramsbotham declared Callaghan’s visit to have been ‘an outstanding success.’24 
Certainly this was the impression that the Carter administration was keen to foster with their 
British counterparts. As Brzezinski insisted in discussion with British officials, ‘The 
president really meant it (that a special relationship existed) [and] he was not saying it to 
please…Mr Carter regarded our relationship as historical and visceral.’ Brzezinski himself 
‘even felt it a little.’ As such, when ‘Britons and Americans got together there was no need 
for preliminaries, they could discuss any problem without hang ups.’25 
Whilst the talks may have been deemed a success a number of outstanding matters 
remained which were likely to lead to Anglo-American difficulties in the future. With regards 
to matters that could be classed of secondary importance, such as the landing rights of 
Concorde at U.S. airports or U.S.-EEC trade issues, little headway had been achieved during 
the discussions.26 On matters believed to be of supreme importance to British policy makers, 
such as the subject of nuclear weapons technology and testing, Carter’s policy direction 
remained unclear and this generated considerable uneasiness in British circles. For example, 
during the Carter-Callaghan meeting the president had hinted that he was prepared to sign a 
Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) agreement with the Soviet Union which would obligate all 
signatories to cease the testing of nuclear weapons for a specified period of time. Whilst this 
was not something that Callaghan would necessarily oppose, a ban on nuclear weapons 
testing would have ramifications for the British government’s own on-going programme to 
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improve the British strategic nuclear deterrent. As Callaghan made clear to Carter, the British 
were ‘utterly dependent’ on the United States for testing their own nuclear weapons.27 In 
response, Carter had only offered to discuss the matter in more detail and was unwilling to 
provide the British with any firm details as to what the U.S. would agree to in a CTB treaty. 
The president’s enthusiasm for reducing the number of nuclear weapons was proving to be an 
added complication to the British government’s already problematic upgrade to Polaris.   
The discussion with Harold Brown also highlighted that the U.S. Department of 
Defense would continue to exert its institutional pressure against the British government to 
encourage it to increase its defence spending. This was important because Carter had made it 
known that any further American improvements to NATO’s force posture were dependent 
upon similar commitments being undertaken by the rest of the alliance. Moreover, the U.S. 
Department of Defense was vitally important with regards to continuing to support the United 
Kingdom’s strategic nuclear deterrent. As recently demonstrated during the Nixon-Ford 
years, the U.S. Department of Defense was willing to allow this relationship to be utilised as 
political leverage against the British government in order to attain other U.S. policy 
objectives with London. Policy makers in London had thus recently experienced just how 
detrimental that falling afoul of the White House could be for Britain’s interests. Though the 
Anglo-American nuclear relationship was not a one-way street it was imbalanced in that it 
left the UK dependent on U.S. goodwill for continuing to support its nuclear programme. 
Callaghan’s discussion with both Carter and Brown simply reminded the prime minister of 
this fact.28    
Callaghan’s meeting with Carter was far from the overriding success that British 
officials at the time convinced themselves it had been. Of course a personal rapport between 
Carter and Callaghan had been established which both London and Washington would look 
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to exploit over the course of Carter’s presidency. Both Carter and Brzezinski had alluded to 
utilising the Anglo-American relationship for solving common problems in a way that had 
largely been absence during the Nixon-Ford years. However, such statements are easily made 
and whilst the president had spoken of closer Anglo-American cooperation, he had crucially 
been unable to explain how this would work in practice. The real litmus test for the 
relationship would be how unresolved issues would be dealt with in the coming months.    
Burden Sharing and Nuclear weapons 
Cyrus Vance informed the British government that one of Carter’s priorities on assuming 
office would be to improve NATO’s force posture because the alliance was not getting ‘value 
for money.’29 Soon after taking office, Carter began the process of re-assessing current 
American military commitments. This resulted in a lengthy memorandum titled PRM-NSC 
10.30 PRM-NSC 10 concluded that NATO’s conventional force posture had to be improved 
as currently there was little chance of ‘conflict termination’ being achieved on favourable 
terms. More simply put, the United States could not fight a conventional war with the Soviet 
Union and expect to hold back eastern bloc forces for any reasonable length of time without 
having to resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Significant improvements to NATO’s 
conventional force posture were therefore required to rectify this dangerous military-strategic 
imbalance. Whilst all of the major protagonists within the Carter administration agreed that 
improvements to NATO were required, there was no consensus as to how this should be 
accomplished. Essentially the debate within the Carter administration surrounded the 
emphasis that should be given to building up conventional and tactical nuclear forces within 
the NATO alliance.31 Following internal debate within Washington, Carter brought the 
subject into the public domain during a speech before NATO delegates in May 1977. It was 
here that the president called for all NATO members to increase their existing defence 
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budgets by a minimum of 3% per annum. Later in the month, Carter spoke at the University 
of Notre Dame and repeated his call for NATO members to increase their defence 
expenditure.32 
Carter’s call for a 3% increase in defence expenditure was not some arbitrary figure 
which he hoped NATO would agree to. In the opinion of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General George Brown, members needed to increase their defence expenditure by at 
least 3% to ensure NATO could uphold its ‘territorial integrity’ without having to resort to 
nuclear weapons almost immediately in a war with the Soviet Union. Brown and Brzezinski 
concurred with this thinking. Vance, whilst far more sceptical as to whether NATO’s military 
position in relation to the Soviet Union was as unfavourable as others suggested, agreed that 
defence expenditure had to be increased by all members of the alliance. A Presidential 
Directive was therefore issued in August 1977 explaining that it was now official U.S. policy 
to encourage all members of NATO to provide additional resources to the alliance.33 But it 
was evident from the outset of this initiative that senior members of the administration, 
including the president himself, doubted whether this agenda would be realisable. As Carter 
lamented in his diary, the European members of NATO were economically weak and ‘can’t 
do much.’34 Events would demonstrate that Carter was too pessimistic as the alliance would 
eventually agree to these American proposals. Obtaining this agreement, however, required 
lengthy and often antagonistic diplomacy within the alliance. 
During his meeting with Callaghan in March 1977, Carter emphasised that he would 
be looking for British support in bringing about improvements to NATO’s force posture.35 
Carter’s proposal was met with a lukewarm response by the Callaghan government as 
lingering doubts, which centred on political and economic factors, existed about the 
desirability of supporting Carter’s proposals. As Ramsbotham warned, the president was 
investing serious political capital in overhauling the NATO alliance and expected the British 
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government to ‘deliver’ the support of the European members of NATO. This was 
problematic. The Treasury was less than pleased by the prospect of having to sanction 
additional defence expenditure when it considered existing spending to be disproportionally 
too high as a part of overall British public expenditure.36 Even more importantly, the Carter 
administration exaggerated the degree of influence that London had with its European allies 
and its consequent expectations of Britain were too high. For his part, Callaghan was only too 
well aware of his constraints and of the dangers of failing to deliver upon Britain’s long-
standing claim to be an Atlantic intermediary. In March 1977 he remarked ‘I am not sure we 
can deliver anything for them. I am worried that they will be disappointed.’37 If Washington 
reached the conclusion that Callaghan could not ‘deliver’ then British ambitions of decisively 
influencing U.S. policy would be significantly undermined.  
At the same time, Callaghan recognised that Carter had afforded him an opportunity 
to resolve common challenges of interest. The task then was to convince Britain’s European 
allies to support the president’s proposals, including the controversial issue of improving 
NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons. It was the development of the Enhanced Radiation 
Warhead (ERW) and whether it would be deployed within the NATO arsenal that became an 
enormous source of inter-allied disagreement throughout 1977-9 before the eventual Dual 
Track agreement was reached in September 1979. The ERW was being considered for 
development because military experts argued that it offered the most cost effective way to 
counter the Soviet Union’s conventional and theatre nuclear force superiority in Europe. In 
particular, the Soviet modernisation programme of its intermediate range ballistic missiles 
(IRBMs) demonstrated the Soviet Union’s growing military capabilities.38 
ERWs therefore had a number of benefits in terms of financial and military efficiency. 
First, in terms of cost, it was far cheaper to purchase ERW’s then the equivalent number of 
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conventional forces required to balance the Warsaw Pact’s enormous advantage in armoured 
vehicles, especially heavy and medium sized battlefield tanks. In terms of military efficiency, 
ERWs were ideally suited to destroying large quantities of battlefield tanks without inflicting 
the massive explosive damage that would result from the use of other forms of nuclear 
weapons. As was surmised in one briefing paper for the president: ‘in battlefield use, [ERWs] 
would allow a desired kill radius against military personnel with less undesirable physical 
destruction than standard nuclear warheads.’39   
The Soviet Union’s development of the SS-20 IRBM further compounded the 
problem for the Carter administration. Following the U.S.-Soviet summit at Vladivostok in 
November 1974, guidelines for a SALT II agreement had been reached. This agreement had 
crucially omitted to include American nuclear capable aircraft or short ranged missiles based 
within Europe. There had also been no agreement that prevented either superpower from 
modernising their respective IRBM systems. The Soviet Union’s decision to modernise their 
IRBM’s and nuclear capable bomber aircraft did not therefore contravene any arms limitation 
agreements reached with the United States. Yet, Soviet improvements alarmed observers in 
Washington and London. Attracting the attention of NATO’s intelligence and military 
observers were the RSD-10 Pioneer IRBM and the Tupolev Tu-22M strategic bomber which 
assumed the respective monikers in NATO circles of the SS-20 Saber and the Backfire 
Bomber. The SS-20 was first tested in September 1975, and following further trials, began to 
be deployed throughout Eastern Europe in March 1976. It was at this point that American and 
British analysts started to become seriously interested in the SS-20 for it provided the Soviet 
Union with much improved nuclear targeting accuracy and hence destructive capability. 
Furthermore, the SS-20 would carry 3 nuclear warheads as opposed to a single warhead 
carried by existing Soviet IRBMs.40  
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Why then was the ERW to prove so controversial? Central to the ERW debate was the 
fact that the Carter administration was reluctant to approve its production unless other 
members of the NATO alliance would agree to have ERWs deployed on their territory. This 
made sense on a tactical level given ERWs were designed to destroy Soviet tank columns 
which would be moving across mainland Europe in the event that the Cold War turned hot. 
For European governments, however, the prospect of allowing ERWs on their territory was 
domestically a politically unpopular course given that sensationalist newspaper coverage 
presented the ERW (or the ‘Neutron Bomb’ as it was termed) as a weapon which would kill 
people but leave buildings standing. It was, as the critics would have it, the ultimate capitalist 
weapon in that it would destroy people but protect material goods. Moreover, ERWs were 
interpreted by some as a signal that the West was prepared to ratchet up the nuclear arms 
race, abandon détente, and return to a more confrontational relationship with Moscow.41 
Furthermore, as the British government well understood, opposition to ERWs in European 
circles reflected the traditional European (and for that matter British) aversion to planning 
and preparing to fight a ‘tactical’ nuclear war. ERWs were designated as a tactical nuclear 
weapon which the critics of such weapons suggested only encouraged the fallacy that a 
nuclear war could be fought and won.42 
For the Carter administration, the ERW also grew into a troublesome domestic 
problem as Carter had run for the presidency on a nuclear arms reduction platform. Ordering 
the development and deployment of the ERW would contradict this and undermine his 
political base within the Democratic Party. As Carter appreciated, his entire foreign policy 
agenda, including SALT II, peace talks in the Middle East, the normalisation of relations with 
the People’s Republic of China and a treaty with Panama to resolve access to the Panama 
Canal, could only be successfully accomplished with Congressional support. Sparking a 
confrontation with Congress over the ERW would potentially undermine Carter’s broader 
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foreign policy ambitions. At the very least then, Carter had to handle Congressional actors 
carefully and he consequently went to great lengths to explain his priorities to Congressman 
in order to win their support.43  
Throughout the summer of 1977 the president weighed up the arguments for the 
production and deployment of ERW. Whilst remaining undecided on the issue of 
deployment, the president requested that Congressional funding be approved for the 
production of ERW.44 Carter, however, made it known that whilst he was ensuring that the 
ERW could be funded he had not actually approved its production at this juncture. Regardless 
of whether or not the go-ahead for ERW would be given, Carter first required confirmation 
from the European allies of NATO that they would actually accept the deployment of ERWs 
on their territory.45 Only once this approval had been provided would the president authorise 
production of the ERW. Gaining such approval would be no easy task given the growing 
domestic opposition within European countries against ERWs.46 Indeed, little enthusiasm for 
the ERW existed within European policy making circles. In Brzezinski’s assessment the 
European members of NATO simply wished to ‘duck the issue’ of how to tackle the growing 
imbalance in conventional and nuclear forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.47  
Sterner U.S. diplomacy within the NATO alliance was required if European support 
for the ERW was to be obtained. Vance encouraged the president to take such action and 
advised that ‘We believe that the Europeans, if pressured by us, would accept a presidential 
decision to develop the weapon, but would breathe easier if you should cancel.’48 And it was 
the Anglo-American relationship that was seen by the Carter administration as one useful 
avenue for encouraging NATO to accept the deployment of ERWs. Consequently, the Carter 
administration envisaged utilising the British government as a stalking horse with West 
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Germany and other European members of NATO as a means of encouraging them to accept 
the deployment of ERWs.49  
American thinking was misplaced for it crucially neglected that London was also 
unenthusiastic about the deployment of ERWs. Indeed, the Callaghan government shared 
many of the reservations about ERWs that their European neighbours did.50 As the British 
concluded, ERWs would increase the probability of U.S. military planners believing in the 
absurdity that a tactical nuclear war could be fought. Quite simply, the British government 
did not believe a war which involved tactical nuclear weapons could ever remain limited and 
would in fact quickly escalate to strategic nuclear war which would likely obliterate the 
British Isles. In addition, domestic political calculations were influencing London’s thinking. 
For the prime minister, the possibility of the ERW being deployed in Britain would likely 
cause serious problems within the Labour Party and with his unofficial coalition partners in 
the Liberal Party. The left of the Labour Party, which had traditionally been sceptical about 
the merits of nuclear weapons, was asserting its influence, as evidenced by the rise of the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).51 While Callaghan had been able to 
compartmentalise other aspects of Britain’s nuclear programme, the acceptance of ERWs on 
British sovereign territory would require a public statement acknowledging their deployment, 
not least because such a deployment could not be hidden from interested parties in the media 
and CND. Accepting ERWs would thus likely generate enormous political difficulties which 
the prime minister would rather avoid.52 
The British remained apprehensive about the possible deployment of the ERW and 
looked to avoid having to give any decision to Washington. British policy makers concluded 
that the preferable solution was to simply play for time which they hoped would kick the 
whole question of ERW deployment into the proverbial long grass.53 As such, when 
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Brzezinski sought to win support for the deployment of the ERW from the British 
government he found British officials would provide only non-committal statements and raise 
numerous technical questions and queries about U.S. nuclear strategy and intentions. On 
discussing the matter with other European members of NATO a similar response was to be 
found.54  
These on-going negotiations within the NATO alliance encouraged the Carter 
administration to reassess its position on the ERW. Even though the U.S. had been unable to 
get NATO to approve the deployment of ERWs, on 16 November 1977, the president gave 
his approval that funding for the production of the ERW should be made available. A final 
decision on deploying the ERW was still to be taken.55 At the heart of the ERW controversy 
lay competing ideas about nuclear strategy the nature of nuclear deterrence and the feasibility 
of nuclear war fighting. The subject also importantly highlighted how the Anglo-American 
relationship did not necessarily work in the fashion that Washington wanted. London 
throughout this episode resisted American pressure. Interestingly, Callaghan was on the verge 
of deciding to side with his European allies in opposition to U.S. wishes even though it risked 
antagonising opinion in Washington. Interests and not sentiment dictated the course of British 
foreign policy. Yet London’s decision to procrastinate would only succeed for so long. Soon 
Washington would demand a decision from London and Callaghan would have to give an 
answer to the ERW question one way or the other. Callaghan’s decision to play for time had 
won him a temporary reprieve and had been a tactical triumph. Ultimately, however, the 
question remained to be answered.   
Increasing defence expenditure  
As highlighted above, Carter had requested that the members of the NATO alliance should 
increase their defence expenditure by 3% per annum. Extensive deliberation amongst British 
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policy makers and officials in London therefore began. Whilst not unsympathetic to these 
suggestions, a divergence in opinion within London’s policy making bureaucracy existed.56 
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) given that they had been calling for improvements to NATO 
throughout the 1970s, greeted Carter’s proposals positively. The critical point, however, was 
being able to finance these NATO improvements, and, as the MOD itself acknowledged, and 
the Treasury was keen to emphasise, pursing such a course would place a ‘significant’ extra 
strain upon the British economy. Such a scenario was hardly welcome given that all British 
ministers well remembered the economic difficulties that the United Kingdom had 
experienced in 1976. The economic forecasts for the immediate future hardly emboldened the 
Treasury to engage in additional spending either. Accordingly, when Fred Mulley wrote to 
his American counterpart Harold Brown in May 1977 he rebuffed the American request to 
undertake additional defence expenditure.57  
 Carter’s proposals also sparked strategic concerns in London that the president was 
somehow intending to chart a more isolationist course in foreign policy that would result in 
the United Kingdom being strategically exposed in defending its interests against what was 
perceived as the existential threat posed by Soviet Communism. A lingering suspicion existed 
in British circles that the United States was looking for the European members of NATO to 
assume a greater share of the military burden in order for the United States to reduce its own 
commitments. Perhaps then, Carter’s suggestions were part of a broader American plan to 
retreat from the global stage and make local actors assume a far greater burden in providing 
for their own security.58  
British officials substantiated such thinking by pointing to Carter’s rhetoric about 
seeking to significantly reduce the size of existing nuclear arsenals; the president’s decision 
to cutback a number of strategic assets from the U.S. defence budget (The B-1 strategic 
bomber was publicly cancelled in June 1977); the president’s decision to substantially reduce 
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the U.S. navy’s expenditure, and the growing impression emanating from the United States 
that Carter was somehow a ‘weak’ president that could not stand up to the Soviet Union.59 In 
the face of the American public’s growing apathy with foreign engagements following the 
debacle of the Vietnam War, there was a sense in British circles that the United States might 
critically reduce its European security commitments. The perennial fear of the British 
government that the United States could lurch back into isolationism and leave the United 
Kingdom alone to face foreign enemies resurfaced at this point.60 
British assessments misjudged the Carter’s administration’s intentions towards NATO 
and European security more broadly. Requesting that all members of the NATO alliance 
provide additional resources was not an attempt by the Carter administration to lessen 
America’s own commitments. Rather, the president was determined to avoid the scenario 
whereby the United States would unilaterally assume a greater burden of the alliance’s 
military commitments. Carter was encouraging burden sharing so as to distribute the 
economic consequences of increased defence expenditure more equitably throughout the 
alliance. Second, Carter believed that these force improvements were essential to sustain the 
strategic status quo vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. As had been outlined 
earlier in the administration, U.S. policy sought to assure an ‘overall balance of military 
power between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its 
allies on the other at least as favourable as that that now exists.’61 The president was not 
intending to retreat from America’s international obligations and security commitments. 
What Carter sought was a greater effort from America’s allies in upholding these shared 
security interests.     
Carter’s problem was largely a communication one in that he was unable to articulate 
this policy clearly and convincingly to his allies. As a case in point, the British had been less 
56 
 
than warm to the American proposals and a similar lack of enthusiasm was encountered when 
U.S. officials met with their other NATO counterparts. The response of the Federal Republic 
of Germany was particularly cool which caused enormous irritation in Washington. Private 
diplomacy was achieving little from the American perspective so the president again went on 
the public offensive.62 In an address in August 1977 Carter urged all member states of NATO 
to increase their defence expenditure by 3% per annum. Once again the response fell short of 
American desires but subtle shifts in the positions of London and Bonn now developed. 
Agreeing that President Carter would continue to push for NATO reforms to the point that a 
serious diplomatic disagreement would develop, Callaghan and Schmidt agreed bilaterally 
that they would both increase their defence expenditure by the 3% per annum through 1979-
85 requested of them.63 In the end, Callaghan prioritized longer-term strategic cooperation 
with the United States over any short term economic or domestic political benefits he would 
derive from not increasing the defence budget. Persistent U.S. pressure had paid dividends in 
the end. 
SALT II and British fears 
On campaigning for office, Carter had spoken boldly about wishing to re-energise the stalling 
SALT II negotiations. Once in power, Carter gave further public emphasis to his desire to see 
strategic nuclear arsenals reduced. Walter Mondale even informed one French official that 
Carter wanted to reduce the number of nuclear weapons ‘to zero.’64 The president’s 
commitment to substantial reductions in nuclear arms was sincerely held as he proposed to 
Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, that the United States and Soviet 
Union should reduce their stockpiles to 1000 ICBMs equipped with 1 warhead a piece.65 To 
put this into context, in 1977 it was estimated that each superpower owned in the region of 
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2000-2400 ICBMs, with the Soviet Union possessing some 5000 warheads. The United 
States was estimated to have somewhere in the region of 9000-10,000 warheads.66  
Given Carter’s appetite for a SALT II agreement he ordered a detailed study of U.S. 
nuclear policy to be drawn up soon after entering office. In the interim, Carter wrote to the 
Soviet premier, Leonid Brezhnev, suggesting that the Vladivostok agreements struck in 1974 
with the Ford administration would be the basis of the SALT II agreements. Carter hoped that 
this could be settled speedily and then further progress on arms limitations could begin in the 
context of a SALT III negotiation. However, Carter’s agenda became rather more ambitious 
and he sought more aggressive reduction targets in a SALT II agreement than had originally 
been agreed to at Vladivostok. On 23 March 1977 Carter thus issued a presidential directive 
outlining that the United States would seek ‘a comprehensive agreement based on reductions 
to a level of about 2000 [ICBMs] and [a] resolution of the Backfire and cruise missile 
issues.’67  
In London, such directives were observed closely because any SALT II agreement 
had the potential to have negative consequences for the maintenance of Britain’s strategic 
nuclear deterrent. Uppermost in British thoughts was the idea that the United States would 
agree to a No Transfer provision in a SALT II agreement. Such fears were premised upon 
Soviet public declarations that made Moscow’s agreement to a SALT II treaty contingent 
upon inclusion of a No Transfer provision. Yet, at the same time, British policy makers were 
supportive of Carter’s overall effort to reduce the level of nuclear armaments as long as this 
was achieved via a multilateral agreement and in a fashion which maintained the credibility 
of strategic nuclear deterrence. As such, British policy makers looked for reassurances from 
the Carter administration that any SALT II agreement would not affect the Anglo-American 
nuclear relationship. London was subsequently informed that the Carter administration would 
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not enter into any nuclear agreements which would prevent the maintenance of the Anglo-
American nuclear relationship. Yet such assurances failed to calm British anxieties as 
Carter’s decision to accept a non-circumvention clause in a SALT II Treaty raised 
considerable apprehension in London that the Carter administration would agree with the 
Soviet Union to stop selling nuclear weapons to third parties.68  
London maintained public support for Carter’s SALT II policies but in private British 
fears became more pronounced.69 Whilst not fundamentally opposed to a non-circumvention 
agreement, the British government wanted the United States to spell out clearly what this did 
and did not involve in real terms. John Hunt, the British cabinet secretary, suggested that 
British concerns could be placated by the United States agreeing to a clause which 
specifically stated it would not circumvent the agreements of SALT II rather than signing up 
to a general ‘non-circumvention’ agreement. This, as Hunt reasoned, would safeguard any 
future exchange of nuclear weapons between London and Washington.70 Whilst appreciating 
the British predicament, ultimately the Carter administration remained unconvinced that 
British concerns were justified. As Washington viewed matters, the provisions of the Mutual 
Defense Agreement of 1958 and the Polaris Sales Agreement of 1963 safeguarded Anglo-
American nuclear cooperation. British fears that SALT II would destroy the Anglo-American 
nuclear relationship were misguided and exaggerated.71 ‘There was no question of our 
accepting a no transfer provision’ Vance would retrospectively argue.72  
Perhaps so but London remained ever cautious that Carter’s nuclear diplomacy would 
crucially undermine the Anglo-American nuclear relationship. Whilst Callaghan was always 
careful to publically endorse Carter’s SALT II efforts, in private he remained concerned that 
superpower diplomacy would hurt British interests.73 Reassurances about U.S. policy were 
again sought from Brzezinski and his staff on the National Security Council. Again, the 
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Carter administration assured the British government that a SALT II Treaty would not 
infringe upon the Anglo-American nuclear relationship. Such reassurances did at least 
convince Peter Jay, the recently appointed Ambassador to Washington, that the Carter 
administration was being forthright in its consultations with the British.74 Nevertheless, when 
the British Ambassador informed London in October 1977 that ‘there is no significant danger 
of the U.S. selling us down the river in SALT II’ it did little to quell apprehensions back in 
London.75 Quelling London’s suspicions about U.S nuclear policy would prove to be one 
objective that the Carter administration would never quite accomplish.  
Human Rights and U.S. foreign policy 
Carter’s decision to place additional emphasis upon the promotion of international human 
rights was to have profound consequences for the Anglo-American relationship. For London, 
Carter’s new approach created two key challenges. First, as one paper provided to David 
Owen noted, Carter possessed an ‘almost evangelical sense of international morality’ which 
was problematic in the sense it could lead to the Carter administration pressurising the United 
Kingdom to ‘adopt a morality based foreign policy which would not accord with either our 
political or economic interests.’76 Callaghan articulated his concern candidly when he told 
Bernard Donoughue (the prime minister’s senior policy adviser) that he was ‘afraid the 
president was in daily communication with God’ and that this would lead to Carter pursuing 
an unrealistic foreign policy.77 Such concerns about the president’s foreign policy gained 
strength throughout British policy making circles and became a key area of concern for 
officials within both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Treasury. Second, British 
officials feared that Carter’s human rights agenda would encourage the president to become 
embroiled in events in Northern Ireland as these were coming under closer scrutiny by human 
rights activists.78 
60 
 
On the subject of economics, international trade was extremely important for the 
British economy and a not insignificant proportion of this was conducted with regimes that 
Washington now considered to be human rights abusers. In the estimation of British officials, 
if the United States sought to implement global trade restrictions against certain regimes 
(probably through some sort of United Nations sponsored sanctions) such restrictions would 
significantly harm British economic interests.79 In addition, wider political and security 
concerns about the U.S. pursuing a human rights agenda, especially in relation to the Soviet 
Union, abounded. British officials concluded that if the U.S. decided to pursue its human 
rights concerns directly with the Soviet Union this would result in Moscow taking a less 
cooperative attitude in areas deemed to be of vital significance to British interests, such as a 
SALT II treaty, a Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) agreement or a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban treaty. All told, whilst the British government had never been particularly 
enamoured with superpower détente, they preferred it to continual superpower confrontation 
and crisis which they believed Carter’s championing of human rights with Moscow would 
likely lead to.80  
British officials articulated these concerns to Washington and encouraged the Carter 
administration to temper their human rights agenda, especially vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. 
British arguments were met with little sympathy in Washington. As Brzezinski made plain to 
British officials in September 1977, President Carter was not obsessed with the ‘balance of 
power’ and would continue to promote human rights issues with the Soviet government. This 
was something which the president fundamentally believed in and he would continue to do 
this regardless of whether Moscow appreciated it or not.81 Vance, Warren Christopher 
(deputy U.S. secretary of state) and Marshall Shulman (Vance’s special adviser on Soviet 
affairs) all reaffirmed this line, telling London that the Carter administration would publically 
speak out about on-going Soviet human rights abuses and press their concerns during 
61 
 
bilateral engagements with Soviet officials. More disquieting yet from London’s perspective 
was that the Carter administration appeared to reject British arguments that other areas of 
U.S.-Soviet relations which had a bearing on British interests, such as the SALT II 
negotiations, would be more difficult to conclude if Washington continued to lambast 
Moscow’s approach to human rights. In essence, the Carter administration was rejecting the 
very notion that U.S.-Soviet relations were as interlinked as the Nixon-Ford administrations 
had insisted that they were.82 
Back in London, U.S. arguments were met with concern by British policy makers 
because they rejected the idea that the Carter administration could vehemently criticise the 
Soviet Union’s human rights record without this having some type of negative repercussion 
upon other areas of U.S.-Soviet diplomacy. The failure of the two superpowers at the March 
1977 Moscow summit to reach agreement on a SALT II treaty appeared to endorse British 
thinking.83 Though Vance informed the British that Brezhnev had made a ‘strong’ statement 
condoning the president’s rhetoric on Soviet human rights policy, the U.S. secretary of state 
denied that this explained the motivation behind Soviet intransigence. Instead, it was the 
sheer level of cuts proposed by the United States to existing nuclear stockpiles that had 
frightened the Soviet leadership and accounted for the failure to find agreement. British 
policy makers were unconvinced by Vance’s argument and as one influential official within 
the Foreign Office reasoned: ‘The explanation of why the Russians should have rejected the 
American proposals in such outright terms may to some extent lie in their general 
dissatisfaction with President Carter’s handling of U.S.-Soviet relations. They have, of 
course, been stung by the president’s human rights policies and perhaps saw the two SALT 
options presented to them as a further example of pressure tactics by the president.’84 
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This was an early setback for the Carter administration and in some ways it acted as 
an example that linkage in U.S.-Soviet relations was a reality. As one historian has justifiably 
concluded, ‘Incredible as it may seem Carter believed that he could condemn the lack of 
personal freedom in the USSR without at the same time hurting U.S.-Soviet relations. The 
reasoning behind this rather naïve expectation was that, as long as his administration denied 
that there was any linkage between Soviet human rights abuses and other policy matters, no 
damage would occur.’85 Linkage was evidently a fact of superpower relations. Certainly this 
was the impression that Soviet officials liked to convey to their U.S. counterparts at the time. 
And as Jonathan Haslam has shown, this was certainly the opinion that the Soviet leadership 
sincerely held at this juncture.86 Linkage was a reality whether Carter would accept it or not.  
In spite of their denials to their allies, key actors within the Carter administration 
privately accepted that the failure of the recent Moscow summit could largely be attributed to 
Carter’s decision to emphasise Soviet human rights abuses. Lengthy discussions in 
Washington now took place about how to rectify the continuing deterioration in U.S.-Soviet 
relations. It was now suggested that tempering U.S. criticisms of Soviet human rights abuses 
would assist in improving relations. Privately, Brzezinski started to refer to ‘linkages’ 
between various aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations which needed to be accounted for when 
dealing with Moscow. As Brzezinski advised the president, ‘we must orchestrate our efforts 
so they will be mutually reinforcing and not mutually contradictory.’87  
Yet, though Carter recognised that raising human rights concerns with the Soviet 
Union had compromised the chances of a speedy SALT II resolution, the president did not 
suddenly quiet down his rhetoric. Rather, quite the opposite occurred as Carter continued to 
publically criticise the Soviet Union’s human rights record during the summer of 1977.88 At 
first glance this may appear a curious approach given that concluding a SALT II agreement 
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was one of the president’s foreign policy priorities. However, Carter calculated, quite rightly 
as events would demonstrate, that the Soviet Union was interested in seeking accommodation 
with the United States because this was deemed to promote Soviet interests. Because of this 
factor, Carter concluded that he could afford to push his human rights considerations with the 
Soviet Union and still find agreement with Moscow on SALT II. In Carter’s estimation, the 
recent Soviet intransigence in relation to SALT II was a diplomatic tactic designed to achieve 
better terms for Moscow. Fundamentally the Kremlin desired agreement and this would be 
reached given time and regardless of whether or not Carter raised concerns about Soviet 
human rights or embraced Soviet dissidents. Yet, there was also from the autumn of 1977 
onwards a subtle shift in the rhetoric on human rights and in how often this was mentioned in 
discussion with the Soviet Union 89 Carter had realised that if he wanted to have a SALT II 
settlement concluded prior to the end of his first term in office and, quite crucially, before his 
re-election campaign began from the fall of 1979 onwards, then his promotion of human 
rights with the Soviet Union would have to take a backseat for the time being. As one 
historian has noted: ‘Carter…learned the hard way what should have been obvious: that his 
campaign for human rights could be a huge impediment to negotiations on arms control and 
other issues.’90  
Throughout this period the British government were privately encouraging this shift 
in Carter’s thinking. Whilst London was aware that they were unlikely to be able to convince 
Carter to abandon his rhetoric of promoting improved human rights, a twofold strategy to 
influence Washington was employed. On the one hand, Callaghan instructed his officials to 
raise British concerns that emphasising human rights too strongly with the Soviet Union 
could prevent progress in SALT II and recklessly result in a more dangerous and unstable 
Cold War. However, in public and indeed during many bilateral conversations, the British 
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were always careful to appear to be whole heartedly in support of the president’s human 
rights agenda on a philosophical level.91  
Once again there was a clear distinction in how Callaghan handled Washington in the 
public and private spheres. In public Callaghan ensured that the British government 
supported the Carter administration. Privately the British prime minister would press his 
concerns in order to influence U.S. policy along lines more amenable to British interests. 
Callaghan’s approach nevertheless remained limited in its success. The Carter administration 
was aware that if it failed to deliver results in terms of a SALT II agreement, or a drastic 
deterioration in relations with Moscow developed, this would have profoundly negative 
consequences for U.S. relations with the European members of NATO.92 And the president 
had learned by harsh experience that emphasising human rights with the Soviet Union would 
indeed delay progress on SALT II. For Carter, reducing nuclear stockpiles was one of his 
central foreign policy ambitions which would have to be balanced with his appetite for 
promoting international human rights. It was striking this balance which largely accounted 
for the major inter-departmental squabbling within the Carter administration itself. Given this 
set of circumstances, it is likely that British influence was always subsidiary to the advice 
being proffered from the likes of Brzezinski and Brown in Washington. 
Northern Ireland 
Carter’s decision to declare publically an American interest in the on-going events in 
Northern Ireland also created serious apprehension in British policy making circles. 
Throughout the presidencies of Nixon and Ford the United States had officially remained 
diplomatically silent since the ‘Troubles’ had erupted in 1971. Washington’s official silence 
benefited British interests for it provided additional international legitimacy for their actions 
inside Northern Ireland. Behind the scenes the Ford administration was even more supportive 
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as intelligence assessments about the activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were 
provided to London.93 
This official American silence was shattered with Carter’s election to office. In an 
effort to garner Irish-American votes in the Democratic primaries Carter had briefly spoken 
about his sympathies for the Irish nationalist cause. Worse was yet to come as on 17 April 
1976 Carter was captured by the Economist wearing a badge stating ‘England get out of 
Ireland’ at a Democratic rally in New York. During a speech in September 1976, Carter gave 
a further airing of his views when he announced that the United States could not ‘stand quiet 
on the struggle of the Irish for peace, for the respect of human rights, and for unifying 
Ireland.’ The Democratic Party Platform (or manifesto) even stated that ‘The voice of the 
United States should be heard in Northern Ireland.’94 On 27 October 1976 Carter went even 
further when he declared before a group of Irish-American politicians that the Democratic 
Party should seek to bring about a unified Ireland. Such declarations provoked an immediate 
response from London and serious questions were now raised as to what a President Carter 
would mean for British policy vis-à-vis Northern Ireland. It looked likely that if Carter was to 
win the presidential election then the issue of Northern Ireland would no longer be met with 
official silence in Washington. The on-going difficulties in Northern Ireland looked set to 
become internationalised under Carter’s presidency.95 
On assuming power, British fears that Carter would become directly involved in 
Northern Ireland were soon realised. A report provided to Congress from the Human Rights 
Office within the State Department in March 1977 raised concerns about the legal treatment 
that suspected IRA activists received from the British government. This announcement 
irritated British officials who sought to defend their practices in Northern Ireland.96 Worse 
was to come later in the year when, following a period of intense negotiation with senior 
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Democratic Congressmen, Carter issued a statement in August 1977 that declared that the 
United States had a legitimate interest in seeing a ‘peaceful settlement’ in Northern Ireland. 
In order to achieve this peaceful settlement, Carter announced that the United States 
government would provide financial assistance to encourage such an outcome.97 
The British government perceived Carter’s actions as illegitimate U.S. meddling in 
their domestic affairs. In the opinion of Roy Mason, the secretary of state for Northern 
Ireland, those complaining about alleged human rights abuses by British forces did not fully 
appreciate the scale of violence that British citizens and soldiers faced in Northern Ireland. 
As Mason candidly wrote: ‘In this same period there were also countless acts of thuggery, 
beatings, maiming, threats and robberies all perpetrated in the Republican cause. This was 
everyday reality of life in Northern Ireland. Words can’t express the disgust I felt when the 
people responsible for such evils bleated about the alleged erosion of their human rights.’98  
Mason’s opinion captured the state of British official thinking towards Carter’s 
interference in events in Northern Ireland. In the assessment of British policy makers, the 
United States had no legitimate basis to become involved in what they considered to be a 
domestic matter. Callaghan thus remained wedded to the concept that a devolved government 
for Northern Ireland would be brought into being only once it was deemed acceptable by the 
parties in Northern Ireland itself. Whilst the Carter administration remained committed to 
‘encourage [a] close constructive relationship between Ireland and the UK, especially 
regarding Northern Ireland Issues,’ Washington had made a decision to refrain from pushing 
the matter more forcefully in their bilateral diplomacy with London.99 Thus, when Callaghan 
met with Jack Lynch, the Irish Taoiseach (prime minister) in September 1977, the Carter 
administration did not seek to interfere in the negotiations. Instead the U.S. Ambassador in 
Dublin simply reported the meeting to the State Department. Throughout the rest of the year a 
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similar stance was adopted as the Carter administration monitored British efforts in Northern 
Ireland but did not interfere directly. 
Tellingly, in bilateral communication between London and Washington the Carter 
administration did not broach the subject of Northern Ireland in any serious manner.100 One 
speech which the president gave on Northern Ireland was described by a British observer as 
having been ‘so-watered down that it came as a damp squib.’101 The British had correctly 
understood that the president would largely leave the issue of Northern Ireland to the British 
to settle internally as long as London made it known to Washington that they would not 
tolerate U.S. interference.102 Carter’s interest in Northern Ireland had originally been driven 
by his desire to win Irish-American votes in the Democratic primaries. This had been 
achieved and having raised the subject with the British government he could also legitimately 
point out to Tip O’Neill (the speaker of the House of Representatives and a leading figure in 
the Irish-American community) that he had tried to resolve the issue. Once the President had 
obtained what he wanted in the domestic sphere, his enthusiasm in Northern Ireland largely 
waned.    
Yet the fact that Carter had involved himself in the issue in the first place 
demonstrated a number of important factors. First, it illustrated that the U.S. president could 
play a role in settling the Troubles inside Northern Ireland albeit one that still depended on 
the British government legitimising American involvement. Indeed, Carter’s decision to 
become involved with the issues in Northern Ireland began the process of a long American 
engagement in resolving the problems beguiling the province. Second, the British 
government were required to react to the pressures emanating from Washington. Even if 
Carter’s engagement did not solve the problem, it had forced the British government to 
consider the opinion of Washington rather more carefully than it had hitherto.103 Carter’s 
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involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland may have been fleeting and largely 
unsuccessful but they set a precedent that subsequent U.S. presidents followed. 
Rhodesia 
In 1960, Harold Macmillan (British prime minister 1957-63) gave his ‘Winds of Change’ 
speech before the parliament of South Africa whereby he declared his intention to dissolve 
Britain’s African Empire. Independence to Britain’s remaining colonies would be premised 
upon the basis of majority rule, i.e. elections based upon universal suffrage for all adults 
regardless of race. Independence for a number of former British colonies duly followed but 
within the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland the issue of majority rule was so 
problematic that it resulted in the dissolution of the former British colony into three separate 
areas: Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. Following several attempts to 
negotiate a settlement, on 31 December 1963 the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was 
formally dissolved. Northern Rhodesia gained independence and now assumed the title of the 
Republic of Zambia. Later in the year Nyasaland became independent and was renamed as 
Malawi. After further wrangling between London and the Southern Rhodesian prime 
minister, Ian Smith, about the terms of independence, Smith proclaimed a Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom. On 11 November 1965, the 
Southern Rhodesian cabinet announced that Southern Rhodesia, now referred to simply as 
Rhodesia, regarded itself as an independent sovereign state. Questions relating to majority 
rule were now ones that Ian Smith (the new Rhodesian prime minister) and his cabinet would 
consider independently of London. Left to its own devices, Smith’s Rhodesia would maintain 
the system of racial apartheid that had previously existed.   
Harold Wilson’s Labour government, which had come to office in 1964, was outraged 
by Smith’s UDI. Accordingly, the British government refused to recognise the legitimacy of 
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the new Rhodesian government and with British support the United Nations Security Council 
declared Smith’s UDI to be illegal. Economic sanctions were introduced against Rhodesia to 
encourage Smith to implement majority rule but little came of such measures. Meantime 
within Rhodesia itself, Black Nationalist movements sought to bring about majority rule as a 
programme of civil disobedience began. This programme of civil disobedience grew 
increasingly violent as the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU) 
declared its intent on achieving national self-determination via violent methods if necessary. 
The first phase of the Rhodesian Bush War erupted. Little progress toward majority rule 
occurred as Smith’s Rhodesia, which received considerable military assistance from South 
Africa, proved militarily capable of subduing the guerrilla forces of ZANU’s military wing, 
the self-declared Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA).104  
The second phase of the war grew in intensity and in violence as Portugal’s decision 
to grant Mozambique independence (1975) provided ZANLA with a sanctuary and staging 
area outside of the Rhodesian Security forces remit. The conflict also became increasingly 
internationalised as ZANU declared their sympathy for the world communist movement and 
received increasing military and economic assistance from the People’s Republic of China. 
Within Rhodesia itself, Ian Smith instigated a draft to help quell the growing trouble posed by 
ZANLA forces. The British government’s position throughout the conflict was to remain 
supportive of the principle of majority rule but there was a growing sense that Rhodesia could 
be lost to the communist bloc unless a resolution to the war could not be swiftly brought 
about. With the increasing involvement of communist forces across Africa’s growing litany 
of wars (Angola; Mozambique; the Congo) Washington’s interest also grew throughout the 
period. Joint efforts by the British foreign and commonwealth secretary, Anthony Crosland, 
and the U.S. secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, produced agreement in 1976 that London 
and Washington would support Smith to implement majority rule within two years. After the 
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successful implementation of majority rule, the United States and United Kingdom would 
ensure that the United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia would be lifted and the 
new majority rule government would be granted formal international recognition.105 
Kissinger subsequently met with Ian Smith and with the two prominent leaders of ZANU, 
Robert Mugabe and Joseph Nkomo in the summer of 1976. Kissinger quickly found that the 
leadership of ZANU were less than enthusiastic about his proposals. British efforts to push 
ahead with talks stalled, leaving Kissinger to complain that ‘it is difficult to imagine how 
incompetent the British are.’ In the U.S. secretary of state’s assessment, British efforts were 
likely to result in ‘another Angola.’106 Regardless of Kissinger’s private complaints, 
President Ford’s election defeat to Jimmy Carter in November 1976 meant that he was out of 
office. It would thus be left to the Carter administration to assume the task of resolving the 
question of Rhodesian majority rule.107 
 Carter’s interest in events in Southern Africa is explained by a series of 
interconnected factors that touched upon geopolitics, Cold War politics, domestic 
considerations and the president’s own sense of morality as personified in his promotion of 
an international human rights agenda.108 First, like his predecessor, Carter’s concern about 
Rhodesia was raised by virtue of the PRC’s support of ZANU. ZANU’s military wing was 
fracturing into two distinct groups headed by Mugabe (ZANU) and Nkomo (Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union: ZAPU). Both groups consequently sought support from their 
respective communist backers as the PRC backed ZANU and the Soviet Union with Cuban 
assistance supported ZAPU.109 Even though Carter had deliberately sought to distinguish 
himself as a president that would not pursue policies solely according to the zero-sum logic 
of the Cold War, he could not nevertheless ignore the obvious growth in Communist 
influence inside Rhodesia either.110  
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Second, the Black Caucus in the Democratic Party, which reminded the president that 
African-American voters had voted overwhelmingly for his election, encouraged the 
president to pursue majority rule in Rhodesia more vigorously than his predecessor had. For 
the Black Caucus it was imperative for the United States to be seen to be supporting racial 
justice and democracy internationally. In essence, the Civil Rights movement was becoming 
increasingly internationalised and was now starting to have a direct influence upon U.S. 
foreign policy.111 As one author has noted, the 1976 General Election signified ‘a remarkable 
rise of black influence in the Democratic Party and on foreign policy.’112 Carter’s domestic 
position thus encouraged him to at least demonstrate greater interest in Rhodesia and 
Southern Africa more broadly than his predecessor had.113 Third, as one astute commentator 
has noted, Carter’s own sense of morality, which was influenced by his own experiences of 
witnessing racial prejudice inside the United States and his religious beliefs, encouraged his 
pursuit of majority rule in Rhodesia.114 Vance explained U.S. policy thus:  
…Our decision to break sharply with the policy of the past did not 
merely reflect concern about Soviet influence or revolutionary 
movements. We were committed to majority rule, self-determination 
and racial equality as a matter of fairness and basic human rights. If 
the United States did not support social and political justice in 
Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa itself, Africans would correctly 
dismiss our human rights policy as mere cold war propaganda, 
employed at the expense of the peoples of Africa.115 
 
For Carter to achieve his ambition of majority rule in Rhodesia, he sought to place 
political and economic pressure upon Smith’s Rhodesia to encourage internal reform. Along 
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with this, Carter would place political pressure against the government of South Africa (led 
by John Vorster) which was Smith’s most significant ally.116 Yet in spite of his determination 
to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia, the president remained unwilling to place the United 
States at the centre of negotiations in the fashion it was assuming in relation to the Middle 
East peace talks. It was to London, therefore, that Carter looked to lead negotiations towards 
majority rule even though the president privately accepted that the United Kingdom had 
‘practically no remaining influence.’ 117 Yet Carter concluded that with Washington’s support 
the chances of achieving majority rule in Rhodesia would be significantly increased.  
Carter was thus looking to utilise the Anglo-American relationship as a means of 
promoting U.S. interests and for obtaining his international goals. He could pursue his 
objective of implementing majority rule in Rhodesia without having to assume the burdens of 
leadership. After all, Carter and his national security team were already engaged in serious 
and complicated diplomacy in relation to arms control and the Middle East. Allowing London 
to lead these negotiations, though not dictate the content of any final settlement, would allow 
the president to obtain what he desired. In a fashion, Carter was looking to the Anglo-
American relationship in exactly the same way that Callaghan viewed it, i.e. it was a vehicle 
for advancing national interests but could also settle matters of mutual concern.  
 Andrew Young, the president’s envoy to the United Nations, was tasked with leading 
this new American effort to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia. Young now liaised with 
British officials and discussed how they might jointly proceed.118 Agreement was reached to 
form an ‘Anglo-American consultative group’ which would lead the diplomatic efforts. This 
was headed by John Graham (a senior FCO official) and Stephen Low (U.S. Ambassador to 
Lusaka).119 Quickly apparent from these early discussions was the fact that London would 
not undertake a fresh round of diplomacy which could entail new economic and political 
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sanctions against either Rhodesia or South Africa without first securing guaranteed 
assurances from the Carter administration that full American support would be forthcoming. 
Anglo-American consultation was characterised by British procrastination. British diplomacy 
was deeply irritating to the president who privately complained in March 1977 that the 
British government had shown a ‘remarkable incapacity’ to resolve the issue of majority rule 
inside Rhodesia.120 In the weeks that followed the president assured London that American 
support for firmer action against Rhodesia would be forthcoming and he urged the British 
government to be sterner in their diplomacy with Smith. Carter went as far as to suggest that 
the British government should propose to Smith that London would dispatch a British 
Commonwealth peacekeeping force to Rhodesia which would maintain security during the 
transition to majority rule in the country. Along with this, Washington requested that London 
support a further round of economic sanctions against both Rhodesia.121 
 When Vance met with Owen on 10 March 1977, he encouraged the latter to support 
Carter’s proposed economic sanctions, which would include a ban on selling Rhodesian 
Chrome. The U.S. secretary of state also urged Owen to assume a sterner stance against 
Smith during Anglo-Rhodesian talks. Vance’s argument won through as Owen agreed that 
the British would support the American proposals to implement economic sanctions against 
Rhodesia. Why then did Owen accede to the American request at this point in spite of 
knowing that Britain’s economic interests would be hurt by this action? The answer rests 
upon a number of strategic and political calculations undertaken by Owen and the wider 
British government. First, with Carter so determined to pursue this sterner course of 
diplomacy it was decided in British circles that it would be unwise to be in opposition to 
Washington so early on in the new president’s term of office. Second, the British government 
wanted the United States to take a far greater interest in Southern Africa which Carter, in 
contrast to his predecessor, clearly was doing. Whilst Carter was taking a policy line which 
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did not entirely fit with British opinion on how to advance the negotiations, opposing the 
president could threaten to fatally undermine Anglo-American cooperation. Furthermore, the 
British well understood that Carter was determined to obtain his sanctions against Rhodesia 
regardless of any opposition that London may generate. The British calculated it better to 
give the impression of influence by supporting Carter than to reveal impotence in 
unsuccessfully opposing the U.S. president. As such, when Carter pushed to repeal the Byrd 
Amendment in Congress (which had allowed American companies to import Rhodesian 
chrome into the United States in spite of other sanctions against Smith’s Rhodesia being 
maintained), London endorsed the president’s actions. Finally, Owen himself was seeking a 
‘Kissinger style’ settlement in relation to Rhodesia whereby he would lead the negotiations to 
a grand settlement (Vienna was touted as one location to finalise this agreement) and thereby 
enhance his own political stature.122 Personal political ambition coupled to broader political 
and strategic calculations therefore informed the British government’s decision to endorse 
economic sanctions against Rhodesia and to press ahead with implementing a majority rule 
settlement.  
 Having agreed to further sanctions, Owen proposed that a conference between the 
warring factions inside Rhodesia should be convened for the summer of 1977. At the 
conference, Owen believed that he could negotiate a timetable for establishing democratic 
elections in Rhodesia which would bring about majority rule. The Carter administration, 
though, was deeply sceptical as to whether Owen’s plan would actually succeed. From 
Washington’s perspective, the leaders of the warring parties were nowhere near reaching any 
sort of agreement and the British foreign and commonwealth secretary had a greatly inflated 
sense of his diplomatic abilities.123 Owen’s proposed conference therefore threatened to 
create a very public and diplomatically embarrassing and damaging failure that would make 
it harder for the warring factions to reach a settlement in the future. Further yet, as U.S. 
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officials argued, the economic sanctions had not been given sufficient time to really hurt 
Smith and thus encourage him to be more accommodating. Moreover, given that Smith was 
continuing to negotiate with Bishop Muzorewa (the leader of the United African National 
Council and the only remaining legal Black party in Rhodesia for it had renounced violent 
struggle) about a majority rule settlement, it seemed improbable that Smith would agree to 
attend such a conference at this stage.  
American doubts may have had substance to them but Owen remained determined to 
hold the conference regardless. As one close adviser to Callaghan noted, there was a sense 
that Owen’s enthusiasm for settling the question of majority rule in Rhodesia was governed 
by his own political ambitions and vanity.124 Sensing the inevitable, and in keeping with U.S. 
policy to allow the British to lead Anglo-American diplomacy vis-à-vis Rhodesia, Vance 
agreed that he would attend Owen’s conference.125 Meantime the Carter administration 
sought to apply additional pressure on Smith via the Vorster channel. In May 1977 Mondale 
met with Vorster and pressed the case that South Africa had to encourage Smith to accept 
fundamental political reform in Rhodesia.  
As expected, Vorster brushed off the American demands and pointed to the fact that 
Smith was currently engaged in discussions with Muzorewa about delivering majority rule. 
And these very talks increased British and American concerns that Smith would somehow 
find a compromise settlement with Muzorewa which would allow him to remain in power 
and uphold a system of racial apartheid in Rhodesia. Such a scenario would only likely lead 
to a broader Rhodesian civil war as the supporters of Muzorewa would be utilised in an effort 
to crush ZANU (which would never recognise a settlement that allowed Smith to remain in 
power). Owen again met with Vance in June 1977 to discuss the situation and it was decided 
during these talks that the Anglo-American consultative group would convene with the 
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various leaders of the warring factions in Rhodesia to see if some sort of compromise 
settlement could be found. On liaising with the various leaders, it was soon apparent that little 
appetite for compromise existed on any side. As Vance informed the president, the warring 
factions in Rhodesia were so far apart that there stood little chance of them reaching any 
settlement.126 
The British foreign and commonwealth office informed Washington that it would 
continue to apply political pressure against Smith’s regime and would seek to negotiate a 
compromise between the warring factions in Rhodesia. No offer of a British Commonwealth 
peace keeping force was to be made. And an escalation of the scale and intensity of economic 
sanctions against Smith was also to be avoided. As Owen made clear to Vance in April and 
June 1977, intensifying economic sanctions against Rhodesia (or South Africa) would have 
serious consequences for the British economy and could not at this point be endorsed.127  
Carter was unimpressed with the British response and sought now to win British 
support for a series of political moves against Smith. As such, Carter requested British 
support for a United Nations resolution that would declare that Smith had to afford equality 
under the law to all of Rhodesia’s population; for the principle of one man one vote 
regardless of race to be implemented; a new constitution drawn up by the British government; 
and for free elections to be held in the following year. If Smith failed to comply, then the 
United Nations would implement a further round of economic and political sanctions against 
the government of Rhodesia. Concomitantly Carter looked towards South Africa for 
assistance in bringing Smith in line. Whilst the president was of the opinion that the United 
States would not ‘push South Africa around on their own racial and political characteristics, 
except over a long period of time’ Carter let it be known to Vorster that economic sanctions 
against South Africa would be enacted if Vorster did not encourage Smith to comply with the 
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demands of the United Nations. Furthermore, the president again revisited the idea of London 
dispatching military forces to Rhodesia to act as peacekeepers during a transition period to 
majority rule and, in discussions with the leadership of the Front Line States (Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia), the United States suggested that 
they would support a final political settlement in Rhodesia which saw all of Rhodesia’s 
armed forces placed under the control of the government. When Smith learned of this, it was 
met with immediate opposition because he feared that a Rhodesian government composed of 
Black rulers would utilise the armed forces against White Rhodesians.128 Carter’s bold 
rhetoric was therefore creating as many problems as it appeared to solve.  
Carter’s latest initiative again encountered opposition in London. First, economic 
sanctions against South Africa and Rhodesia would damage Britain’s well-established 
commercial and economic interests in the region. The British government, in an effort to 
disguise its economic motivations, suggested to Washington that economic sanctions were 
unlikely to accomplish the desired outcome and so were an inappropriate form of diplomatic 
leverage. As Owen outlined, economic sanctions against Vorster were likely to antagonise 
him and lead to a more unhelpful South African position vis-à-vis Smith. The joint Anglo-
American approach to the situation in Rhodesia appeared to have reached an impasse; 
economic sanctions appeared not to be working and Smith refused to negotiate with anyone 
other than Muzorewa. For their part, the other leaders of the warring parties in Rhodesia 
appeared little interested in attending some grand conference under Owen’s auspices to settle 
matters either. Again it was Washington that sought bolder action as both the president and 
Vance urged Owen to commit to the idea of dispatching a British Commonwealth peace-
keeping mission to Rhodesia to ensure the stability of the country during any transition to a 
majority rule government. Owen had little enthusiasm for such action and the increasing 
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levels of violence inside Rhodesia did not encourage anyone in London to change their 
minds. 
Again, American willingness to pursue what the British believed were overly 
belligerent policies created considerable apprehension in London. First, the British 
government did not agree that Smith was being as obstinate as the Carter administration 
believed. Rather, in the British estimation Smith had shown a degree of flexibility and a 
genuine willingness to negotiate. Second, the fact that Smith would not accept the entirety of 
the Anglo-American proposals could largely be attributed to President Carter’s indiscreet and 
ill-advised decision to agree with Julius Nyerere, the president of Tanzania, that the armed 
forces of a post-Smith Rhodesian should comprise the Black Nationalist liberation forces that 
were currently fighting the guerrilla war against the Rhodesian security forces. On learning 
that this decision had been reached, the British were angered because they knew such a 
condition would unlikely to be accepted by Smith at this point in time. In sum, the British did 
not think that Smith’s opposition to certain proposals was entirely unreasonable. As 
Washington was well aware by August 1977, there existed a ‘basic difference of view’ 
between the United States and United Kingdom on how to transition to majority rule in 
Rhodesia.129 
Agreement on how to proceed was nevertheless reached during talks between Owen 
and American intermediaries (including discussions with Vance and Young).130 During these 
discussions, Owen largely acquiesced under American pressure to agree to present proposals 
to Smith that would guarantee a British model of law, a democratic constitution, and the 
implementation of elections which would return a government based upon universal 
suffrage.131 Agreement was reached that Owen himself would lead the diplomatic efforts and 
he would meet with both Smith and Vorster to press for their agreement. However, if these 
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proposals were rejected then additional economic and political pressure sponsored by London 
and Washington would be enacted against both Rhodesia and South Africa.132  
 Following this Anglo-American agreement, the British foreign and commonwealth 
secretary and Andrew Young met with Smith in Salisbury, Rhodesia, in September 1977. It 
was here that the joint Anglo-American proposals were put forward. The meeting proved 
difficult as Smith refused to accept the proposed conditions. In the American estimation 
Smith’s failure to accept the terms meant that the economic and political sanctions against 
Rhodesia now had to be increased in their severity. London informed the White House that 
they would support efforts to increase the severity of economic sanctions against Rhodesia in 
the United Nations Security Council.133  
Carter sought to place additional public pressure upon Smith and took advantage of 
his tour of several African states in September 1977 to reiterate the need for a majority rule 
settlement. The following month in an address before the United Nations General Assembly 
the president again reiterated American support for majority rule in Rhodesia.134 At the same 
time his administration moved to head off a possible internal settlement between Smith and 
Muzorewa that would allow the former to retain power and exclude the Patriotic Front (both 
ZANU and ZAPU) from the government. Vance felt this would ‘lead to the nightmare of a 
black civil war.’135 Yet decision makers in Washington also recognised that a Smith-
Muzorewa agreement could attract international and British support as it would provide a 
veneer of majority rule in Rhodesia. Washington therefore sought to shore up British support 
to reject any internal settlement that did not include all of the warring factions in Rhodesia. In 
addition, the Carter administration again looked to implement further economic sanctions 
against Rhodesia to convince Smith not to agree to an internal settlement which excluded the 
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Patriotic Front. In Washington’s estimation, only an agreement that included all of the 
warring factions could bring about a legitimate settlement to the war in Rhodesia.  
 Coupled to this, the Carter administration now supported calls for the United Nations 
Security Council to enforce an arms embargo against South Africa to cajole Pretoria into a 
more cooperative attitude vis-à-vis Rhodesia. For London this was an unpopular course given 
the lucrative armaments contracts that existed between the United Kingdom and South 
Africa.136 But once again, following American pressure, the Callaghan government was 
convinced to support Washington’s lead.137 Little, however, came of such diplomacy. Indeed, 
this joint Anglo-American diplomacy appeared to be having the opposite effect upon Smith 
as he pressed ahead with his negotiations with Bishop Muzorewa and publically announced 
his intention to reach a settlement outside of American or British auspices. Finding a 
settlement to the issue of majority rule inside Rhodesia would not be achieved quickly and 
evidently require firmer and more patience diplomacy from both London and Washington. 
Conclusion  
At the end of the first year of Carter’s presidency, significant Anglo-American cooperation 
was evidenced in the realms of NATO alliance diplomacy and in trying to settle the question 
of majority rule inside Rhodesia. Of course, such cooperation did not always run smoothly 
but this is to be expected given that two separate sovereign states with divergent interests and 
political pressures were involved. Yet, Carter’s decision to work closely with London 
demonstrated the continuing relevance of the Anglo-American relationship for international 
relations. It also offered London the opportunity to influence Washington’s decision making, 
and vice versa. Carter may have taken a backseat position with regards to implementing 
majority rule in Rhodesia but American influence with regards to increasing the severity of 
sanctions against Rhodesia in the face of British opposition was illustrative of how American 
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power allowed the president to exert decisive influence against London. Likewise, the British 
were unconvinced that promoting human rights best served their interests but they were 
compelled by the Carter administration to at least engage in the rhetoric of human rights 
promotion. Several important unresolved items remained to be settled in the following years, 
amongst which included the most divisive question for the NATO alliance, the production 
and deployment of the ERW. Resolving such issues would test Callaghan’s ability as a 
meaningful interlocutor towards the European members of the NATO alliance to breaking 
point. In is within the subsequent chapter that these issues are analysed.         
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4 
Stresses and Strains 
New Year Objectives 
As the end of his first year in office approached, Carter wrote in his diary that: ‘With the 
Middle East, Rhodesia, the Soviets on SALT, European acceptance of the neutron bomb, and 
the general reaction to my late November trip, all seem to be good.’1 Carter’s key national 
security advisers shared the president’s sentiments. In a lengthy overview of the president’s 
first year in office, Brzezinski claimed that immense progress in all of the core areas of 
Carter’s foreign policy had been made.2 Yet as the president was all too aware ‘all this could 
go back again quite rapidly.’3 Events would prove that Carter was right to feel reticent. 
Whilst significant progress in the Middle East talks had been made other aspects of the 
president’s foreign policy were beginning to falter. The issue of the ERW was already 
developing into a major source of U.S.-European antagonism. The SALT II talks which were 
becoming mired in technical deliberations with Moscow were encountering increasing 
difficulties with Congressional critics. As one adviser to Carter noted, ‘It's clear even to an 
observer unfamiliar with all of the substantive issues involved that we're in potentially very 
deep trouble on this matter. I can, think of nothing more damaging to the president, both 
domestically and internationally, than to suffer a Senate defeat on SALT. It would be an 
unmitigated disaster.’4 
Other areas of Carter’s foreign policy were also coming under pressure not least with 
regards to how the promotion of human rights should be incorporated into the president’s 
broader foreign policy. Indeed, the president’s human rights agenda had become diluted to 
the point that nobody was quite sure, including Carter himself, as to what the promotion of a 
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human rights foreign policy actually entailed in practical terms. Within the administration 
there was a divergence of opinion as to how far it was practicable to emphasise human rights 
concerns in U.S. foreign policy. Throughout the year Carter failed to provide the necessary 
presidential leadership that was required to enforce a coherent human rights focused foreign 
policy. Carter’s domestic challenges were just as great as his political opponents become 
increasingly successful in thwarting his legislative agenda and the 1978 Congressional 
elections saw the Republican opposition win gains in the House of Representatives that lost 
the Democrats the all-important two-thirds majority (which would prevent the opposition 
Republican Party from overriding any presidential vetoes.) All told, 1978 would be a difficult 
year for the Carter presidency.5   
Anglo-American relations would prove in some ways to be no exception as 
differences persisted over an array of issues including improvements to NATO, the 
deployment of the ERW and the effort to implement majority rule in Rhodesia. Yet in other 
ways Anglo-American relations actually warmed throughout the year. For instance, 
significant progress in ensuring the continuation of Anglo-American nuclear weapons 
cooperation was made. During Callaghan’s final official meeting with Carter at the 
Guadeloupe summit in February 1979 the British prime minister received personal 
confirmation from the president that the United States would sell the Trident C4 SLBM to the 
United Kingdom. Second, a broader theme emerged throughout the year whereby Callaghan 
continually sought to position himself carefully in support of the president during Carter’s 
quite vigorous disputes with a number of NATO allies. Callaghan ultimately maintained this 
position in spite of it causing significant disagreement with European leaders (especially with 
Schmidt) but the British prime minister did so because Washington alone had the power and 
influence to reach agreements on a number of matters which were seen of the utmost 
importance to British interests (for example on SALT II, Anglo-American nuclear 
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cooperation, Rhodesia and Northern Ireland).6 For Anglo-American relations the second year 
of Carter’s presidency witnessed policy disputes on a number of specific issues but it was 
also marked by significant cooperation.  
The British government was well informed about Carter’s increasing political 
difficulties. Peter Jay composed a lengthy round up of the U.S. political scene and offered his 
analysis on the likely trajectory of Carter’s foreign policy. As the British Ambassador noted, 
Carter lacked the political acumen required to effectively handle the United States Congress 
which endangered his chances of achieving both his domestic and foreign policy agenda. 
Later in the year Jay would borrow from the Roman historian Tacticus and concluded that 
Carter was ‘Capax Imperii.’ As Jay was rather pretentiously suggesting, the president 
suffered from an inability to govern because he could not enforce his will or garner sufficient 
support from the U.S. Congress for his policies.7 
 Jay’s assessment may have been verging on the hyperbolic but it did accurately reflect 
how key policy makers within the Carter administration assessed their own political fortunes 
at this time. Walter Mondale suggested that the administration demonstrated ‘inadequate 
strategic political thinking in the development of our foreign policy.’8 Hamilton Jordon 
reflected that Carter was a victim of his own outsider status which meant that key actors 
within the Democratic Party resented Carter’s election and looked to actively undermine his 
presidency. Jordon further warned that unless the president radically addressed this issue then 
he would only face mounting difficulties in attaining the necessary public and Congressional 
support for his foreign policy ambitions.9  
The problems facing Carter in the realm of international affairs were not just 
personality driven. Rather, as Brzezinski suggested, the United States confronted changing 
structural forces in the international system that challenged American interests and national 
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security. In stark contrast to the positive appraisal of the administration’s policy 
achievements he had provided at the end of 1977, Brzezinski had entirely reversed his 
assessment by February 1978. Now Brzezinski warned the president that the United States 
was faced with the threat of ‘strategic deterioration.’ The United States confronted the 
possibility that its allies in Europe were threatened by serious internal problems which could 
even lead to indigenous communist forces in countries such as France, Greece and Portugal 
taking power. Such a scenario would lead to the calamity of the NATO alliance comprised of 
Communist states! Brzezinski’s analysis was even darker when it appraised the Soviet 
Union’s position in the Third World as he highlighted recent Soviet support for Ethiopia as 
demonstrative of Moscow’s ability and willingness to project decisive global influence.10 
Brzezinski was not alone in articulating such concerns as one lengthy study composed by the 
National Security Council in April 1978 cautioned that America’s continuing economic 
difficulties now undermined America’s ability to project international power. As the paper 
warned: ‘Although the weakened dollar has undermined neither our military power nor the 
basic health of our economy, foreigners may have begun to question our willingness to use 
our strength in pursuit of our interests and to doubt our ability to grant and withdraw 
benefits.’11 An even gloomier appraisal was provided by Brzezinski a week after this report 
was delivered.12  
Indeed, Brzezinski’s outlook had by the end of 1978 reached new lows as he 
advanced his thesis that the United States was confronted by an ‘arc of crisis.’ Brzezinski 
outlined his thinking in more detail as he advanced a new national security framework for the 
United States. This idea was centred upon the Persian Gulf and explained how American 
interests were threatened from the Horn of Africa across the Persian Gulf towards the 
Southwest Pacific rim. As Brzezinski suggested, ‘If you draw an arc on the globe, stretching 
from Chittagong (Bangladesh) through Islamabad to Aden, you will be pointing to the area of 
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currently our greatest vulnerability. All at once, difficulties are surfacing in Iran and Pakistan, 
and they are thinly below the surface in India and are very manifest in Bangladesh, and there 
is reason to believe that the political structure of Saudi Arabia is beginning to creek. Turkey 
is also becoming more wobbly.’13 Included in Brzezinski’s analysis was a plan to improve 
America’s military posture and to encourage the rest of the NATO alliance to follow suit. 
‘The trends in the military components of national power…all favour the Soviet Union’ 
Brzezinski warned the president.14 One way in which to meet this challenge was for each 
individual member of the NATO alliance to increase their defence expenditure and to 
approve the deployment of new nuclear weapons (including ERWs).15  
Given such thinking existed inside the Carter administration, Peter Jay was prudent to 
warn London that Carter’s foreign policy objectives were at their most ‘delicate.’ Jay advised 
that it would be sensible for Callaghan to maintain his public support for the central tenets of 
Carter’s foreign policy so as to avoid creating any misunderstandings with Washington that 
would only lead to undesirable consequences for British interests. However, Jay well 
understood that Carter would look to London for support that went beyond rhetorical 
declarations. Specifically, the president wanted the British government to persuade the other 
members of the NATO alliance to now implement their 1977 decision to increase national 
defence expenditure by 3% per annum. The president would also look for the British 
government’s public and private support in his efforts to reach a SALT II agreement with the 
Soviet Union and in his on-going Middle East peace talks between Israel and Egypt. 
London’s continued support in forthcoming international economic, monetary and energy 
negotiations would also be sought by Washington.16 The prime minister’s forthcoming visit 
to Washington thus afforded both the Carter administration and the Callaghan government to 
discuss these issues and to influence one another’s policies for their own benefit. 
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Influencing Washington 
Callaghan arrived in Washington on 23 March 1978 for a one day working lunch with the 
president. Meetings were scheduled with the key members of the Carter administration with 
international economic policy, SALT II, NATO security policy, Anglo-American security 
cooperation, and the on-going diplomacy with regards to Rhodesia all set as the major topics 
for discussion. International economic policy and the forthcoming multilateral conference 
between the members of the Group of Seven (G7) dominated the Callaghan-Carter 
discussion. The president attached great importance to this economic summit and he sought 
international cooperation for boosting economic assistance to Low Developed Countries 
(LDCs) and agreement to end protectionist tariffs on agricultural and industrial outputs as 
practiced within France, Italy, United Kingdom and West Germany (as part of their 
membership of the EEC). Carter wanted Callaghan’s cooperation and inquired as to whether 
the prime minister would be willing to allow the United States to lead the discussion at the 
forthcoming G7 conference. Callaghan agreed, noting that the British government had no 
intention of ‘thrusting itself into the driver’s seat.’17  
Having accepted that the British government would cede leadership to the United 
States at the forthcoming summit, Callaghan instead sought to shape U.S. policy along lines 
that would benefit British interests. In keeping with his earlier efforts, the prime minister 
urged that the United States had to resist implementing protectionist policies if it was to 
ensure the cooperation of the other G7 members. Encouraged by his Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Denis Healey, and Harold Lever, the Duchy of Lancaster, Callaghan suggested 
that the president set bolder economic growth outputs and deficit reduction targets as well as 
refrain from implementing new import tariffs. No promises were made, and U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Blumenthal hinted that new protectionist policies could well be introduced.18  
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Callaghan, however, continued to emphasise that international economic policies had 
political and security implications that had to be fully appreciated. Thus, even if something 
made sense according to economic theory it was only once political and security 
ramifications were factored in could a final economic policy be decided upon.19 Quite how 
much influence Callaghan would have over U.S. international economic policy would of 
course be the litmus test for this approach but at the very least the British prime minister was 
making his arguments known to the key policy makers in Washington. The intensity of these 
British arguments is demonstrated by the virtue of the fact that the U.S. Ambassador in 
London sent a memorandum back to Washington warning that Anglo-American economic 
relations had witnessed a ‘cooling’ in recent months and ‘more bad news’ was likely to be 
forthcoming.20 Yet in a sign that British influence was making some headway with 
Washington’s policy makers, British officials pointed to the fact that their own ‘tailored’ 
protectionist policies applied against ‘super-competitive countries’ (such as Japan) was being 
mirrored by the Carter administration. By tailoring protectionist policies against certain 
countries deemed to hold an unfair advantage in terms of labour costs, the British government 
believed that you were able to prevent the introduction of more widespread international 
tariffs that would hurt the competitiveness of British exports. The British approach was 
proving partially successful which Callaghan sought to exploit in the coming months. Subtle 
diplomacy with Washington was providing dividends for the British prime minister.21    
Throughout the Carter-Callaghan discussion there had been a determined effort by 
Callaghan to act as an intermediary between Washington and Bonn as it pertained to 
protectionist tariffs, international monetary challenges, and the levels of support that the G7 
states should offer to LDCs. As Callaghan told Carter, Schmidt was intellectually opposed to 
providing additional economic assistance to LDCs for he believed foreign aid to be unhelpful 
in helping LDCs build the necessary infrastructure required to produce long-term economic 
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growth. However, as Callaghan further explained, Schmidt was pragmatic enough to 
appreciate that if Washington applied sufficient political pressure upon Bonn, then the 
president could obtain West German approval for increasing economic assistance to LDCs. 
The British prime minister suggested that Schmidt’s opposition to increased LDC assistance 
was premised upon an honest intellectual assessment and not some narrow political interest. 
Because of this, Callaghan recommended that Carter should arrange to meet with both West 
German and British representatives to see if some agreement could be negotiated that 
accommodated some of Schmidt’s concerns.22 This episode again highlighted Callaghan’s 
efforts to mediate between Carter and Schmidt and in the process become a trusted confident 
to both. By achieving the trust of both actors, Callaghan hoped that this would allow him to 
mitigate damaging rows between the pair and also influence policies of mutual concern to the 
benefit of British interests.23  
Callaghan’s approach was proving fruitful as Carter wrote to Schmidt little over a 
week after his meeting with Callaghan which was far more accommodating to West German 
concerns. As the president outlined, the advanced economies faced five serious challenges 
which included: maintaining long-term economic growth, balancing long-term capital 
outflows, securing sufficient energy resources, stabilising international trade and ensuring 
monetary stability. Every one of these challenges could only be met with the cooperation of 
the major industrialised countries. Carter therefore offered to undertake detailed discussions 
with Schmidt in order to see how U.S.-West German differences could be overcome and 
agreed strategies established.24 In the lead up to the Bonn Economic Summit which was 
provisionally set for July 1978, Callaghan and other British officials continued to exercise 
this meditating role between Carter and Schmidt.25 
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The Bonn Economic Summit would demonstrate whether Callaghan’s efforts at 
mediating between Bonn and Washington would have meaningful results. The Carter 
administration’s ambitious agenda for the summit would test Callaghan’s mediating role to its 
limits as Washington sought approval for comprehensive economic agreements to tackle the 
myriad challenges created by international inflation, monetary instability and rising energy 
prices.26 Along with this, other major U.S. goals included a pledge to limit oil imports (and 
thus stabilise its price), obtaining German and Japanese agreement  to monetary loosening so 
as to stimulate economic growth, and to attain an all-party agreement on a set of trade 
practices that would allow for the removal and reduction of global trade tariffs.27 Such an 
ambitious agenda was likely to always cause enormous differences between the G7 members 
and within the media it was reported that the prospects of the summit even convening looked 
slim given the obvious differences between the parties. Callaghan, however, again looked to 
play his mediator role between Washington and Bonn and appealed directly to the president 
to attend the summit. Likewise, Callaghan contacted Schmidt and requested that he also 
attend the summit.28 
In spite of Carter’s initial reluctance to attend the Bonn Economic Summit he was 
convinced that his attendance was required if he was to win the support of the fellow G7 
members for his ambitious international economic policies. As the president understood, the 
buoyancy and vitality of the U.S. economy was interlinked to the fate of the broader 
international economy and his attendance was required at the G7 to help shape international 
agreements for the benefit of U.S. interests. The summit convened on 16 July 1978 and it 
soon became evident that Callaghan’s efforts to mediate the growing rapture between Carter 
and Schmidt would prove unsuccessful. During the discussions, Callaghan argued that 
economic cooperation between the G7 members was imperative and that certain decisions 
would have to be approved even if they resulted in damaging domestic political 
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repercussions.29 The British prime minister’s appeal seemed to be ignored as both the 
German and Japanese delegations argued that U.S. proposals pertaining to the removal of 
protectionist tariffs would allow U.S. companies to export into their markets without full 
reciprocity. Overcoming these divergent interests proved difficult as Carter continually went 
on the diplomatic assault against Schmidt who ably resisted the president’s pressure.30 Thus, 
by the end of the summit U.S. ambitions had not been fully met. Schmidt was left to bitterly 
complain that he had come under unwarranted attack from the president. U.S.-West German 
relations had hardly been improved by the Bonn Economic Summit and major outstanding 
points as it related to international economic policy remained. The communique issued at the 
end of the conference had managed to create a public impression that an ‘economic 
consensus’ had been established yet British officials privately recognised that the agreements 
reached contained ‘little substance.’31 This growing rift between the United States and West 
Germany as personified in the clashes between Carter and Schmidt would continue to 
exercise Callaghan in the months ahead as he remained committed to his mediator role. In 
spite of Callaghan’s best efforts relations would, however, only further sour. There were 
clearly limits to Callaghan’s influence on the international stage and the deep seated 
differences between Bonn and Washington could not be settled by the prime minister’s 
personal diplomacy.32 
Nuclear politics  
As shown earlier, the subject of whether ERWs should be built and deployed had created 
enormous difficulties within the NATO alliance. For both Callaghan and Carter it was a 
subject that they both secretly hoped would somehow just go away. Neither would be granted 
their wish as in the latter part of November 1977 the subject of the ERW was given renewed 
emphasis as the Soviet General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, contacted a number of NATO 
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states proposing that all ERWs should be banned. Any decision to deploy the ERW would 
now have magnified ramifications for it could be viewed as an escalation in the nuclear arms 
race or interpreted as outright provocation of the Soviet Union and further undermine U.S.-
Soviet relations. On the other hand, by not deploying the ERW, the Carter administration 
could be depicted as having yielded to Soviet pressure which would raise issues about 
American dependability within the NATO alliance. Brzezinski captured the predicament 
facing the president neatly: ‘It is more likely, however, that the Brezhnev letters will mean 
that the Alliance will continue to be in disarray over the whole issue, thus helping to 
accomplish the basic Soviet objective.’33 Events that followed would prove such prophecies 
correct.  
Following Brezhnev’s proposal to ban ERWs the lobbying for their deployment was 
actually increased by Schmidt who now sensed that the Soviet Union was dangerously close 
to obtaining its objective of ‘de-coupling’ the U.S. nuclear deterrent from the protection of 
Western Europe. Schmidt now wanted the ERW deployed so as to act as a clear signal to 
Moscow that the United States would bolster its nuclear presence in Western Europe to match 
Soviet developments. Yet Schmidt realised his domestic position made it politically 
impossible for West Germany to unilaterally accept the deployment of ERWs. To overcome 
this domestic opposition, the solution would be for the entire NATO alliance to agree to 
deploy ERWs so that Schmidt could plausibly claim to the West German electorate that he 
was merely pursuing the traditional West German policy of supporting NATO policy. 
Schmidt thus informed Washington that West Germany’s approval for deploying ERWs on 
German territory was conditioned upon the proviso that other NATO allies would do 
likewise.34 
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The British government consequently came under pressure from both Washington and 
Bonn to accept that ERWs (or their component parts) would be deployed on British 
territory.35 Fearing that rejection would spark serious difficulties with Carter and Schmidt, 
Callaghan reluctantly indicated that he would approve the deployment of ERWs on British 
soil.36 By 17 March 1978 U.S. officials had reached agreement with both their British and 
West German counterparts that public announcement to deploy ERWs would be issued. A 
day later, however, Carter began to have misgivings about the decision. As one British 
official involved in the negotiations remembered ‘We were on the point of agreeing a formula 
about it in the NATO council when word came through that the president (Jimmy Carter) had 
prayed all night and had decided not to deploy this thing.’37 
Why then had the president reversed his decision? First, Carter had always been 
troubled about the morality of developing ERWs. Second, the president remained concerned 
that deploying the ERW would scupper his chances of obtaining a meaningful arms control 
agreement with Moscow. Finally, Carter was also aware that approving the ERW would do 
immense damage with core constituencies within the Democratic Party which had supported 
his candidacy in 1976 because of his stance on reducing nuclear arms. For all these factors 
then, Carter completely backtracked. Within ten days of deciding to deploy the ERW, the 
president announced that the ERW would not be deployed after all.38  
The president’s indecision infuriated his European allies. As Brzezinski 
retrospectively wrote, Carter ‘knew that the impact of this decision would be serious.’39 The 
advice offered to Brzezinski was rather more candid as he was warned that Carter’s 
indecision gave the impression that the president was unable to make and stick to a decision 
which undermined his position as the de facto leader of the western alliance.40 Even more 
alarming was Robert Hunter’s report on a conversation he had held with Schmidt and Owen 
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who both suggested that Carter’s reversal demonstrated that the president was critically weak 
on matters of national security.41 Such criticism was restrained in comparison to the analysis 
provided by the Conservative Party shadow defence secretary, Ian Gilmour, who asserted that 
‘President Carter’s behaviour over the so-called Neutron Bomb has been a classic 
demonstration of how not to conduct international diplomacy and disarmament negotiations. 
There have been weeks of leaks and contradictions; and after an orgy of weakness and 
vacillation the wrong decision has finally been reached. Mr Carter has been scared off the 
Neutron Bomb by the Russian propaganda barrage.’42  
Back in Washington, the likes of Brzezinski, Brown and Schlesinger all set to work in 
convincing the president to reconsider his decision for they were all of the opinion that the 
ERW would act as useful counterweight to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20. All three 
therefore made efforts to persuade the president to reverse his decision and give the go ahead 
for the deployment of the ERW. In the end though Carter rebuffed such advice and decided 
that the ERW would not be deployed.43 Carter now ‘decided to work out a way to cancel the 
idea (ERW) without giving an image of weakness to our European allies.’44 Such efforts 
would, however, prove unsuccessful. The West German response was visceral as Carter was 
personally lambasted for demonstrating weak and naïve leadership. A much more measured 
response was found in London as Kingman Brewster, the U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom, informed Washington that ‘The British government as you know will back you 
whatever you decide.  This is a great tribute to the strength of the bond which you have 
forged.’ This was to prove accurate as Callaghan struck a sympathetic tone and reiterated his 
support of Carter’s decision during meetings with American policy makers.45  
Privately, however, the British government was rather less sympathetic. Whilst 
Callaghan had always been reluctant to support the deployment of ERWs, now that the Carter 
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administration had gone to the lengths of endorsing their deployment and then withdrawing 
this support, the credibility of the NATO nuclear umbrella was clearly now being brought 
into question. Callaghan’s position was clear: if the NATO nuclear deterrent was credible, 
then why was the deployment of the ERW even being countenanced in the first place? As 
Owen pointed out to Warren Christopher, ‘because having asked Allies to march up the hill 
and now down again, credibility will still be damaged no matter how well the public 
formulation is handled.’46 As such, the British government inquired whether the United 
States could provide additional resources to NATO’s conventional force capability. Such a 
request was predicated upon the belief that if Washington would not undertake improvements 
to NATO’s nuclear forces to counteract the Soviet Union’s conventional and nuclear 
weapons build-up, then additional conventional forces would have to be supplied. And given 
that the president was unwilling to authorise the ERW which would have been a cheaper 
alternative than conventional force improvements, it was London’s opinion that Washington 
should have to foot the bill for such improvements.47  
The British response may not have been as damning as that of West Germany but key 
actors inside the Carter administration understood that the ERW episode had significantly 
damaged the president’s standing with his fellow leaders inside the NATO alliance. More 
damaging yet was that the president’s handling of the ERW issue provided the impression 
that Carter was indecisive, politically weak and his national security policy was ‘all over the 
place.’48 All told the possible development and deployment of the ERW had been a damaging 
and embarrassing affair for the president. For Anglo-American relations the episode once 
again highlighted the difficulties of alliance politics.   
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Rhodesia 
As 1977 came to an end, America and Britain had reached agreement that the basis of any 
political settlement inside Rhodesia had to bring about majority rule, i.e. Black Rhodesians 
would have to be granted universal suffrage and new elections would be conducted to elect a 
new parliament and president. Events in Rhodesia, however, would soon test the unity of 
London and Washington. Following negotiations between Smith and Muzorewa an 
agreement was announced on 15 February 1978 that a settlement for implementing majority 
rule had been reached. This internal settlement would become known as the ‘Salisbury 
Agreement.’ On 3 March 1978 Smith provided further details and outlined that elections to 
form a new government would be convened which would allow for the participation of Black 
Rhodesians. In the interim period prior to the elections, Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and 
Jeremiah Chirau were to join a Rhodesian Executive Council to oversee progress.49 
London and Washington interpreted this announcement in radically different ways. 
From London’s perspective this marked significant progress for it suggested that Smith was 
committed to bring about majority rule. The Salisbury Agreement also had the additional 
benefit of bringing together Black Nationalist leaders such as Muzorewa that had renounced 
violent struggle in achieving majority rule in Rhodesia.50 This contrasted sharply with the 
Patriotic Front of Mugabe’s ZANU or Nkomo’s ZAPU that continued to use violent methods 
for achieving majority rule and looked to the USSR and the PRC for support in realising this 
ambition. Given this, London believed that Smith would never enter into a formal power 
sharing arrangement with the Patriotic Front. On liaising with Smith, however, David Owen 
found a new cooperative attitude from the Rhodesian prime minister. Indeed, Smith informed 
Owen that he was genuinely committed to the Salisbury Agreement and he would attend a 
further round of Anglo-American-Rhodesian discussions about transitioning to majority rule 
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in the near future. Talks with Sithole and Muzorewa further encouraged the British 
government to view the Salisbury Agreement positively. As such, it became the policy of the 
British government to ‘neither condemn nor condone the internal settlement.’51 London had 
therefore decided to wait until they better understood Washington’s reaction before 
committing to any definite line of policy in reaction to the Salisbury Agreement. 
 The Carter administration, in contrast, viewed the Salisbury Agreement rather less 
positively. As Vance suggested, the majority rule measures proposed within the Salisbury 
Agreement had a number of clauses which would sustain the privileged position of the White 
Rhodesian population. For example, the Rhodesian parliament would be comprised of 100 
Members of Parliament (MPs) but not all would be elected according to the rules of universal 
suffrage. Thus, of these 100 MPs, 72 would be elected by Black Rhodesian votes (who 
comprised 96% of the population), 20 MPs would be elected by White Rhodesian votes (who 
comprised 4% of the population), and a further 8 MPs would be elected by Black Rhodesians 
who had been selected to stand for office by White Rhodesians. In sum, White Rhodesians 
who comprised 4% of the population would elect 28% of the MPs in this newly proposed 
Rhodesian parliament. The importance of this was evident on closer inspection of the 
proposed Rhodesian constitution which would only allow amendments to it if 78 out of the 
100 MPs voted their approval. This meant that the make-up of the Rhodesian parliament 
under such conditions would allow MPs elected directly or indirectly by White Rhodesians to 
veto any amendments to the constitution. Fundamentally the proposed Rhodesian parliament 
had a structural advantage built into it for White Rhodesians. Whilst the Salisbury Agreement 
marked a significant departure from the existing apartheid system in place in Rhodesia it still 
accorded political power on racial lines. 
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Secondly, the Salisbury Agreement lacked the support of either Patriotic Front 
faction. Nkomo, for instance, claimed that the Salisbury Agreement was the ‘greatest sell-out 
in the history of Africa.’52 With such damning rhetoric it was little surprise that the Patriotic 
Front continued to fight the Rhodesian Bush War. As Low, Vance and Young all concluded, 
supporting the Salisbury Agreement would not bring an end to the Rhodesian Bush War and 
it also threatened to create a broader civil war in Rhodesia between the supporters of Mugabe 
and Nkomo against the forces of the Salisbury Group (Chiru, Muzorewa, Sithole and 
Smith).53 
The Carter administration subsequently informed London that they would refuse to 
recognise the legitimacy of the Salisbury agreement. Washington reminded London that it 
needed to remain committed to the previously agreed Anglo-American plan that any 
settlement in Rhodesia would only receive their endorsement if it was truly a majority rule 
settlement, i.e. it brought the Patriotic Front into the final agreement in some form or another. 
Even though Congressional pressure for lifting sanctions against Rhodesia was being applied 
to the Carter administration, the president refused to yield.54 As Washington had been 
informed from various African leaders, they would not support the Salisbury Agreement and 
London’s refusal to condemn it had only further illustrated to these African leaders that 
London was not fully committed to majority rule. Given these competing pressures, the 
Carter administration remained more determined than ever that their support for any 
Rhodesian settlement would have to be premised on a system that brought together all 
Rhodesians and destroyed any vestiges of political power being dictated by race.55 
The Carter administration instructed its mission at the United Nations to issue a 
statement that rejected the Salisbury Agreement. The United States now proposed that all the 
parties in Rhodesia come together to negotiate a majority rule settlement. London, whilst 
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angst at Carter’s decision to reject the Salisbury Agreement again decided to support 
Washington’s actions. As British policy makers concluded, their political influence within 
Rhodesia was ultimately premised upon American power which meant they had to support 
the fundamental tenets of American strategy regardless of their own misgivings about the 
merits of U.S. policy.56 Subsequently, joint letters composed by Carter and Callaghan were 
dispatched to several African leaders to convince them to support the Anglo-American plan. 
Smith was informed that the Salisbury Agreement would not be recognised by London or 
Washington. In a sign to Washington that the British government remained committed to 
implementing the Anglo-American plan, Owen now engaged in another intensive round of 
diplomacy with the leadership of South Africa and the Front Line states to support the Anglo-
American plan.57  
Anglo-American diplomacy was to achieve little as Smith refused to yield to this 
pressure. In fact, Smith informed both London and Washington following the talks he held 
with Owen and Vance in April 1978 that the measures agreed to in the Salisbury Agreement 
were to go ahead and he would begin the transition to a new Rhodesian government.58 Worse 
news was to come as both Mugabe and Nkomo made it clear that they were unprepared to 
enter an all-parties negotiation with the new government of Rhodesia (or Rhodesia Zimbabwe 
as it was now being referred to as). The attitude of the Salisbury Group also prevented 
progress. Muzorewa and Sithole insisted that the Salisbury Agreement had established a 
legitimate and democratic government that should be recognised by the international 
community.59 Smith insisted that the physical security of White Rhodesians had to be assured 
in any settlement which the Salisbury Agreement had achieved. As Smith reminded London, 
incorporating the Patriotic Front into any agreement would undermine his ultimate objective 
of providing security for White Rhodesians in a post-apartheid state. The recent killings of 
White Rhodesian missionaries in the Vumba Mountains along with the shooting down of a 
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passenger aircraft by Patriotic Front guerrillas only endorsed the view that White Rhodesian 
security would be fatally undermined by an agreement that brought the Patriotic into a power 
sharing arrangement.60  
As the guerrilla war in Rhodesia intensified in the subsequent months, Smith provided 
a practicable demonstration of his seriousness when he declared that the ‘time has come for 
less talk and more action’ as he sought a military end-game to the war with the Patriotic 
Front. In the weeks that followed, Rhodesian forces began to raid Patriotic Front forces that 
were stationed in bordering states which led to increased guerrilla and civilian casualties. The 
Rhodesian Bush War was now threatening to spill into neighbouring territories resulting in a 
wider and more violent conflict.61 As one British official reported in September 1978, ‘It 
does not augur well for the holding of all-party talks with a reasonable prospect of success. It 
seems likely to me that, while ZANU will continue to pay lip-service to the need for an all-
party meeting, they will hedge their acceptance, and play their hand, in such a way as to make 
it very difficult for anything constructive to emerge if talks are held.’62 
Carter was increasingly frustrated with the predicament and privately noted in his 
diary in September 1978 that the ‘best solution is probably for Smith to give Rhodesia back 
to Great Britain.’63 Whilst a revealing statement in and of itself, others within the Carter 
administration were increasingly concerned that American involvement in Rhodesia should 
not become overextended. Since the outset of Carter’s involvement in Rhodesia, it had been a 
consistent element of American policy to ‘lead from behind.’ There was to be no meaningful 
change in U.S. policy at this point in spite of these latest diplomatic setbacks. Indicative of 
such concerns was the advice proffered by Brzezinski: ‘If you can’t then don’t’. As 
Brzezinski implied, if the United States could not reach a settlement then they should not try 
and push too hard because it would only generate increased resentment in the Front Line 
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States against the United States for having failed to deliver on their promises. Secondly, if the 
British government supplied peacekeepers which subsequently came under attack from 
Patriotic Front forces, would U.S. assistance be forthcoming? Would military action against 
the Patriotic Front lead to increased Soviet and PRC support for their respective clients? 
Aware that these scenarios would create numerous challenges for U.S. interests, diplomatic 
efforts coupled to economic and political sanctions would remain the basis of Carter’s 
approach to achieving a majority rule settlement in Rhodesia.64 
Yet the British government was fully conscious that their limited political influence 
with the actors inside Rhodesia meant that they were unable to deliver the types of results that 
Washington desired. Indicative of Britain’s diminished influence was evidenced during 
Callaghan’s visit to a number of the Front Line States in September 1978. Whilst the 
meetings had gone far better than the prime minister had anticipated, Callaghan informed 
Washington that he had been unable to make any discernible progress in helping implement 
majority rule in Rhodesia.65 London feared that a failure to implement the Anglo-American 
plan successfully would lead to the Carter administration accusing the British government of 
sabotaging or delaying progress for they remained secretly committed to supporting the 
Salisbury Agreement. As Jay informed London ‘U.S. policy towards Rhodesia could become 
an issue with mass opinion if, as Dr Brzezinski put it to me, white nuns were daily being 
raped on national TV by black soldiers with red stars on their caps.’66 Additional pressure 
from Washington to resolve the situation was therefore expected in London. Jay reported 
back to London: 
Since then, there has been an unmistakable trace of schadenfreude in 
[Brzezinski’s] reactions to the failure of US-UK policy to make some 
more headway. He and his deputy talk, sometime recklessly, about 
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the Americans washing their hands of Southern Africa. I do not 
believe for a moment that he contemplates this as a sensible policy for 
the U.S., if only because of the dangers of the geo-political signals 
which it would send all over the world. It is, rather, his way of trying 
to bring home to the State Department and us the need, as he sees it, 
for us to put more direct pressure on the Front Line States and the 
Patriotic Front, using sticks as well as carrots to reach a settlement, 
and to resist Soviet and Cuban encroachment into the area.67 
 
The British government concluded that further negotiations with Smith would now have to be 
undertaken, not least as a means of appeasing the United States and preventing Rhodesian 
differences spiralling into other facets of Anglo-American relations.68 Thus, to provide a 
demonstrable sign of Anglo-American unity, Peter Jay and David Newsom, the 
undersecretary of state for Political Affairs, met with Smith, Sithole and Muzorewa in 
Washington in October 1978. It was here that both American and British diplomats argued 
that the Salisbury group had to bring both factions of the Patriotic Front into the majority rule 
negotiations.69 As the Anglo-American delegation made clear, the Salisbury Agreement 
would not be recognised. Carter was even more explicit during one public address which 
followed these talks when he declared that ‘What we want is to have democratic elections in 
Rhodesia with an established constitution based on democratic principles. We want anyone 
who desires, to run for public office, and we want the people in Rhodesia, black and white, to 
be able to vote on an equal, one person one vote basis, to choose their own leader.’70 Fresh 
talks between all the parties were therefore required to bring about a settlement that would 
implement majority rule.71  
103 
 
In an effort to now overcome this impasse the British government analysed a number 
of possible courses of action. The options even included dispatching British armed forces to 
Rhodesia as a part of a UN peacekeeping mission to guarantee the security of White 
Rhodesians in an attempt to reassure Smith that White Rhodesian security would be 
guaranteed in a majority rule Rhodesia that included Patriotic Front participation. Such a 
step, though encouraged by Washington, was something that Callaghan was unwilling to 
sanction not least because of the quite unknowable challenges that would face British 
peacekeepers. Thus, when the South African foreign minister, Frederik Botha, suggested to 
Owen that 100,000 peacekeepers could be parachuted into Rhodesia to install stability, the 
British foreign and commonwealth secretary replied that this ‘kind of operation was out of 
the question.’72 Military action was quite simply anathema to the British government. 
Callaghan therefore decided on a less risky course of action and dispatched Cledwyn Hughes, 
the Labour Party Chairman, as a ‘special envoy’ to the region in December 1978. Callaghan 
also met with Nyerere and requested that he place pressure upon the leaders of the Patriotic 
Front to enter negotiations.73 American pressure on London was clearly encouraging the 
Callaghan government to engage in a renewed round of diplomacy and to hasten progress 
towards a majority rule settlement that included the participation of the Patriotic Front. 
The British further analysed what additional pressure they could apply to Smith in 
order to convince him that he should attend an all-party conference. London looked at the 
possibility of implementing a broader economic embargo against South Africa with a view 
that under such pressure the South African government would convince Smith to attend the 
talks. London believed that with the Shah of Iran’s recent overthrow from power, South 
Africa’s main source of oil would be curtailed by the new Iranian regime. An oil embargo 
applied to South Africa could now perhaps lead to the desired political outcome. The British 
also looked at inducements they could offer to the various factions to bring about agreement. 
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These included improving existing levels of development aid, providing a British contingent 
to any UN peacekeeping force, ensuring the supply of oil to the new government of 
Rhodesia, and offering to help White Rhodesians with emigration costs.74 But it became 
quickly apparent that British intervention was producing little diplomatic progress. Carter 
was made aware that Hughes’s intervention had probably hindered negotiations for his arrival 
had only antagonised all parties in the Rhodesian negotiations. British efforts at persuading 
the Front Line States to place pressure upon Mugabe and Nkomo to enter negotiations 
appeared to make little headway either. Thus, on 19 December 1978 Callaghan informed 
Carter that the Hughes mission had for all intense and purposes failed.75  
 By the end of 1978 little progress had been made as both Mugabe and Nkomo refused 
to attend an all-party conference and the Salisbury Group asserted that they remained the 
legitimate government of the newly named Rhodesia Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, Rhodesian 
security forces were stepping up their efforts to militarily defeat the Patriotic Front. Given the 
events in Rhodesia, Carter remained suspicious that London would look to support the 
Salisbury Agreement and in preparation for the forthcoming Guadalupe summit (February 
1979), Carter and Vance decided that they would remind the prime minister to continue to 
urge the leaders of the Patriotic Front and the Salisbury Group to attend an all-party 
conference. Pressure was therefore being placed on London to continue to support the 
American policy that an acceptable majority rule settlement would have to include the 
Patriotic Front.76  
Over the course of the next weeks little progress was made as the British government 
remained unable to convince the parties to come together for all-party talks. The dispatch of a 
British Commonwealth peacekeeping force was again mooted but London rejected this 
course fearing that British forces would become targets for the Patriotic Front.77 With Smith 
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pressing ahead with his referendum of White Rhodesians to decide whether or not to create a 
new Rhodesian constitution which would be followed by elections on 20 April 1979 (which 
would allow certain Black leaders to stand but excluded the Patriotic Front), London looked 
on powerless unable to implement a majority rule settlement that all parties in Rhodesia could 
agree upon. All Callaghan could offer was to publically reiterate that ‘The referendum of the 
White electorate held in Rhodesia on 30 January has little significance in terms of the 
acceptability of the regime’s constitutional proposals to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.’78  
By the time Callaghan left office the situation in Rhodesia was perhaps even more 
unstable than one he had inherited on becoming prime minister. Nevertheless, a number of 
significant advances had also been made. First, Callaghan had exploited America’s growing 
interest in the question of majority rule in Rhodesia to ensure that American power supported 
British diplomatic efforts. Of course, this support came at a price especially in terms of 
freedom of action. Consequently, the British government had to yield to American demands 
on occasion, most notably having to reject the Salisbury Agreement as the basis of a 
legitimate majority rule settlement which London had initially welcomed. Yet Callaghan’s 
diplomatic hand was also weakened by his unwillingness to undertake sterner measures 
against Smith in the form of more comprehensive economic sanctions. The prime minister’s 
outright rejection of deploying British military forces to act as peacekeepers further limited 
the effectiveness of his diplomacy. Because of these decisions, London’s already weak 
diplomatic position undermined Callaghan’s ability to influence a transition to a majority rule 
settlement that would be acceptable for all of the parties involved.  
America’s influence was similarly limited by virtue of Carter’s unwillingness to 
undertake bolder measures towards solving the Rhodesian majority rule question. Whilst 
Carter was happy to suggest that London commit military force to Rhodesia, there was never 
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a question that Washington would do likewise. The unwillingness to utilise U.S. military 
power inherently limited the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy. Nevertheless, given that both 
London and Washington rejected the Salisbury Agreement and remained insistent that a 
majority rule settlement had to include all factions in Rhodesia, the internal settlement could 
never establish international legitimacy. Indeed, the unity of the Anglo-American position 
ensured that a legitimate settlement to the question of majority rule in Rhodesian would have 
to include the Patriotic Front. This was a notable achievement for it established the 
parameters by which any final majority rule settlement in Rhodesia would be recognised as 
legitimate by the international community. Carter and Callaghan may not have resolved the 
question of majority rule in Rhodesia but they had by the time Callaghan left office 
established the framework by which any final settlement would be judged as legitimate.    
The Anglo-American nuclear agreement at Guadeloupe  
The British update to Polaris via the Chevaline project had quietly, if expensively, been 
moving ahead. However, the point had now been reached that a decision on replacing Polaris 
with an entirely new system had to be made. Following deliberation on the preferred option 
for replacing Polaris, Callaghan concluded that a submarine based strategic nuclear deterrent 
was the preferred choice. Accordingly, the British prime minister would raise the possibility 
with the president whether the United States would sell the latest American SLBM system, 
Trident C4, to the United Kingdom.79 An opportunity to do this was afforded at the 
forthcoming Guadeloupe summit where the four leaders of France, the United Kingdom, the 
United States and West Germany were set to meet on the island of Guadeloupe in January 
1979 to discuss matters of mutual interest. 
It was during the summit that Callaghan personally raised the subject of purchasing 
Trident C4 with Carter. Such was the secrecy which surrounded this discussion is evidenced 
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by the fact that there was no record of the conversation created at this point. In a further 
illustration of the exclusive nature of the conversation, Owen informed foreign office posts 
that he did not ‘yet have details or even [the] gist of [the] Guadeloupe discussions.’80 It was 
only once Callaghan faced a no confidence vote in the House of Commons and fearful that he 
would be ejected from office at the end of March 1979 that he hastily arranged for an ‘official 
record’ of the president-prime minister private agreement to be created.81  
Meeting with the president in his private beach hut at Guadeloupe, Callaghan raised 
the subject of purchasing Trident C4 as a direct replacement for Polaris.82 Carter responded 
far more directly and positively than Callaghan had believed likely. A ‘private agreement’ 
between the president and prime minister was struck to sell the British government Trident 
C4 if a formal request for its purchase was made. That Trident C4 was a system that 
comprised of multiple re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) which could potentially create difficulties 
for the United States in the context of their SALT II negotiations would not, the president 
assured Callaghan, prevent its sale to the United Kingdom.83 As Callaghan informed his key 
cabinet colleagues: 
I put it to Carter that the option which on present information I would 
favour as being most likely to meet our requirements was the Trident 
C4 Mirved missile; would he be willing in principle to make this 
available to us on a financial basis which would be within the limits 
of what we could afford? In reply Carter reaffirmed his support for 
the maintenance of an independent British deterrent…and said he was 
very ready to consider letting us have the Mirved C4 if this was what 
we wanted and that he thought it should be possible to work out 
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satisfactory financial terms. He agreed to my suggestion that I should 
send over to Washington a small team to talk about this.84  
 
In spite of the protestations made in the subsequent memoirs of key Labour policy makers 
that no decision was taken by the Callaghan government to replace Polaris, it is apparent 
from the private documentation now open to scrutiny that the prime minister was personally 
determined to purchase Trident C4.85 Problems with the Labour Party election manifesto, 
which had stated that ‘We have renounced any intention of moving toward a new generation 
of strategic nuclear weapons’ explains why Callaghan was so careful in obtaining an 
agreement to purchase Trident C4 with ‘no commitment.’86 This ‘no commitment’ clause 
was a condition which Callaghan continually emphasised in his communication with his 
cabinet colleagues and with the United States.87 At any rate, any opposition from Healey or 
Owen was believed to be easily overcome given that they had both approved the continuation 
of the Chevaline programme and both were politically invested in sustaining Callaghan’s 
premiership.88 Evident that a decision to purchase Trident C4 was gaining political 
momentum is demonstrated by the fact that talks between British and American personnel on 
the technical details of Trident C4 replacing Polaris now began.89 In a further sign of 
Callaghan’s determination to purchase Trident C4, the prime minister in a break with 
protocol ensured that his successor, Margaret Thatcher, would have access to his private 
papers on matters related to the replacement of Polaris. This quite remarkable act was 
undertaken to ensure that his successor would be well briefed about the private agreements 
that had been reached with the United States so that a fully informed decision on replacing 
Polaris could be made.90 Whilst no formal agreement had been reached to replace Polaris 
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with Trident C4, Callaghan had put in place the necessary groundwork to ensure that any 
successor to him as prime minister had the option available to them if they so desired.  
 This episode reveals a number of interesting points about the nature of the Anglo-
American relationship during Callaghan and Carter’s short time in office together. First, it 
endorses the viewpoint that good personal relations are important in helping to reach 
agreement.91 Such was the ease of the Carter-Callaghan relationship that it allowed for the 
prime minister to raise this subject of purchasing Trident C4 on a personal basis and without 
an official record of the meeting being kept. This was important because the private 
agreement appeared to be sufficient for both sides to proceed with further technical 
discussions. By the time that Callaghan had left office, he had ensured that any successor 
government had the opportunity to replace Polaris with Trident C4 if they so desired.  
Callaghan’s tenure as prime minister would soon come to an end. Facing increasing 
troubles with a number of Trade Unions which had forced a 3 day working week upon 
government services and mounting rebellions within the House of Commons with the 
dissolution of the informally agreed Lib-Lab Pact, Callaghan faced a no-confidence vote in 
his leadership. Callaghan narrowly lost the vote and was forced to call for a General Election. 
The result was a political disaster for the prime minister as Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
Party swept to power in May 1979. It is to Margaret Thatcher’s first years in office that we 
now turn to.  
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5 
Thatcher comes to power 
 
Thatcher in office 
During her tour of the United States in 1977 Margaret Thatcher had met with Jimmy Carter 
where she clearly did not endear herself to the president. Such was the tone of the meeting 
Carter left with the impression that Thatcher was both hot-headed and ‘overbearing.’ 
Overbearing or not, U.S. policy makers understood that Thatcher was likely to be the next 
British prime minister. Events would bear out such assessments as Callaghan’s political 
predicament was made increasingly untenable as he faced mounting industrial crisis 
throughout the country. In January 1979 the oil tank drivers of Texaco Oil Company voted to 
go on strike which was followed by further strikes from the road haulage union. This was 
followed by union strikes from public transport and water works workers. In an effort to 
preserve resources, the British government announced a ‘3-day week.’ Callaghan’s visit to 
Guadeloupe in February 1979 and his handling of the waiting press at Heathrow, whereby the 
prime minister brushed off suggestions that Britain faced a ‘crisis’ hardly helped matters. 
When asked by one reporter what was his view on the ‘mounting crisis in the country at the 
moment?’ Callaghan responded by stating that ‘you’re taking a rather parochial view at the 
moment, I don’t think that other people in the world would share the view that there is 
mounting chaos.’ Bernard Donoughue far better understood the political implications. As he 
privately recognised at the time, a picture of Callaghan ‘basking in the Caribbean sun’ would 
not ‘look good when Britain is frozen and coming to halt.’ This was indeed how one 
newspaper interpreted matters as it exclaimed on its front page ‘Crisis, What Crisis?’ 
Callaghan’s inability to solve these mounting challenges led to a passing of a vote of no 
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confidence in the House of Commons which forced the prime minister to dissolve parliament 
and call for an immediate General Election. For Callaghan the result was a political disaster 
as Mrs Thatcher swept into office on 4 May 1979 with a solid 43 seat parliamentary 
majority.1 
 In certain sections of the press it was suggested that Thatcher’s election victory was 
not particularly welcomed by the Carter administration. Advisers close to Thatcher suggested 
that such speculation was the work of either Peter Jay or Hamilton Whyte (David Owen’s 
press secretary) in an attempt to discredit Thatcher’s election chances.2 Where the origins of 
the stories emanated from were a moot point as such reports were indeed accurate. As 
Carrington remembered out of office, the impression he gleaned from Washington was that 
the Carter administration believed Thatcher was a ‘sort of right-wing baboon’ that would be 
impossibly difficult to work with.3 In contrast, Callaghan had proven capable of working well 
with the Carter administration and had always supported the central tenets of Carter’s foreign 
policy in public. In contrast, Thatcher could be a more troublesome partner especially given 
the fact that she had been candid in expressing her distaste for superpower détente and had 
been critical of the Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia. Superpower détente had come in for 
special criticism from Thatcher during her time in opposition. In 1975, for example, she had 
claimed the signing of the Helsinki Accords was analogous to the Munich Conference of 
1938 where the British and French governments had agreed to cede a portion of 
Czechoslovakia to Hitler’s Germany.4  
In Thatcher’s estimation détente was both an immoral and, more importantly, 
dangerous policy to pursue because détente was premised upon the assumption that long-term 
cooperation with the Soviet Union was possible. This was fatal misjudgement in Thatcher’s 
opinion because it overlooked the fact that the Soviet Union was an expansionist power that 
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sought to bring about a permanent revolution of the working classes. The Soviet Union 
therefore posed an existential threat to liberal democracies such as the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, in Thatcher’s judgement, détente had led the western powers into a false sense of 
security and had allowed the Soviet Union to obtain a dangerous military advantage. As 
Thatcher stated before the Conservative party conference in October 1978 ‘The Soviet Union, 
through its Cuban mercenaries, has completed its Marxist takeover of Angola; Ethiopia has 
been turned into a Communist bastion in the Horn of Africa; there are now perhaps 40,000 
Cubans in that continent, a deadly threat to the whole of Southern Africa. And as the Soviet 
threat becomes stronger, so the Labour Government [has] made Britain weaker.’5 Such 
rhetoric was not merely for public consumption in order to accrue political advantages. In 
private, the prime minister was even more alarmist about the western position vis-à-vis the 
communist bloc. During one conversation with the out-going Supreme Commander of 
NATO, Alexander Haig, she claimed that the West had in the previous five years slipped 
from a position of ‘equivalence to inferiority.’ In discussion with Helmut Schmidt she 
advanced a similar type of argument.6 
How the new prime minister’s rhetoric would translate into actual foreign policy 
therefore concerned Washington. Kingman Brewster, the U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom, was thus tasked with providing more details about Thatcher and her likely foreign 
policy trajectory. Brewster quickly supplied Washington with his analysis noting that the new 
prime minister was a ‘cooler, wiser, more pragmatic person now than the Opposition leader 
[Carter] met in May 1977.’ Lord Carrington’s appointment as foreign and commonwealth 
secretary was particularly welcomed. As Brzezinski wrote to the president, this was ‘one of 
the most encouraging signals Mrs Thatcher could send us at the start of her stewardship.’7 As 
Jay accurately informed London, Carrington’s appointment had been welcomed with ‘real 
pleasure’ and ‘some relief.’8  
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For his part, Carrington intended to act as a calming influence upon the prime 
minister and prevent her from charting British foreign policy along any new radical course. 
Since Thatcher had replaced Edward Heath as the leader of the Conservative Party in 1975 
Carrington had privately expressed his concern with the style and substance of her leadership. 
‘What are we going to do after she gets in’ office Carrington asked Lord Hailsham. ‘All we 
can do is see she is surrounded by adequate advisors’ was the response.9 Carrington took the 
advice and as he remembered out of office: 
Margaret Thatcher evinced at times a distrust of the Foreign Office, a 
determined attitude that it didn’t stick up for Britain and was softly 
conciliatory when the reverse was needed. I found that this sentiment 
was never far from the surface, and could erupt in impatient hostility 
unless ably countered-and sometimes even then. I knew that I would 
need as much patience and firmness as I could command.10  
Indeed, Carrington was determined to influence Thatcher away from her more 
confrontational tendencies and was, given Thatcher’s own inexperience in foreign affairs, 
able to achieve this ambition to great effect. As Douglas Hurd recollected, Carrington relied 
upon his ‘seniority and natural mastery of international problems in which the prime minister 
knew she was inexperienced … By limiting himself to foreign affairs he maximised his 
influence.’11 As shown later in the chapter Carrington’s influence was decisively brought to 
bear as it pertained to the bringing about a majority rule settlement in Rhodesia and in 
ensuring British support for Carter’s arms control policies. 
  Doubts about Thatcher persisted in U.S. circles not least with regard to her 
personality. As U.S. policy makers hypothesised, Thatcher’s ‘driven personality’ did not 
make for an easy partner and could lead to her questioning and even challenging the central 
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tenets of Carter’s foreign policy. Her inexperience in foreign affairs and tendency to speak 
candidly could lead her to antagonising and complicating relations with allies and foes 
alike.12 Specifically, U.S. policy makers feared that Thatcher would assume a less 
accommodating attitude to the question of majority rule in Rhodesia and would take a far 
more hostile attitude to the SALT II negotiations.13 The Carter administration was right to be 
concerned as Thatcher immediately began to question whether the United Kingdom should 
support some of the international treaties that the president was seeking to create (such as the 
SALT II and the CTB treaties). Carrington, however, quietly persuaded the prime minister to 
support U.S. ambitions. As Carrington appreciated, Washington would press ahead with these 
agreements regardless of London’s objections thus meaning that opposition would only 
damage Anglo-American relations and provide no meaningful counter benefit.14  
Thatcher’s election therefore created apprehension in U.S. policy making circles but 
such concerns should not be exaggerated. The coming to power of any new political leader 
naturally provokes a degree of apprehension for it alters the political status quo. Carter also 
realised that he would have to work with Thatcher for the foreseeable future so thus sought to 
quell newspaper speculation that he did not welcome her election. The president therefore 
personally telephoned the new prime minister to congratulate her on her election victory. As 
Carter well understood, personality differences would have to be placed to one side. More 
importantly, the Carter administration suspected that Thatcher’s rhetoric vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union was largely designed for party political consumption. Accordingly, it was suggested 
that Thatcher’s foreign policy would likely only differ from Callaghan’s in ‘tone’ rather than 
in substance.15 Cyrus Vance’s visit to the new prime minister, scheduled for the final week of 
May 1979, therefore afforded the Carter administration the opportunity to personally acquaint 
themselves with the new British government. 
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On 23 May 1979, Vance met with Thatcher at 10 Downing Street where a general 
tour d’horizon of international affairs was conducted. Noteworthy from this first encounter 
was that on most subjects, Thatcher carefully stuck to her pre-prepared briefing material and 
emphasised that she was committed to the previous British government’s position of 
supporting Carter’s core foreign policy ambitions.16 The subject of SALT II, however, 
sparked keen discussion between the two sides. Knowing that the U.S. and Soviets were close 
to announcing a SALT II Treaty (this would be signed in Vienna by Carter and Brezhnev in 
June 1979) the British prime minister took this opportunity to seek clarity on the treaties 
content.17 Thatcher inquired as to whether SALT II would allow the Carter administration to 
improve the quality of U.S. nuclear systems to counterbalance what she perceived to be the 
Soviet Union’s growing quantitative and qualitative nuclear weapons advantage. The British 
prime minister also sought clarification on how SALT II would affect the Anglo-American 
nuclear relationship as she reminded Vance that a non-circumvention clause could prevent 
the United States from supplying the United Kingdom with nuclear material and thus 
undermine London’s ability to maintain its strategic nuclear deterrent.18  
Thatcher’s complaints about SALT II were hardly the most original given that 
successive British governments had made similar arguments for the past decade. But her 
lengthy criticism forced Vance to mount a sustained justification of current U.S. policy. As 
such, the U.S. secretary of state explained how the president would never allow the Anglo-
American nuclear relationship to be undermined by agreements reached with the Soviet 
Union. Vance also explained at great length how the Carter administration was ensuring that 
the Soviet Union could not obtain the qualitative advantage in nuclear weapons that Thatcher 
feared was possible because of the president’s modernisation programme of the U.S. strategic 
nuclear arsenal. All told, the president had endorsed a modernisation programme that would 
require a $30 billion investment in the U.S. nuclear arsenal which Vance believed would 
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ensure that the Soviet Union could not possibly obtain a qualitative nuclear advantage. It was 
at this point that Lord Carrington injected himself into proceedings. Evidently sensing the 
growing antagonism generated by Thatcher’s criticism of current U.S. nuclear weapons 
policy, Carrington assured Vance that the United Kingdom would fully support the upcoming 
SALT II agreement in public and in private discussion with America’s allies.19  
This episode is revealing at a number of levels. In some ways the British government 
were indeed promoting U.S. efforts in relation to SALT II as Thatcher would go on to 
publically endorse the president’s policies. Privately Thatcher also sought to quell potential 
opposition from the likes of Helmut Schmidt who was the most vocal in publically criticising 
SALT II. Ironically Schmidt’s criticism echoed similar concerns that Thatcher shared. Yet 
her decision to publically and privately support SALT II was premised upon the calculation 
that regardless of how ‘imperfect’ the treaty may be it was necessary to support for a number 
of important reasons. First, the Carter administration had ‘pressed’ London to support SALT 
II so the consequences of not doing so risked a major political spat with Washington. Such a 
scenario was believed to be unwise at a point when Thatcher was establishing herself in 
government and when the British government was itself engaged in discussion with 
Washington about finding a successor system to Polaris. As London concluded, it was 
imperative to avoid any political rapture with Washington and unduly endanger the Anglo-
American nuclear relationship. As one British official reminded his colleagues, if President 
Carter was to be ‘disappointed’ with Britain’s position over SALT II, there would likely to be 
‘repercussions elsewhere.’20  
Second, the British government had a realistic appreciation of its influence over 
Washington and understood just how much importance that Carter attached to the successful 
ratification of the SALT II treaty. British policy makers understood that their opposition to 
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SALT II would not stop the Carter administration signing the Treaty and knew that the 
mounting difficulties between Carter and the U.S. Senate over the wisdom of its ratification 
was something which London could not possibly derive any benefits from. Indeed, the Carter 
administration appreciated just how difficult the successful ratification of SALT II would be, 
with one administration official noting that ‘The selling of the SALT agreement, any SALT 
agreement, is going to be the toughest foreign policy challenge to this Administration, 
tougher even than the Panama Canal Treaties.’21  
Given that British opposition would not prevent the SALT II agreement, Thatcher was 
convinced that it was wiser to instead derive any political benefits that could be attained by 
encouraging its successful ratification by the U.S. Senate and in winning over sceptical allies 
such as Helmut Schmidt. Along with this, London believed that it was better to protect 
specific British interests (such as ensuring that a non-circumvention clause did not prevent 
the sale of a successor system to Polaris) instead of engaging in some broader philosophical 
discussion about the merits of SALT II per se. More to the point, the Carter administration 
recognised Thatcher’s concern about the growth in Soviet theatre nuclear weapons and now 
re-doubled its efforts to implement the Duel Track policy whereby arms limitation 
agreements with the Soviet Union would be sought at the same time as deploying additional 
nuclear weapons to Europe.22 Even though Thatcher’s rhetoric differed from that of 
Callaghan’s, fundamentally the British position of endorsing Carter’s SALT II policies whilst 
seeking to defend specific British interests remained the same. 
Following the talks with Thatcher and Carrington, Vance met with Francis Pym, the 
new British defence secretary. It was here that Vance raised the issue of how Thatcher’s 
publically stated ambition of reducing public expenditure would affect the previously agreed 
position of the British government to increase defence expenditure by 3% per annum. Pym 
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assured Vance that this remained official government policy but such assurances were 
contradicted when Vance met with Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.23 As 
Howe unequivocally informed the U.S secretary of state, there could be ‘no sacred cows’ 
when it came to reducing British public expenditure. Defence expenditure much like 
everything else would be analysed and appropriate cutbacks would be undertaken. As Howe 
further explained, his information indicated that the British government spent more as a 
proportion of their GDP on defence than the United States, West Germany or France. Given 
this and coupled to the bleak economic outlook facing the United Kingdom, the British 
government would have to reduce its existing levels of defence expenditure.24 
At the end of his visit to London, Vance could be reasonably content with the 
discussions he had held with the senior policy making actors within the Thatcher government. 
Whilst Howe had suggested British reductions in defence expenditure were likely to be 
forthcoming, Thatcher, Carrington and Pym had provided equivocal support for maintaining 
Britain’s existing commitments. Only time would tell which position would win through but 
the Thatcher governments’ Budgets for 1979 and 1980 left defence expenditure largely 
untouched pending a broader defence review. At this point in her premiership Thatcher had 
decided to prioritise defence expenditure over implementing her broader economic agenda.25 
Anglo-American differences over SALT II had been apparent during the Vance talks but 
again Thatcher and Carrington had reiterated that they supported the Carter administration’s 
ultimate objective of securing a SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union. Importantly, 
Thatcher promised Vance that she would only make public statements in support of SALT II 
which in the coming months she honoured. In all other areas of concern for Anglo-American 
relations, Vance had received the consistent message that Thatcher would continue to pursue 
the same levels of cooperation as experienced under Callaghan’s government. In sum, 
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Brewster had been correct to predict that Thatcher’s foreign policy would largely differ from 
Callaghan’s in terms of ‘tone’ rather than substance.  
 The British government could also be reasonably satisfied with the outcome of the 
Vance talks. Thatcher had questioned the U.S. secretary of state about U.S. nuclear policy 
and had been reassured that the president was undertaking a serious modernisation 
programme of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal that would maintain the existing strategic 
nuclear balance. Moreover, by advancing her concerns, the British government had received 
a number of assurances from Vance that Anglo-American nuclear cooperation would not be 
undermined by the signing of the SALT II Treaty. This assurance was followed by a personal 
letter to the prime minister from the president himself in which he asserted that he would not 
allow the SALT II Treaty to infringe upon Anglo-American nuclear cooperation.26 Quite how 
useful such assurances would prove in the future would of course be another matter but at the 
very least the British had got the president and his secretary of state on the record promising 
to safeguard the nuclear relationship. Such assurances were of course far from ironclad but 
they could be exploited usefully sometime in the future. 
The Washington Summit 
Soon after she took office, Thatcher looked to arrange an official visit to Washington which 
was finally set for December 1979. Prior to this, Thatcher had met with Carter at the Tokyo 
Economic Summit in June 1979 where the new prime minister had followed her briefing 
material closely and reiterated her support for the Anglo-American alliance.27 In sum, the 
first Carter-Thatcher meeting had been largely uneventful but the prime minister had made a 
better impression with Carter than she had during her meeting in 1977. As Carter reflected in 
his diary ‘Margaret Thatcher is a tough lady, highly opinionated, strong-willed, cannot admit 
that she doesn’t know something. However, I think she will be a good prime minister for 
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Great Britain.’28 Thatcher’s Washington visit, however, would be rather more important not 
least because there was a growing sense in London that Carter’s presidency was in serious 
trouble. As British officials observed, international and domestic difficulties were making it 
increasingly probable that Jimmy Carter would be a one-term president. As such, Carter 
would look to exploit the Thatcher visit to guarantee London’s support on a number of major 
international subjects.29 The most important of these related to the taking of U.S. hostages in 
Iran. As Thatcher was advised, Carter would look for her continued public support and would 
likely also propose that the British government endorse economic and political sanctions 
against Tehran (partly as a punishment against the Ayatollah but also as a means of helping to 
convince Iran to release the U.S. hostages). Thatcher’s visit would also be exploited by the 
president to demonstrate that he was not a ‘lame duck’ but was in ‘command of affairs’ and 
engaged in negotiations with one of America’s principle allies.30 Thatcher’s forthcoming visit 
therefore assumed greater importance because of international events and could potentially be 
exploited for domestic political benefit by both parties. 
Yet it was readily apparent that the British government were far from enthusiastic in 
supporting U.S. plans for implementing sanctions against Tehran. Whilst Thatcher was 
sympathetic to the president’s predicament, she remained unconvinced that Britain’s interests 
were best promoted by supporting economic sanctions against Iran. During initial talks in 
London between Thatcher and Vance no agreement could be found as to what economic 
sanctions should be pursued against Iran. When Vance proposed that the British government 
should freeze Iranian assets held in British banks, Thatcher immediately opposed such action. 
As she reasoned, such measures had only ever been undertaken during a ‘time of war.’ As 
such, the broader economic ramifications of such action had to be analysed in much greater 
depth before she would agree to support such moves.31  
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British opposition to American plans was predominantly motivated by a desire to 
safeguard significant British commercial and economic interests. London, for instance, was a 
critical hub in the international financial system. Exploiting this was central to Thatcher’s 
economic reforms at the start of her term in office as she sought to expand the financial 
services industry within the city. Seizing or freezing assets held by foreign states in British 
banks would severely undermined this broader policy ambition. More specifically, 
implementing these dramatic actions against banks based in the United Kingdom could 
encourage a capital flight away from London and significantly damage British financial 
interests.32  
Implementing Vance’s suggested actions therefore appealed little to British policy 
makers. Yet outright rejection of the Carter administration’s request would potentially 
engender a rift with Washington. In order to camouflage these self-interested commercial and 
economic motivations guiding British policy, the prime minister cited a number of legal 
problems which would prevent her from being able to support American economic sanctions 
against Tehran. As Thatcher consequently argued, she could not actually authorise the 
freezing of Iranian assets held within British banks without first passing emergency 
legislation through Parliament. Such arguments appeared unconvincing to the U.S. secretary 
of state. Vance challenged Thatcher’s position and suggested that sources within the British 
Treasury actually indicated that the prime minister had the existing legal authority to freeze 
foreign held assets. Carrington interjected at this point and reiterated that the British 
government had ‘no powers at present’ in which to undertake the type of action that 
Washington was requesting. Regardless as to who was factually correct was a moot point as 
Thatcher appeared unwilling to undertake the proposed American measures. The scene was 
now set for a diplomatic showdown in Washington where the Carter administration would 
look to win British support for enacting sanctions against Tehran.33  
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 On arriving in Washington on 17 December 1979, the British prime minister held 
meetings with key Carter administration policy makers, senior Senators and Congressmen, 
and media representatives. On liaising with a number of U.S. Senators, Thatcher went on the 
charm offensive and followed her briefing advice very closely. As Thatcher told the Senators, 
‘The special relationship was indefinable, but it existed and it gave the Americans the right to 
be able to count on Britain.’34 Senator Javits [R: New York] responded in a likeminded 
fashion as he told the group that ‘There was much talk of a special relationship between 
Britain and the United States. This special relationship did exist: between the peoples of 
Britain and the United States. In a crunch, they understood each other and shared the same 
ideals.’ Thatcher looked to exploit this sentimental rhetoric by emphasising that she 
supported the SALT II Treaty and hoped that the Senate would ratify it. She also highlighted 
how the United Kingdom stood steadfastly behind the United States in trying to solve the 
Iranian hostage situation.  
 Behind the highfaluting rhetoric Thatcher was quietly promoting her argument that 
nothing should be hastily undertaken against Iran in retaliation for the taking of the American 
hostages. As she informed her hosts ‘It was very frustrating for a great nation to have to move 
slowly and steadily, particularly when it was swept by a wave of anger. But when one was in 
power, one had to concentrate on the objective and she was sure that the United States was 
following the right course and would succeed in the end.’ Closely following her briefing 
material, Thatcher urged influential policy actors in Washington not to implement economic 
sanctions against Tehran. Subtly then, the prime minister was attempting to exercise 
influence over Washington’s decision makers and encourage a cautionary approach in 
dealing with Iran. How much influence Thatcher exercised, however, would be shown to be 
rather limited when the president authorised in April 1980 for a series of economic sanctions 
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against Iran and a rescue mission of the American hostages without first consulting with the 
prime minister. 
Rhodesia and Northern Ireland were also discussed during this meeting as Thatcher 
thanked the Senators for their public support in condemning terrorism in Northern Ireland 
and in praising the Lancaster House agreements. But Thatcher also showed a sharper side to 
her personality as she made it clear that she would not countenance the idea that ‘Ulster’ did 
not belong to the United Kingdom. As she told the Senators, including Tip O’Neill who was 
present: ‘Ulster was a part of the United Kingdom because that was the way its people 
wanted it. They had voted very strongly in that sense in a referendum in 1973. So long as 
there was terrorist violence, the Army must stay and the British Government’s aim must be 
(1) to beat terrorism and (2) to bring about more political progress in the Province.’35 The 
British prime minister had been none too subtle in asserting that the question of Irish 
sovereignty was not a subject to be debated between the British and American 
governments.36 
Following these discussions Thatcher met with Paul Volcker, the Chairman of the 
Board of the US Federal Reserve System. It was here that Thatcher sought to raise a number 
of British concerns about U.S. monetary reform and the possibility of economic sanctions 
against Iran. Thatcher raised the question as to whether the United States was planning to 
introduce some dramatic changes to U.S. monetary policy. Volcker denied that this was 
current American planning and he explained that there was simply no ‘Holy Grail’ in which 
to solve common monetary problems.37 Further discussion about monetary supply and 
tackling inflation was conducted which once again demonstrated how the transnational 
interchange of ideas worked at a practical level. Solving common economic and political 
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challenges that faced both the United States and United Kingdom was a key feature of 
Thatcher’s talks in Washington.38 
It was, however, the subject of possible economic sanctions against Iran which 
Thatcher was most interested in raising with Volcker. In a similar fashion to her discussions 
with Vance on this subject, disagreement quickly materialised. The British prime minister 
reiterated her earlier position that the imposition of economic sanctions risked precipitating a 
global economic recession. As Thatcher reasoned, freezing or seizing Iranian assets held by 
British financial institutions could lead to a serious run on western banks. At the very least 
then, the British government would require detailed discussion with Washington about the 
likely ramifications of undertaking economic sanctions against Iran prior to London 
committing to such action. At the heart of Thatcher’s argument then was the notion that 
economic sanctions against Iran could have damaging long term repercussions for western 
interests and this fact had to be fully appreciated when deliberating the action to be taken 
against Tehran.39 Thatcher persistently counselled cautionary advice to Washington on how 
to overcome the hostage crisis. 
Following this, Thatcher had a long discussion about the strategic position of the 
western alliance vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc with Harold Brown, the U.S. defense secretary. The 
meeting started warmly as Brown complimented the British prime minister on her continuing 
support for the western alliance. Thatcher reciprocated by reminding Brown that the United 
Kingdom was fully supportive of the Carter administration’s theatre nuclear force 
modernisation programme and had publically and privately championed for the ratification of 
the SALT II Treaty. The meeting moved on as Thatcher inquired as to American assessments 
about current levels of Soviet defence spending. Brown explained that he believed that 
current levels of Soviet expenditure would slow down because of the economic challenges 
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and labour shortages that Soviet planners faced. Yet, in spite of this, Brown estimated that the 
Soviet Union would spend somewhere in the region of 13% of its GDP on defence over the 
course of the next 20 years.  
Disagreement between Brown and Thatcher soon emerged when discussion moved to 
the subject of the Soviet Union’s actual foreign policy intentions.  Brown suggested that the 
Soviet Union’s growing conventional force capability was probably designed to safeguard 
against a future invasion. Thatcher openly disagreed claiming that the Soviets ‘surely did not 
expect to be invaded now.’ It was again Carrington that interceded to prevent an escalation of 
Anglo-American differences as he diplomatically suggested that given the known ill health of 
Brezhnev, a leadership succession loomed on the horizon. As such, the Soviet military 
bureaucracy would exploit its position to increase Soviet defence spending during this time of 
uncertainty in the Communist party’s leadership. Given this period of expected political 
uncertainty in Moscow, Carrington suggested that the NATO alliance should better 
streamline its own defence procurement and production efforts.40 As was often the case 
throughout the Cold War, the American and British governments disagreed how to best 
respond to what both governments perceived as a common threat posed by Moscow. But that 
open disagreement was allowed to occur during bilateral meetings was testament to the 
closeness of relations between the two countries political leaders. 
Following her meeting with Brown, Thatcher met with the president and engaged in a 
general discussion about international affairs.41 It was also during these talks that Carter 
sought British support for his newly emerged national security strategy as articulated within 
the Carter Doctrine.42 British approval for stationing new tactical nuclear weapons on British 
territory was sought. The president also asked for permission to expand America’s military 
presence on Diego Garcia. Following on from Harold Brown’s earlier point that increased 
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British military support was required globally the president suggested that the United 
Kingdom should look at ways in which to increase both its political and military presence 
throughout the Persian Gulf. Thatcher demurred and pointed out that there were obvious 
economic challenges facing her government which prevented her from agreeing to such 
proposals. Given the economic and political difficulties confronting Thatcher, the president’s 
hope of obtaining British agreement to reverse 40 years of ever shrinking global military 
power was always fanciful. Carter, however, would achieve his ambition of obtaining British 
agreement to expand the U.S. presence on Diego Garcia.43  
 The issue of Britain’s strategic nuclear deterrent was also raised in this bilateral 
meeting. As the minutes of the meeting note: ‘The president and prime minister agreed on the 
importance of maintaining a credible British strategic deterrent force and US-UK strategic 
cooperation.’44 Similarly, the discussion on Diego Garcia demonstrated that the Anglo-
American intelligence ‘special relationship’ would be continued under the new political 
leaders. Mutual interests clearly transcended any political and personality differences that 
may have existed.  
The majority of the Carter-Thatcher discussion was indeed largely amicable. The 
exception to this, however, was the subject of the United States supplying the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) with revolvers. It was the recent decision by the United States 
government to suspend sales of revolvers to the RUC which generated disagreement between 
Carter and Thatcher.45 The issue of Northern Ireland which had from the beginning of the 
Carter presidency been a thorn in the side of Anglo-American relations thus once again 
surfaced at this point. But in a similar fashion to her predecessor James Callaghan, Thatcher 
was able to compartmentalise this point of disagreement and prevent it from affecting other 
aspects of the relationship. Thatcher therefore raised her complaints that the suspension of 
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arms sales to the RUC was unwarranted and moved the conversation forward. Indeed, when 
Vance was set to visit London in February 1980, the British opted not to raise the issue again 
as British policy makers had rightly concluded that further discussion was unlikely to result 
in a change of U.S. policy.46 
 At the end of Thatcher’s visit to Washington a concerted effort from both sides was 
made to present a public image that both leaders had reached significant agreement on how to 
precede over a number of common international challenges. Public statements of continued 
Anglo-American solidarity were issued with Thatcher making a deliberate point of informing 
the news media that the British government were committed to supporting America’s position 
towards the Iranian hostage situation.47 As Thatcher told the press on the White House Lawn, 
‘At times like these you are entitled to look to your friends for support. We are your friends 
and do support you. And we shall support you. Let there be no doubt about that.’48 Carter’s 
remarks were verging on the obsequious when he declared that ‘Madam Prime Minister, 
you’ve exhibited greatness in the form of assuming responsibility; not only to deal with 
important and difficult domestic issues…but in searching for ways in which you can meet the 
challenges of the international world.’49 Such warm words evidently had some affect as one 
Washington insider told Nicholas Henderson, the British Ambassador to Washington, that the 
meeting between Thatcher and Carter had been ‘the best he had attended.’50 Another Senator 
had suggested to Henderson that no British leader had made such an incredibly positive 
impression upon the key policy-makers in Washington as had Thatcher. Henderson himself 
noted that the prime minister had made a ‘remarkable impact’ during her visit to 
Washington.51  
 Behind the rhetoric there had also been a number of agreements reached between the 
two sides. Thatcher had received the president’s tacit approval for continuing the Anglo-
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American nuclear relationship which would involve the sale of Trident C4 to the British 
government. The United States had obtained British agreement to expand their presence on 
Diego Garcia. Common agreement had also been reached on updating NATO’s theatre 
nuclear weapons and on the necessity of moving forward with a SALT III Treaty. Carter had 
also had the opportunity to appear before the American media as engaged in international 
negotiations with one of America’s principle allies. The rhetoric of a ‘special relationship’ 
served as useful political capital for both Carter and Thatcher. Of course, disagreement also 
existed. Perhaps the most obvious and pronounced was with regards to Northern Ireland but 
the British government privately accepted that the American sale of Revolvers to the RUC 
was probably not going to happen as long as Carter inhabited the White House and Tip 
O’Neill remained as the Speaker of the House. The possibility of Iranian sanctions however 
brought the two sides into opposition. Thatcher had taken a subtle approach in warning 
against hasty action for fear that this would spark some major economic crisis. Both sides had 
therefore achieved enough during Thatcher’s visit to Washington to feel reasonably content. 
Rhodesia   
By the time Callaghan had left office in May 1979 the Anglo-American plan for 
implementing majority rule in Rhodesia had reached an impasse as Smith continued to press 
for international recognition of the Salisbury Agreement and the Rhodesian Bush war 
continued. A successful transition to majority rule in Rhodesia in the near future looked 
doubtful. On the surface, Thatcher’s election only contributed to the complexity of the 
Rhodesian situation given that there was no guarantee that she would continue to endorse the 
Anglo-American plan for implementing majority rule. Within the Conservative Party itself, 
the question of Rhodesian majority rule was an exceptionally divisive one. Carter’s own 
involvement in settling the majority rule issue had never been particularly welcomed. One 
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Conservative MP, Lord Hailsham, spoke for many deemed on the right wing of the party, 
when he suggested that Carter would ‘give-away’ Rhodesia to the forces of international 
communism.52 From Washington’s perspective, there was a concern that Thatcher would 
come under the influence of the right wing of her party and thus withdraw her support for the 
Anglo-American plan and instead support the Salisbury Agreement and provide Smith with 
vital international legitimacy.53 On the subject of majority rule, the Conservative Party 
manifesto of 11 April 1979 was vague enough to convince Washington that Thatcher’s 
election would see a radical departure in British Rhodesian policy. As the Conservative Party 
manifesto stated, a ‘lasting settlement to the Rhodesia problem had to be ‘based on the 
democratic wishes of the people of that country.’ The Carter administration feared that the 
Thatcher government would interpret the election of Muzorewa in the recent Rhodesian 
parliamentary elections as having represented the ‘democratic wishes’ of the Rhodesian 
people. If such recognition was afforded to Muzorewa’s election, Washington feared that the 
guerrilla campaign of the Patriotic Front would in fact escalate to a broader Southern African 
war which could involve the participation of South Africa and the Front Line States.54 
Thatcher’s election certainly complicated Anglo-American cooperation over Rhodesia 
as the British prime minister requested that Washington re-assess its position towards the 
Salisbury Agreement. By re-opening this question, Thatcher was asking that the Carter 
administration completely reverse its current Rhodesian policy. More concerning yet was that 
Britain’s reinvigorated enthusiasm for the Salisbury Agreement would provide 
encouragement for the president’s critics within the U.S. Congress. The passing of the Case-
Javits Amendment had led to U.S. observers being dispatched to Rhodesia to monitor the 
forthcoming multiracial elections. As an additional condition of the Case-Javits Amendment, 
the president would be required to make a ‘determination’ as to whether or not Smith’s 
regime had allowed ‘free and fair’ elections. If Smith was considered to have done this, then 
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economic sanctions against Rhodesia would be lifted. In the assessment of the Thatcher 
government, these ‘free and fair’ elections had taken place in May 1979 when multiracial 
elections had been undertaken and had led to Muzorewa becoming prime minister. As 
Carrington announced before the House of Lords, ‘There had been a fundamental change 
inside Rhodesia’ which had seen ‘an election in which every adult man and woman [had] 
been able to cast a vote.’55 Within the U.S. Senate, Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) agreed 
with Thatcher’s interpretation of events and began the process of passing legislation to 
immediately end sanctions against Rhodesia.56  
The British fully understood that this domestic pressure against the president could be 
exploited to bring about a change in U.S. policy towards Rhodesia.57 Carrington therefore 
proposed that Carter should make a presidential determination outlining that the conditions 
set by the Case-Javits Amendment had been substantially met by virtue of the fact that 
elections had been decided by universal suffrage. Moreover, Smith had been succeeded by 
Muzorewa as prime minister. Given these changed circumstances, the British government 
now suggested that economic sanctions should temporarily be lifted against Rhodesia and in 
six months’ time the sanctions could be permanently withdrawn as long as Smith abided by 
the terms of the Salisbury Agreement.58 
Carter remained unconvinced and refused to recognise the legitimacy of the recent 
Rhodesian election for a combination of factors centred upon domestic political calculations 
and concerns about ‘realpolitik and the peculiar influence of race.’59 As Vance explained to 
Carrington, the lifting of sanctions at this juncture would provide a mixed signal to Smith that 
Washington and London were not prepared to push forward with majority rule that included 
membership for the Patriotic Front (both ZANU and ZAPU). Without their inclusion there 
existed little probability that the Rhodesian Bush War could be brought to an end and the 
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continuation of the war would only ensure that ZANU and ZAPU would receive additional 
support from their communist backers. Ultimately Washington made the hard headed 
calculation that Muzorewa could not bring an end to the Rhodesia Bush War and thus stem 
the tide of growing communist influence in the region and prevent a broader war from 
breaking out. Second, the Carter administration did not believe that the recent Salisbury 
Agreement had been ‘free and fair’ and nor could the new Rhodesia Zimbabwe constitution 
be considered democratic as it afforded political advantages for White Rhodesians. Racial 
discrimination would continue to persist under the new Rhodesia Zimbabwe constitution 
which Carter refused to legitimise. Third, by ending economic sanctions at this juncture, the 
Carter administration believed that it would signal to the Front Line States that the United 
States was not fully committed to racial equality in Rhodesia and would thus endorse the 
propaganda emanating from Moscow that the United States was both an imperialistic and 
racist power.60  
Domestic politics also influenced the president’s decision to oppose the Salisbury 
Agreement. First, those advocating a change in U.S. policy within Congress were mainly 
Republicans and with the U.S. General Election little over a year away, now would be an 
inopportune time to be seen to be yielding to Republican pressure. Second, the Black Caucus 
within the Democratic Party continued to lobby the president to remain committed to 
achieving racial equality in Rhodesia. At a time when relations between the White House and 
Congressional Democrats were already seriously strained the president was reluctant to 
provoke further controversy with Democratic supporters at this time. Finally, the president 
was already under criticism from core supporters within the Democratic Party whom alleged 
that he allowed his foreign policy to stray too far away from the human rights agenda he had 
been swept into office proclaiming.61 For all of these reason then, the Carter administration 
rejected the British notion that Rhodesia Zimbabwe could be recognised by the United States 
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or that economic sanctions should be lifted. On 7 June 1979 Carter delivered an unequivocal 
message: ‘I am absolutely convinced that the best interests of the United States would not be 
served by lifting the sanctions.’62 
Accepting that Washington would not recognise the Salisbury Agreement, and 
appreciating that the Rhodesian Civil war was continuing to threaten to spiral into a broader 
Southern African war, London called for all of the warring factions to meet at Lancaster 
House under British auspices. As Carrington explained in his memoir, a settlement in 
Rhodesia which would end the civil war there would have to ‘command sufficient internal 
assent.’ In other words, Carrington needed to convince the Patriotic Front to lay down its 
arms and recognise the political legitimacy of a new Rhodesian government. For this to be 
achieved, the Patriotic Front would have to be included in the new government. Carter’s 
uncompromising stance when coupled to the positions of several African states, highlighted 
to London that a solution would have to be found that would be accepted by all sides, 
including one acceptable to both factions of the Patriotic Front.63 It was now Carrington’s 
task to convince all of the factions in Rhodesia to attend British sponsored talks to negotiate a 
final majority rule settlement. 
It was, however, by no means guaranteed that all parties would attend such talks as 
each side continued to blame the other for the on-going war in Rhodesia. Sections of opinion 
within the British foreign and commonwealth office believed that Mugabe would probably 
never attend a conference. Even if he did, he would be unlikely to negotiate ‘seriously for an 
agreement’ because he was confident of achieving his aims by continuing with the guerrilla 
war. As the British reflected, Mugabe did not have the ability to defeat the Rhodesian 
security forces in the field but he probably reckoned that he could inflict sufficient levels of 
casualties against the Rhodesian security forces to ensure that the new government of 
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Muzorewa would sue for terms. On the other hand, others within the British policy making 
bureaucracy suggested that there were grounds for optimism given Mugabe’s own position 
vis-à-vis Nkomo. It was speculated that if Nkomo entered into agreement with the Salisbury 
Group, it was ostracise Mugabe and leave him both politically and militarily isolated. Also, 
South Africa had privately informed London that if Mugabe continued with his guerrilla 
campaign following an internationally legitimised settlement to the question of majority rule 
in Rhodesia, they would likely lend their military power to the new Rhodesian government to 
crush Mugabe.  In sum, the British were fully aware that Mugabe’s attendance at the talks 
and his acceptance of a final majority settlement was vital if the Rhodesian Bush War was to 
be prevented from spiralling into a broader Southern African war. Following extensive efforts 
on the part of both the British and American governments, all factions agreed to attend the 
Lancaster House talks. It was here that Carrington chaired long and intense negotiations 
about transitioning to a mutually acceptable majority rule settlement. Carrington’s skilful 
handling of the negotiations encouraged cooperation as the Lancaster House agreements 
emerged which set up a new constitution for Rhodesia Zimbabwe and mandated new 
elections which could be contested by all political parties.64 
Ostensibly the United Kingdom was to remain neutral in the forthcoming Rhodesian 
elections but beneath the surface London desired Muzorewa’s United African National 
Council to emerge victorious. In London’s assessment, Muzorewa’s decision not to take up 
arms against Smith’s regime demonstrated a level of wisdom that was lacking in the 
alternative candidates. More important still, Muzorewa was believed to be the most ‘pro-
western’ of the candidates. Both Mugabe and Nkomo were viewed as Marxists that would 
ruin Rhodesia’s economic vitality and would also be susceptible to Soviet manipulation.65 In 
the minds of British policy makers, considerations about Rhodesia’s future well-being and 
134 
 
broader Cold War concerns were the key factors behind London’s decision to support 
Muzorewa’s candidacy.  
Again, however, Anglo-American disagreement emerged as Washington alleged that 
London’s support for Muzorewa only encouraged Mugabe and Nkomo to break the delicate 
ceasefire that existed inside Rhodesia. Vance put these points to Carrington in January 1980 
but the British were dismissive of the U.S. secretary of state claiming that he was not ‘well 
briefed’ on events.66 Indeed, the British were now concerned that Washington’s interference 
would actually encourage Mugabe and Nkomo to return to arms. Such an eventuality could 
lead to White Rhodesians to flee to South Africa or to encourage direct South African 
involvement in fighting the Patriotic Front.67 In spite of these concerns elections were 
conducted in Rhodesia. The outcome was a sweeping victory for Mugabe’s ZANU. Rhodesia 
was now formally accorded its independence from the United Kingdom and on 18 April 1980 
Mugabe was instated as the countries new president.   
From London’s perspective there was a general sense of relief that this imperial 
hangover was finally over. But within the Thatcher government there was a clear sense of 
regret that Mugabe had won the election. Yet, as the prime minister was aware, the realities 
of power meant that London had to accept this outcome. ‘Truth to tell, I think most people, 
whatever their politics, were now relieved that the business was over’ Carrington reflected.68 
All that Thatcher could do was to lament in her memoir ‘It was sad that Rhodesia Zimbabwe 
finished up with a Marxist government in a continent where too many Marxists mal-
administer their countries’ resources. But political and military realities were all too evidently 
on the side of the guerrilla leaders. A government like that of Muzorewa, without 
international recognition, could never have brought to the people of Rhodesia the peace that 
they wanted and needed above all else.’69  
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The Carter administration, in contrast, believed that Mugabe’s election was a victory 
for democracy and the promotion of international human rights. Carter was less concerned 
with Mugabe being a declared Marxist. Indeed, Carter publically announced that he believed 
Mugabe would no longer be a ‘Marxist and hater and enemy of the United States’ and would 
now become ‘one of our strong and potentially very good and loyal friends.’70 Carter’s 
decision to recognise Mugabe as the legitimate head of the new government of Zimbabwe 
demonstrated a unique approach to handling the Cold War in the Third World. Carter policies 
were dictated by a strong moral compass; i.e. it was right to afford Rhodesia independence 
and this should be done according to the will of the people. Broader Cold War calculations 
about potential Soviet, Cuban or PRC influence of course informed the president’s thinking 
but it did not dictate his policy towards the question of majority rule in Rhodesia in the 
fashion it had with other president’s. Carter believed that his efforts in bringing about 
majority rule in Rhodesia could serve as a model for America’s handling of similar situations 
in the future. As Carter told Congressional Democrats: ‘What we’ve seen lately in Rhodesia, 
soon to be Zimbabwe, the institution of a Democratic government under the leadership of 
Great Britain, supported by us and others, that will bring majority rule there and add a sense 
of dignity to people who have too long been subjugated by racial discrimination. We hope to 
spread that concept, based on our own principles, to others who’ve suffered too long.’71 
The British government was far less satisfied with how the majority rule question had 
been settled. Both the Callaghan and Thatcher governments would have preferred a 
Muzorewa victory and had been prepared to support the Salisbury Agreement. Carter’s 
reluctance to support this, however, convince London that another majority rule settlement 
which eradicated all vestiges of racial discrimination would have to be pursued instead. 
Ultimately, the dynamics of power, both within Rhodesia and within the Anglo-American 
alliance meant that Carter’s wishes and those of the Rhodesian people won through. As Peter 
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Jay remembered, Carter’s coming to power brought with it an American president determined 
to settle the question of majority rule inside Rhodesia.72 For better or worse, Carter achieved 
largely what he wanted in relation to Rhodesia which was to establish a government that was 
formed according to the popular will of the Rhodesian people. By the time Carter had left 
office this had been accomplished. But the conduct of this diplomacy also revealed the 
uneven nature of the Anglo-American relationship. Throughout the entire process it was 
Washington that pursued a majority rule settlement that included the participation of the 
Patriotic Front even though this did not sit comfortably in London. Ultimately American 
power allowed the president to pursue a path that he believed promoted both U.S. interests 
and tallied with his ideas about racial equality.   
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6 
The end of détente 
 
Introduction  
Zbigniew Brzezinski remembered that the ‘Christmas of 1979 was grim and full of 
foreboding.’ For the president, things would not improve as 1980 turned into a political 
disaster. Domestic and international circumstances conspired to make Carter’s re-election 
chances remote by the time he faced his Republican challenger Ronald Reagan in November 
1980. Stagflation afflicted the American economy as the Reagan candidacy asked the 
pertinent question of ‘can we afford 4 more years’ of a Carter administration? Whether 
Carter’s handling of the American economy was as poor as his detractors claimed was a moot 
point for, as the U.S. Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal perceptibly noted, Carter 
was perceived to be  a ‘weak and indecisive economic leader.’ As Blumenthal warned, ‘Like 
it or not, we have failed to convince the public that the president is a strong economic chief, 
leading and influencing events rather than reacting to them. That's why he gets little credit for 
the positives and more blame than he deserves for the problems.’1 
International events only further undermined Carter’s re-election chances. The on-
going Iranian hostage situation was exploited by Carter’s critics as an example of a president 
hopelessly unable to protect American citizens abroad. Détente collapsed following the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979). Carter’s flagship nuclear arms limitation 
treaty, SALT II, stalled before the U.S. Senate. The Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua in a 
sign that in America’s ‘backyard’ Carter could not even prevent communist advances. 
Carter’s difficulties with America’s key allies continued as relations with West Germany and 
France bordered upon open antagonism. Carter’s difficulties were compounded by the 
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challenge of Edward Kennedy to run as the Democratic nominee for the presidency in 
November 1980. Managing to just secure the Democratic nomination, Carter was soundly 
beaten in the General Election by Ronald Reagan. It is with justification that the final year of 
Carter’s presidency is depicted as one of ‘crisis.’2 
Anglo-American relations were to be crucially influenced by these various 
international and domestic factors. American and British views pertaining to the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 differed so much that it prevented any 
coordinated response being pursued. Likewise, Anglo-American cooperation in relation to the 
Iranian hostage situation was extremely disjointed. This chapter therefore explores these 
aspects of the Anglo-American diplomatic relationship and illustrates the disagreement and 
apparent lack of cooperation between the two countries. Yet, for all of the differences in these 
areas, the Anglo-American nuclear relationship was renewed as Carter agreed to sell the 
United Kingdom the Trident C4 SLBM system to replace Britain’s ageing Polaris fleet. And 
for all of the private disagreement between the two countries, Thatcher was also careful to 
remain supportive of the president in public. By analysing this period a far more complicated 
and competitive Anglo-American relationship appears than is suggested within existing 
accounts.3 
Afghanistan 
Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 superpower détente was 
already close to breaking point. Events in Afghanistan would therefore kill the remaining 
vestiges of détente and usher in a return to a more confrontational and militaristic superpower 
rivalry. Importantly, Washington had reached the conclusion that the pursuit of idealist goals 
in foreign affairs had to now be more heavily nuanced by considerations dictated by power 
politics. As Brzezinski reflected: 
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The last phase of Carter’s foreign policy involved the shaping of a 
new balance between the priorities of power and of principle. The 
higher recognition of the centrality of power in world affairs emerged 
gradually through intense internal debates sparked largely by the 
impact of Soviet expansionism and the crisis with Iran. The result was 
a tougher policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, a major effort to shape a 
new regional security framework for the Middle East, and a sustained 
commitment, which paralleled during 1979 the deterioration in U.S.-
Soviet relations, to forge a broader relationship with China.4  
 
The subsequent Carter Doctrine (the name given to this hardening of Carter’s foreign policy) 
was thus formally adopted. Consequently, members of the NATO alliance were more forcibly 
encouraged to support the deployment of new theatre nuclear weapons. A modernisation of 
America’s own nuclear arsenal was now undertaken which was underpinned by a marked 
increase in U.S. defence expenditure.5 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan solidified these 
changes to U.S. national security policy. As one scholar has argued ‘détente had been in 
retreat throughout the late 1970s, but from 1980 it was effectively dead and a revived Cold 
War was proclaimed and planned for.’ Planning for and fighting the ‘Second Cold War’ 
would now come to dominate U.S. foreign policy as newspaper commentators speculated on 
the hardening of Carter’s grand strategy.6 As one commentator suggests, there was a ‘return’ 
to ‘militarism’ in American Cold War strategy.’7 This somewhat simplifies the changes to 
Carter’s national security policy but there was certainly now a greater emphasis upon 
improving American military position in relation to that of the Soviet Union.8  
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Soviet interest in Afghanistan had steadily grown throughout the latter half of the 
1970s and in 1978, Noor Mohammad Taraki, seized control of Kabul for the Afghan 
Communist Party. Taraki’s rule was far from universally popular as insurrection in Herat led 
to attacks on Afghan communist forces which resulted in the brutal killings of Soviet advisers 
that were present in the city. Taraki requested military and economic assistance from 
Moscow to help quell the growing rebellion against his authority. The Soviet leadership 
demurred but Taraki’s removal in a coup orchestrated by his second in command, Hafizullah 
Amin, tipped the balance in the Soviet Politburo for intervention. As the Kremlin was aware, 
Amin was secretly meeting with the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Afghanistan, J. Bruce 
Amstutz, and senior Soviet policy makers concluded that Amin was undertaking a strategic 
turn towards the United States or, worse yet, Amin was in fact secretly working for the CIA 
to help undermine Soviet interests throughout central Asia. After a series of lengthy 
discussions, the Soviet leadership decided to take a more forthright approach to securing 
Soviet interests in Afghanistan. Thus in October 1979 the Kremlin ordered Soviet forces 
already stationed in Afghanistan to begin the process of isolating the Afghan capital, Kabul. 
Communication lines to the capital were severed and additional Soviet forces over 25-27 
December entered Afghanistan and occupied key government buildings. As the Soviet 
leadership explained to the Politburo: ‘In accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-
Afghan treaty of 1978, a decision [had] been made to send…the Soviet Army to 
Afghanistan.’9  
Soviet forces performed their task efficiently as the Tajbeg Palace where Amin had 
retreated was stormed. In the ensuing chaos Amin along with his family were killed. By the 
morning of 28 December 1979 Soviet forces had secured the majority of government 
buildings and exercised control over Afghanistan.10  Washington and London had grown 
increasingly suspicious throughout the summer of 1979 that some sort of Soviet intervention 
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in Afghanistan was likely to occur in the near future.11 Though suspicious of Soviet 
intentions towards Afghanistan, the actual invasion came as a surprise to both Carter and 
Thatcher. On learning of the Soviet invasion, Carter’s moral sensibilities were outraged. As 
the president exclaimed to his closest advisers, the Soviet Union was ‘raping’ Afghanistan. 
As Carter went on to inform reporters, Soviet actions in Afghanistan constituted a ‘grave 
threat to peace.’12 Strategically, the president was equally as concerned for he believed it was 
the Soviet Union’s objective to ‘overthrow the existing Afghan government.’ Such action 
was ‘an extremely serious development’ and demonstrated a ‘major new development in 
Soviet policy.’ It appeared from Carter’s perspective as if the Soviet Union was ‘executing a 
grand strategy to reach the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and encircle Western oil 
supplies.’ Soviet occupation of Afghanistan would provide Moscow with a ‘deep penetration 
between Iran and Pakistan, and pose a threat to the rich oil fields of the Persian Gulf area and 
to the crucial waterways through which so much of the world’s energy supplies had to 
pass.’13  
Opinion in London was rather more mixed than that being publically and privately 
expressed in Washington. For Michael Alexander, serving at this time as the prime minister’s 
principal secretary for foreign affairs, Soviet actions reflected ‘weakness’ on Moscow’s part. 
Given this, the invasion of Afghanistan was something not worth losing ‘too much sleep’ 
about. ‘If the Russians were prepared to bleed themselves white in Afghanistan, good luck to 
them’ was the advice he provided to Thatcher.14 The prime minister did not view matters in 
such relaxed terms. For Thatcher the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a ‘watershed’ in 
international affairs which demonstrated the expansionist desires of the Soviet Union. As she 
reflected, ‘I was less shocked than some by the invasion of Afghanistan. I had long 
understood that détente had been ruthlessly used by the Soviets to exploit western weakness 
and disarray. I knew the beast.’15 With the prime minister interpreting matters so dramatically 
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she looked to work jointly with Washington in fashioning a suitable response to Soviet 
actions. Finding the ideal response, however, would prove extremely difficult, so much so 
that by the middle of the year there remained little Anglo-American agreement on how to 
best respond to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. 
Carter initially limited his reaction to the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan to providing 
a public condemnation of Moscow’s actions. In an interview provided to ABC news, the 
president accused the Soviet leadership of ordering the murder of Amin and violating 
international law. Carter followed this by writing personally to Brezhnev in which he 
protested Soviet actions and requested that Soviet forces leave Afghanistan. Privately, 
however, the president well understood that Moscow would not leave Afghanistan willingly. 
As Carter appreciated, Soviet actions in Afghanistan simply reconfirmed that the Brezhnev 
Doctrine, which dictated that Moscow would uphold the territorial integrity of the 
Communist world, remained the leitmotif of Soviet grand strategy.16 The task then for Carter 
was to devise a strategy which would both encourage the Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan 
and to ensure that Moscow would not replicate similar invasions into non-communist 
controlled areas of the world.      
As 1980 began, a meeting of the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) was held in 
Washington to discuss the U.S. response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Representatives from the Department of State, Department of Defense, the CIA, the JCS, the 
White House and the National Security Council were all present at this meeting. Following 
long discussion, the conclusion was reached that the Soviet Union had all but secured its 
position in Afghanistan. The best recourse was to undermine the Soviet position which could 
be achieved by supporting the Afghan rebels that were fighting against Soviet forces. Such a 
course however was problematic given that the Afghan insurgency was clearly outgunned on 
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the battlefield and was heavily reliant upon the assistance it received from Pakistan. In turn, 
Pakistan relied upon continued U.S. military and economic support. It became apparent that if 
the Afghan insurgency was to stand any hope of undermining the Soviet position then 
additional assistance would have to be provided by Pakistan. In order to meet these additional 
burdens, the Pakistan government would look to Washington to cover the costs involved. 
Following further deliberation, the president agreed to provide additional support for the 
Pakistan government with a view to ‘indirectly’ assisting the Afghan insurgency.17 
The Carter administration also looked at various ways in which they could ‘punish’ 
Moscow for its actions in Afghanistan in an effort to signal to the Kremlin that there would 
be broader consequences for their altering the geopolitical status quo. Washington surveyed a 
list of options which included withdrawing the SALT II Treaty and imposing economic 
sanctions against Moscow. In an ironic sense, the Carter administration were following the 
methods of ‘linkage’ and ‘leverage’ as practised under the Nixon-Ford administrations which 
they had been so critical of during the 1976 election. The SALT II Treaty, which was at this 
point awaiting ratification by the U.S. Senate, was seen as the most useful tool to apply 
pressure against Moscow. Carter, sensing that the Senate would not ratify the agreement at 
this moment anyhow, delayed calling for a vote on SALT II ratification.18  
Yet Carter opted against abandoning the SALT II Treaty completely because he 
concluded that, even in spite of the Soviet Union’s actions in Afghanistan, the Treaty would 
ultimately be in the best interests of the United States. Carter remained wedded to the concept 
of nuclear arms limitation in spite of Moscow’s actions in Afghanistan. As the president 
made clear to journalists, ‘It’s obvious to me that the SALT treaty is in the best interest of our 
country.’19 And in a letter to members of the Senate, Carter suggested that a SALT II Treaty 
was vital for America’s ‘own national security and the peace of the world.’20 As such, the 
144 
 
president privately informed Moscow that he would seek the ratification of the SALT II 
Treaty once the 1980 election was over and the political hostility towards the Soviet Union 
inside the United States would have hopefully died down.21 There remained important limits 
to the actions which Carter was prepared to undertake against the Soviet Union at this 
juncture. As one scholar has noted, ‘The basic motivations that had triggered the pursuit of 
SALT I a decade earlier, in essence, persisted.’22 
As U.S.-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate, the pressure upon Carter to 
undertake more robust action against the Soviet Union mounted. Moreover, the president 
remained concerned that if the Soviet Union believed it could ‘get away’ with its action 
inside Afghanistan then it may replicate similar behaviour elsewhere. Deciding on a viable 
course of action remained hotly contested within the Carter administration and inter-
departmental feuding reached volcanic proportions. Vance argued that the administration 
should remain committed to the maintenance of superpower détente and could not allow 
incidences such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to usher in a return to superpower 
confrontation and crisis. As Vance outlined, it was imperative to maintain a ‘balanced policy 
toward the Soviet Union’ and the United States had to ‘avoid violent swings between trust 
and hysteria’ in its dealings with Moscow. As such, the president’s public condemnation of 
Soviet actions would suffice. If further action was to be undertaken, then this should be 
limited to political actions, such as temporarily withdrawing the U.S. Ambassador from 
Moscow or passing a UN Security Council vote which requested the Soviet Union’s 
withdrawal from Afghanistan.23    
Vance’s call for a limited response was first challenged and then ultimately defeated 
by the advice offered by Brzezinski. As the U.S. national security adviser argued in a lengthy 
memorandum to the president, the Soviet Union’s action in Afghanistan was a decisive 
145 
 
moment in international affairs. Regardless of what actually motivated the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan, the fact remained that this action had ‘changed the strategic situation 
in the region; and we must take steps which will restore a balance.’24 Brzezinski further 
argued that there was also a credibility issue at stake for the United States in the sense that the 
Soviet Union could not be allowed to invade sovereign states and expect its relationship with 
Washington to remain unaffected. Accordingly, the United States needed to respond with a 
‘sustained’ and ‘regional’ effort. Whilst there was no need to ‘freeze the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship any further,’ Brzezinski suggested that efforts to improve relations with Moscow 
should not be undertaken either.25 Emphasising his advice, Brzezinski wrote to the president 
suggesting that ‘These are painful and difficult issues. We will never know whether any of 
this could have been averted, but we do know one thing: if we do not respond in a timely 
fashion, the consequences of an inadequate response will be even more horrendous because 
our vital interest in the Middle East will soon be directly affected.’26 
Brzezinski’s advice only added to the growing chorus inside and outside the White 
House that was calling for the president to respond more forcefully against the Soviet Union. 
Carter, however, remained unconvinced as to the type of action that he should undertake but 
gradually came to the conclusion that the purely political actions advocated by Vance would 
not suffice. Whilst agreeing to pursue a UN Security Council vote to call for a Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan and approving the idea of potentially recalling the U.S. 
Ambassador from Moscow, the president looked to also implement economic and political 
sanctions against the Soviet Union. Yet, as the president deliberated his response, it was 
becoming obvious to all that if sanctions against Moscow were to have a meaningful impact, 
then they would need to be enacted by a large multinational alliance.27 London therefore soon 
found itself under pressure to support the president’s proposals. 
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In London, Thatcher and her national security advisers watched developments in 
Washington, Moscow and Afghanistan closely. Thatcher agreed with the assessment that 
Soviet actions in Afghanistan threatened western security interests. As the prime minister 
suggested to the president in January 1980, the Soviet Union would continue with a policy of 
expansion if the Kremlin believed it would go unopposed.28 Coupled to this, the United 
Kingdom had long established security, commercial and political connections with a number 
of states in central and Southeast Asia. British policy makers feared that Soviet moves in 
Afghanistan perhaps foreshadowed further Soviet expansion throughout the region. The 
repercussions of Soviet actions were viewed as threatening British interests much closer to 
home in the sense that the Kremlin could perhaps be emboldened by its actions in 
Afghanistan to pursue similar tactics when confronted with problems in Europe. As 
Carrington warned the prime minister ‘the manner of the change is unprecedented and could 
have extremely serious repercussions. I think it is important that the West’s response should 
be robust, lest the Russians are led to believe that such tactics pay off.’29 On 8 January 1980, 
a meeting of the British cabinet was convened where a British response was discussed in 
detail. As the notes of the meeting recorded, those present had to decide whether any 
response against the Soviet Union should be ‘limited to an expression of political 
disapproval, or be wider in scope and perhaps painful to the United Kingdom.’ Regardless of 
the eventual course taken, the cabinet had to formulate a strategy whereby any measures 
against the Soviet Union would be ‘enough to deter the Russians from repeating elsewhere 
the action they had taken in Afghanistan.’30 
Whilst determining the actual specific measures to take against the Soviet Union, 
Thatcher, in an effort to signal to Moscow that similar actions to those in Afghanistan would 
not be tolerated in Europe, complained at length to the Soviet Ambassador to London about 
Soviet behaviour. The British prime minister followed this up in a damning letter to 
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Brezhnev.31 Publically, Thatcher’s response was equally as resolute as she lambasted Soviet 
actions and warned of the need to seriously reappraise western policy vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union. During one speech before the House of Commons, Thatcher’s advice was clear:  
The invasion of Afghanistan and the exile of Professor Sakharov 
leave no room for illusion. They seriously weaken the basis for the 
fruitful conduct of East-West relations. They are deliberate acts of 
policy by the Soviet Government. Afghanistan is a symbol and a 
warning. It is not just a far distant country, which we can ignore 
because we face no local crisis in Europe. This is not the first time 
that the Russians have used force to invade a neighbour, used it 
massively, swiftly and callously in a pattern that bears the Soviet 
hallmark. It is not the first time that they have claimed to have been 
invited in by a Government who, on closer inspection, turned out not 
to exist, or whose leaders they subsequently killed. But it is the first 
time since the world war that they have sent tens of thousands of 
soldiers, backed by tanks and helicopter gunships, into a country 
outside the Warsaw Pact; an Islamic country, a member of the non-
aligned movement, and a country that posed no conceivable threat to 
their country or their interests.32 
It is this type of rhetoric which has led previous historians to conclude that Thatcher provided 
‘vigorous’ support to Washington in responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.33  
Yet on examining previous classified material, we learn that privately the prime 
minister was rather more reticent about what exactly the United Kingdom could or, more 
importantly, would do in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Discussing British 
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options with her foreign and commonwealth secretary, Lord Carrington, Thatcher agreed that 
certain political actions could be undertaken. London, for example, refused to recognise the 
new Afghan government and continued to publically condemn Soviet actions. In the United 
Nations the British government supported Washington’s efforts to obtain a UN Security 
Council statement condemning Soviet actions. And British missions abroad were instructed 
to make Soviet diplomats as ‘uncomfortable’ as possible in their dealings with the British.34 
Following further discussion with the Carter administration, London agreed to follow the 
American lead and increase British military and economic support for Pakistan and in turn 
assist in indirectly supporting the Afghan insurgency. Along with this, Thatcher confirmed 
that she would support the creation of an Anglo-American working group within NATO 
which would study ways in which the alliance could bring pressure to bear against 
Moscow.35  
But the British government’s response was far more limited than Washington desired. 
This is explained by a number of interlinked factors. First, any British response was 
complicated by its imperial legacy within the region. For instance, the British understood that 
the likes of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh would likely soon recognise the new regime in 
Afghanistan because they had ‘to do business’ with their neighbour. Accordingly, the British 
government would face political pressure from these allies to recognise the new Afghan 
regime and, more importantly yet, would find its own commercial and economic interests 
within the region undermined by continuing to refuse recognition.36  
The prime minister was also aware that economic sanctions applied against Moscow 
were unlikely to produce meaningful policy consequences unless they were undertaken by a 
broad multilateral alliance. Yet it is important to recognise that economic sanctions had not 
been completely ruled out by Thatcher at this stage. Rather, she would only support economic 
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sanctions if significant multilateral support for such action could be established.37 Strategic 
factors also influenced Thatcher’s decision making. Indeed, London remained deeply 
concerned that the United States could over-react to events in Afghanistan to the point that it 
would precipitate a crisis with Moscow which could escalate out of control with unknowable 
ramifications. Central then to Thatcher’s response was ensuring full consultation with 
Washington in order to advocate that a measured and inherently limited response should be 
taken against Moscow.38 Thatcher had assumed the classic position of that of her predecessor 
Cold War prime ministers in that she counselled patience and looked to convince Washington 
not to pursue overly bellicose policies towards the Soviet Union which London believed U.S. 
policy makers were more naturally inclined to pursue. 
As London deliberated its response, the Carter administration moved ahead with its 
efforts to acquire international support for the imposition of economic sanctions against 
Moscow. Yet the likelihood of securing such international support was already encountering 
difficulties as major allies such as the United Kingdom, West Germany and France all made 
their opposition known. Such a response did not sit well in Washington. As Carter 
complained in private, the European reaction had thus far been ‘very weak.’39 Yet from the 
perspective of European capitals, the imposition of economic sanctions against Moscow 
could have extremely severe consequences. The economic self-interests of the European 
powers at this point triumphed over common security concerns that they shared with 
Washington.  
Nor was Washington immune to the effects that economic sanctions would have upon 
its own economic interests. Indeed, the domestic implications of pursuing economic sanctions 
against Moscow were keenly considered by the president, not least because 1980 was a 
General Election year. As Carter was made aware, banning the export of certain agricultural 
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products to the Soviet Union would hurt the economic interests of American farmers who 
held serious political power in the mid-western states which would be so vital in deciding the 
victor in the forthcoming presidential election. As Walter Mondale suggested to Carter, the 
United States had to be ‘strong and firm’ but that did not have to include the president having 
to ‘commit political suicide.’40 Carter’s task then was to formulate a set of proposals which 
would be able to obtain international support but at the same time would not inflict too much 
economic damage against either America’s allies (which was essential if support was to be 
obtained) nor hurt American economic interests too much either (again vital for Carter’s own 
political position). Domestic political calculations and alliance relations were threatening to 
undermine the prospects of sanctions even being applied against the Soviet Union.    
In the weeks that followed obtaining this international support for economic sanctions 
became the central task of the Carter administration. And it was to the British government 
that Washington looked for support. Warren Christopher was dispatched to London and met 
with Thatcher on 14 January 1980. Here, Christopher informed the prime minister that the 
United States would begin an embargo on the sale of meat and soya products to the Soviet 
Union. Banning the sale of high technology would also be sought in the forthcoming weeks.41 
Thatcher’s response was tentative and she tellingly refused to offer British support for these 
proposals during her discussions with Christopher. Following further deliberation it was 
evident that there was very little British enthusiasm for supporting these American proposals 
largely because they would seriously harm British commercial and economic interests.42 
Following further analysis in London, British officials concluded that the imposition 
of economic sanctions would hurt the western economies more than it did the Soviet Union. 
Détente had proven to be economically bountiful to the UK Treasury and further study in 
London highlighted the severe negative consequences that pursuing an economic embargo 
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against Moscow would have for British commercial interests. It was estimated, for instance, 
that an embargo on selling high technology would mean a loss of about 1% of total British 
exports.43 Such estimates did not even take into consideration possible Soviet retaliation 
which the British government believed could include the suspension of Soviet oil sales. Such 
action was likely to push the barrel price of oil significantly upwards. Other Soviet counter 
measures could include the suspension of gold, platinum and industrial diamond exports 
which would hurt Britain’s industrial production at a time of acute sensitivity in Britain’s 
economic recovery.  
In sum, Thatcher and her principle advisers were fully aware that any possible 
economic sanctions would have very real detrimental consequences for the British state. 
Worse yet, such economic pain would provide little political or strategic compensation as 
economic sanctions would not induce the Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan. Nor would 
economic sanctions deter Moscow from pursuing its interests in Europe by military means. 
Ultimately, the British believed that the Kremlin was deterred by the threat of force, not 
economic sanctions.44 Ultimately Thatcher was unable to establish a coherent strategic 
response towards the Soviet Union. Illustrative of Thatcher’s indecision is caught in the 
following comment she made to Schmidt: ‘There must be some penalty for a nation doing 
what the Soviet Union has and be seen to be some meaningful penalty but it isn’t easy to 
work that meaningful penalty out. It isn’t easy to decide exactly what that penalty shall be.’45 
As the British Ambassador to Moscow, Curtis Keeble, recollected ‘the problem with which 
the Soviet leadership confronted us that December was one of the oldest problems in 
international relations - the deterrence of aggression.’46 So it would prove as the British 
government found itself at loggerheads with Washington over how to respond to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. 
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Defending British economic and commercial interests appeared to be Thatcher’s main 
ambition instead of trying to establish a coordinated response with Washington in order to 
punish Moscow for its transgressions in Afghanistan. Yet British policy was not entirely 
motivated by the cynical pursuit of defending British economic and commercial interests. 
Rather, London was willing to accept a degree of economic pain on the proviso it led to 
political or strategic advantages vis-à-vis Moscow. London had to therefore calculate whether 
undertaking the proposed American sanctions were worth the potential economic costs 
involved. This is important to note because Thatcher’s unwillingness to sign up to economic 
sanctions was not simply driven by economic calculations. Rather, the prime minister was 
prepared to countenance economic sanctions against Moscow if this would encourage a 
change in Soviet behaviour. The challenge then was for Carter to devise such an approach 
which London believed it could endorse.47  
Accordingly, in London the Thatcher government concluded that it could not support 
the implementation of economic sanctions against Moscow at this time. Ultimately, British 
policy makers believed that economic sanctions would have little discernible impact upon 
Soviet policy towards Afghanistan or in relation to Europe. As one lengthy memorandum to 
Thatcher outlined, the Soviet Union was an ideological power which sought, through various 
avenues, a permanent revolution of the working classes which would then be directed from 
Moscow. Given this ideological mind-set, the Kremlin would always look to safeguard 
existing communist influence and given that Amin’s Afghan government appeared to be 
flirting with the idea of leaving the communist camp, it was to be expected that Moscow 
would take steps to ensure the maintenance of communist influence in Afghanistan. 
Economic sanctions, given the nature of the largely closed Soviet economy, could not 
therefore be expected to bring about a meaningful alteration in Soviet foreign policy.48 As the 
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memorandum was implying, any economic sanctions against Moscow would be a futile act 
because they would not encourage the desired political outcomes. 
Yet Thatcher had not entirely ruled out the possibility of implementing economic or 
broader political sanctions against Moscow. What is clear, however, is that the British prime 
minister would not agree to undertake any action hastily and, moreover, wanted economic 
sanctions to be coordinated within the framework of a broad alliance. Thatcher now informed 
Washington that if she was to undertake political punishments against the Soviet Union, such 
as cancelling the forthcoming visit of the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, to 
London or withdrawing of the British Ambassador to Moscow, then the rest of the NATO 
alliance would have to undertake similar action. At the heart of Thatcher’s response was to 
ensure that the British government did not find itself out of kilter with its allies; either in 
respect of being perceived as being too bellicose or weak in its response. Striking this careful 
balance was central to the British government’s reaction at this time.49 
 In Washington the Carter administration found itself under increased domestic 
pressure to pursue a more vigorous course against Moscow. On meeting with a number of 
political advisors the president was urged to be ‘even more forceful’ in responding to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.50 Edward Kennedy, challenging Carter for the Democratic 
nomination for the presidency, was vocally criticising the president for his supposedly inept 
handling of U.S. foreign policy. Carter’s Republican opponents went even further when they 
alleged that Carter’s weak foreign policy had emboldened Moscow to the point that the 
Kremlin believed it could invade its neighbours without facing serious retribution.51 
 This domestic pressure against Carter only encouraged him to remain committed to 
implementing political and economic sanctions against Moscow. The British government, 
which had earlier been reluctant to pursue economic sanctions against Moscow, now found 
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itself under increased U.S. diplomatic pressure to agree to such measures. Brzezinski was 
thus dispatched to London to personally liaise with Thatcher where he was instructed to press 
the American case. Again though, the British reiterated their earlier position that their support 
was contingent upon other countries supporting these sanctions. British resistance to 
American calls for action was a consistent and growing political nuisance for the president. 
The Carter administration nonetheless remained convinced that London had to agree to such 
measures if any meaningful punishment against Moscow was to be enacted. Moreover, if 
London could be won over it was believed other countries would follow suit and follow 
Washington’s lead. In the weeks that followed a sterner line with London would be pursued 
to overcome Thatcher’s continuing reluctance.52  
Secretary Vance’s visit to London in February 1980 gave the United States the 
opportunity to win this required British support. Again little agreement between the two sides 
was to be found. Whilst Thatcher indicated that she was prepared to take a ‘bold’ and ‘strong’ 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, she also warned that NATO’s response could 
be a ‘9-day wonder’ which would ‘dwindle after six months.’ Given such circumstances, it 
was preferable for the United States and United Kingdom to avoid undertaking sanctions 
against Moscow. Vance assured the British prime minister that Carter’s intention was to 
create a multilateral response against the Soviet Union but it was telling that the U.S. 
secretary of state could not guarantee that Washington could bring about this multinational 
support which London deemed vital if it was to support the imposition of economic sanctions 
against Moscow.53 Thatcher’s clever rhetoric had allowed her to present the image of 
solidarity with Washington but she had avoided making any firm commitments. The British 
prime minister had assumed a wait and see policy whereby the United Kingdom would not 
commit to any action until a multilateral response had crystallised. 
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 Back in Washington, the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations only encouraged 
Carter to listen to the views of Brzezinski and to assume a firmer position against the Soviet 
Union. Central to this was increasing the U.S. defence budget, improving the levels of 
defence cooperation within the NATO alliance, and implementing a series of economic and 
political sanctions against Moscow.54 It was to the NATO alliance that Washington looked to 
support this new approach against the Soviet Union. Such support, however, never 
materialised as both France and West Germany publically announced that they would not 
support Washington’s proposed economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. Carter could 
not even secure NATO wide agreement for its members to all attend a NATO summit where 
a unified response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan would be discussed. With 
Carter failing to win approval from Giscard and Schmidt, the pressure on Thatcher to support 
Washington’s policies therefore mounted.55 In an effort to win London’s support, Carter 
dispatched a scathing letter to the prime minister: 
To be frank, I am concerned about the impression of disarray in the 
West and the fact that leaders of the Soviet Union may draw 
dangerous conclusions from it. You know that there is a sense of deep 
disappointment in the United States over the European response to 
date to developments which in the first instance threaten European 
security more directly than our own. I personally cannot accept the 
concept of a divisible détente which insulates our European allies’ 
relations with the Soviet Union from the response required to Soviet 
aggression.56 
Nicholas Henderson reinforced the impression that American patience with London was 
wearing thin. As he warned from Washington ‘American opinion is turning nastily against 
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the Allies’ and whilst ‘originally the UK was largely exempt from this criticism,’ this could 
‘no longer be the case.’57  
This American pressure created considerable concern in London that a more serious 
Anglo-American confrontation would soon materialise. As a cabinet member within the 
Heath government, Thatcher had first-hand experience of how U.S.-European quarrels as 
most obviously demonstrated during Kissinger’s ‘Year of Europe’ scheme in 1973 could 
seriously hurt British interests. Key advisers to the prime minister also well remembered the 
detrimental consequences that broader U.S.-European disagreements could have for the 
United Kingdom. Avoiding a serious diplomatic dispute with Washington remained an 
important aspect of British policy at this stage.58  
Consequently, Thatcher sought to quell this simmering U.S.-European quarrel and 
urged the president to avoid insisting upon a NATO conference. Instead, a NATO response 
could be agreed to a less public forum which would allow policy to be analysed and agreed to 
without the added pressure that an international conference brings with it. The British 
government looked at ways in which pressure could be applied to the Soviet Union that could 
be supported by the entire NATO alliance. Few options materialised as London well 
understood that they were essentially powerless to remove the Soviet Union from 
Afghanistan. Economic sanctions were perceived to be too costly and would not win approval 
from West Germany or France and thus threatened to create a very public fracture within the 
NATO alliance.59 Accordingly, all Thatcher could suggest was that the relaxation of East-
West tension would now have to end. A long-term build-up of western forces would be 
required that would convince ‘The Soviet leaders…that they cannot continue to enjoy détente 
in East-West relations while flouting it in the Third World.’60 Platitudes aside, Thatcher 
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could offer nothing of substance in the short-term which would alleviate the domestic 
pressure against the Carter administration or reverse the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.   
London, however, came under sustained pressure from Washington to respond 
positively to American proposals and over the next several months this was a continual 
feature of U.S. policy towards London. Harold Brown pursued the matter vigorously in 
discussion with Thatcher in June 1980. During follow up discussions with his opposite 
number, Francis Pym, Brown again pushed the argument that the United Kingdom had to 
agree to economic sanctions against Moscow. By August, this sustained U.S. pressure had 
achieved some success as the British government agreed to limit high technology sales to the 
Soviet Union. Eventually British opposition was worn down by concerted American pressure. 
Yet British agreement remained limited as London continually sought to negotiate with 
Washington what should and should not be included in the economic sanctions against 
Moscow. The definition of ‘high technology’ was suitably elastic that British industry was 
able to keep selling significant amounts of material to the Soviet Union.61 In sum, even 
though Washington had secured agreement from London to implement economic sanctions 
against Moscow, the delay in achieving this and the limited intensity of the sanctions meant 
this was a pyrrhic diplomatic victory for the Carter administration. As the president had 
outlined to the American people during his inaugural address there were clearly limits to 
American power and influence.62 As this episode revealed, this applied to handling American 
allies, even those that shared a special relationship with Washington could not be easily 
cajoled into following Carter’s lead.  
The Moscow Olympics 
Implementing economic sanctions against Moscow was only one element of Carter’s 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Political punishments were also sought and 
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the Carter administration investigated whether they could establish an international boycott of 
the forthcoming summer Olympic Games which were set to be held in Moscow. Walter 
Mondale was particularly enthusiastic about an Olympic boycott and wrote to the president 
soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that ‘I hope we would really go after the 
Olympics—I don’t see why that is sacrosanct.’63 The president agreed. Yet Carter also 
understood that for a boycott to achieve maximum political effect it required the support of as 
many other nations as possible.64 Winning support for a mass boycott became Carter’s 
objective and on 20 January 1980 the president announced that U.S. athletes would not attend 
the Moscow Games if Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan. In a message to the United 
Kingdom and other countries, Carter ratcheted up the rhetoric: 
I regard the Soviet invasion and the attempted suppression of 
Afghanistan as a serious violation of international law and an 
extremely serious threat to world peace. This invasion also endangers 
neighbouring independent countries and access to a major part of the 
world’s oil supplies. It therefore threatens our own national security, 
as well as the security of the region and the entire world.65 
Soon after this message Washington officially requested London’s support in organising a 
mass boycott of the forthcoming Moscow Olympic Games. 
 This American request placed the Thatcher government in a quandary. Whilst the 
prime minister personally supported a boycott of the Olympic Games she was actually unable 
to legally prevent the participation of British Athletes at the Games. British participation 
hinged upon the decision of the British Olympic Committee. The prime minister would have 
to win the British Olympic Committee’s support if she was to follow Carter and boycott the 
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forthcoming Olympic Games.66 Moreover, the prime minister would only support a boycott 
of the Olympic Games if the president was able to ensure that ‘other Allies did likewise.’67 
This is not to say that the British prime minister would not do her part to establish this 
multinational alliance that would boycott the Olympic Games. Thatcher was determined to 
create such an alliance and set about achieving this task in the following weeks. Such 
enthusiasm was driven by the prime minister’s genuine desire to see Moscow punished for 
invading Afghanistan but this type of punishment had the additional benefit of not actually 
having the costly side effects that pursuing economic sanctions against Moscow would have 
for British interests. Thatcher looked to garner international support for establishing an 
alternative venue for the Olympic Games. Following extensive deliberation she decided that 
Montreal should be the alternate host of the Games and immediately began to lobby 
international leaders to support her plans. Speaking with Helmut Schmidt, Thatcher argued 
that the Soviet Union’s actions in Afghanistan contradicted the ‘Olympic Spirit’ and the 
Games should be moved to Montreal. Schmidt’s response was evasive and indicative of the 
lukewarm support that existed throughout the western alliance for boycotting the Olympic 
Games.68 If a successful mass boycott of the forthcoming Moscow Games was to be 
established, then more creative diplomacy was evidently required from both London and 
Washington. 
 Whilst Thatcher continued to seek support for changing the venue of the Olympic 
Games, Washington continued to apply political pressure upon the prime minister to 
announce Britain’s withdrawal from the Moscow Games. Carter wrote to Thatcher and 
suggested that she needed to apply pressure against the British Olympic Committee to 
convince it to boycott the forthcoming Games. As the president outlined, he did not have the 
authority to prevent U.S. participation in the Games but his appeal for a boycott to the U.S. 
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Olympic Association had provided fruitful results. The prime minister should follow suit and, 
as Carter assured Thatcher, similarly positive results would be forthcoming.69 This American 
pressure encouraged the prime minister to contact Sir Denis Follows, the Chairman of the 
British Olympic Association. Sir Denis, however, would likely prove to be a difficult patron 
given he had already publically stated that British participation in the Olympic Games should 
go ahead.70 Thatcher wrote to Sir Denis and requested that he approach the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) to suggest that the Games be moved from Moscow. If the IOC 
refused, Thatcher asked Sir Denis to instruct British Athletes to boycott the Moscow 
Games.71 Sir Denis was to disappoint the prime minister. In a polite but firm letter to 
Thatcher, Sir Denis informed the prime minister that it was impossible to organise an 
alternative venue for the Games at such short notice. However, Sir Denis promised to pass 
the prime minister’s letter on to the other board members of the British Olympic Association 
for further consultation.72 Further deliberation did not result in Sir Denis altering his position 
as he again wrote to Thatcher informing her that the British Olympic Association did not feel 
it had sufficient grounds in which to advocate moving the Games away from Moscow. 
Second, Sir Denis made it clear that he would not advocate for a boycott of the forthcoming 
Games. In a follow-up letter to the prime minister, Sir Denis again reiterated this position.73 
All of this was deeply irritating for the prime minister but legal avenues to override 
Sir Denis’s opposition were now explored. Thatcher was, for instance, informed that the 
British government could block the Visa applications of British Athletes that were set to 
travel to Moscow to compete in the Games. Thatcher, however, decided against such action 
concluding that this would likely create tremendous legal and political problems which she 
would rather avoid. More to the point, the prime minister believed that her actions would be 
challenged in the High Courts and any Visa denials would probably be reversed. Such action 
would not only be politically costly but also likely to be unsuccessful. As Thatcher well 
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understood, she was for all intense and purposes powerless to move the Olympic Games from 
Moscow or even prevent British participation in the Games. As she informed the Australian 
prime minister, Malcolm Fraser, the best she could do now was to publically advise British 
athletes not to participate in the Games.74 
 In spite of Thatcher’s political predicament, Carter remained determined to win 
London’s support to boycott the Olympic Games. During Vance’s visit to London in 
February 1980 the U.S. secretary of state pressed the prime minister on the Olympic boycott. 
The response was not what Washington desired as Thatcher explained in great detail that 
whilst she continued to support the president’s ambition of boycotting the Olympic Games 
she could not actually prevent British participation in the Games. Furthermore, Thatcher 
subtlety indicated to Vance that British attendance at the Games was probable given the fact 
that the British Olympic Association had indicated that they would proceed with their plans 
to participate in the Moscow Games. All that Thatcher could offer was her on-going pubic 
advocacy of an Olympic boycott.75  
Learning of this news, Carter called for another meeting of the SCC to discuss the 
proposed Olympic boycott. Conscious that few American allies would endorse a boycott of 
the Games, it was now agreed that America would be better placed lobbying for an 
alternative venue to be established. American officials now lobbied the IOC to move the 
Games from Moscow to Montreal. In order to win support, Carter issued a public declaration 
that the Soviet Union had until 20 February 1980 to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan or 
the United States would boycott the forthcoming Olympic Games. As the Carter 
administration was aware, time was of the essence, so it was decided that Ambassador 
Brewster was to contact Thatcher directly to encourage her to continue to pressurise the 
British Olympic Association to agree to attend the alternative Games in Montreal. But 
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Carter’s hopes of achieving major international support to move the Olympic Games were 
shattered when the IOC announced that they would not countenance moving the Games from 
Moscow. A boycott of the Games was therefore the only option now open to the president.76  
 The hopes of achieving a mass boycott of the Moscow Games looked remote at this 
point as the president was informed that key European allies such as Britain, France and West 
Germany all looked set to attend the Games. Second, a preliminary meeting between the 
United States and the European members of NATO had proven unproductive. Indeed, during 
this meeting the British had taken away the impression that Washington was threatening to be 
less cooperative in other fields of U.S.-European interaction if a coordinated response in 
boycotting the Olympic Games could not be found.77 British discussions with their European 
allies only further demonstrated that there was no consensus within the western alliance. By 
the end of February 1980 the British government had concluded that there existed little 
possibility that a mass boycott of the Moscow Games would be achieved and that British 
athletes would likely attend the Games. Indeed, this was confirmed when the British Olympic 
Association publically announced on 20 March 1980 that British athletes would attend the 
Games.78 
 Thatcher, in an effort to quell suspicion in Washington about London’s lack of 
support for the Olympic boycott, provided a number of public and private assurances that she 
would continue to advocate that British athletes boycott the forthcoming Olympic Games. 
Thatcher intensified her campaign to convince both the British Olympic Association and 
individual athletes not to attend the Games. Contrary to the claim in her memoir that British 
athletes ‘were left free to make up their own minds’ about attending the Games, previously 
classified documentation reveals that a far more assertive position was taken by the British 
government to convince British athletes not to attend the Games.79 For example, in an effort 
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to obtain political leverage over the British Olympic Association the prime minister asked 
Land Rover, the automobile manufacturer, to withdraw its sponsorship from the British 
Olympic team. Such action resulted in a considerable reduction in the level of sponsorship 
provided to British Athletes but this would still prove too little incentive to change the 
decision of the British Olympic Association to send a team to the Games.80 Officials working 
on behalf of the Thatcher government also lobbied individual athletes not to attend the 
Games.81 And in last ditch effort to convince the British Olympic Association to boycott the 
Games, Thatcher dispatched another letter to Sir Denis Follows: 
The Games will serve the propaganda needs of the Soviet 
Government. There is no effective palliative, such as cutting out the 
ceremonies. I remain firmly convinced that it is neither in our national 
nor in the wider Western interest for Britain to take part in the Games 
in Moscow. As a sporting event, the Games cannot now satisfy the 
aspirations of our sportsmen and women. British attendance at 
Moscow can only serve to frustrate the interests of Britain.82 
Such efforts proved unpersuasive as the British Olympic Association continued to maintain 
that it would send its athletes to the Games. And so it would prove as a fully British team 
were in attendance when the Games began on 19 July 1980. Sir Denis Follows had essentially 
‘outplayed Mrs Thatcher’ and successfully resisted all of the political pressure exerted against 
the British Olympic Association to ensure British participation in the Games.83 
As Douglas Hurd reflected, trying to organise a boycott of the Olympic Games was 
‘the most foolish task’ that he had ever been ‘entrusted to as a minister. I knew little about the 
world of athletics, but enough to realise from the start that neither administrators nor athletes 
were likely to abandon for political reasons an occasion in which they had already invested so 
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much work and ambition.’84 Events proved Hurd correct as the United Kingdom along with 
seven of the EEC Nine attended the Games. The United States along with West Germany 
boycotted the Games. The western alliance presented an image to the international 
community at large that it was unable to even coordinate a boycott of the Olympic Games. 
Worse yet, the partial boycott did not significantly reduce the spectacle of the Games. The 
attendance of so many of America’s key allies at the Moscow Games highlighted Carter’s 
lack of influence over the alliance and provided a further example of his unsuccessful alliance 
diplomacy. Carter had, as one commentator suggested, ‘dropped the torch’ in handling the 
Olympic boycott.85  
Iranian hostage crisis 
Following the Shah of Iran’s overthrow in February 1979, he had been admitted into the 
United States for medical treatment. The Iranian revolutionaries, under the direction of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, demanded that the Shah be returned to Iran to stand trial for his alleged 
crimes during his years in power. Following months of wrangling and heightened instability 
in Iran, the Khomeini regime had lost patience with Washington. In an effort to coerce 
Washington into deporting the Shah, the Khomeini regime orchestrated the takeover of the 
American Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and subsequently kidnapped American 
personnel based at the Embassy. The Carter administration was now faced with the 
predicament whereby American citizens were being held captive and publically paraded 
before the television cameras in a sign of America’s powerlessness to protect its own 
citizens.86 
For Carter the hostage situation quickly turned into a domestic nightmare as his 
political opponents attacked his handling of the crisis. Edward Kennedy, contesting the 
Democratic nomination for the presidency, even accused the president of ‘leading the country 
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into war’ and none too subtly alleged that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the taking 
of American hostages in Iran was the president’s fault.87 As the Iranian hostage situation 
dragged on throughout the rest of the year it became a growing international and domestic 
burden for Carter. ‘It is a crisis for your presidency, for the hostages and for our country's 
image around the world’ Hamilton Jordon warned the president.88 The Anglo-American 
relationship would prove just as frustrating for Washington as the Thatcher government failed 
to provide the type and level of support which the president desired. It is to this episode that 
we now turn. 
Throughout the entire Iranian hostage crisis, uppermost in Carter’s mind was to 
achieve the timely and safe release of the American hostages. As Carter later claimed, his 
disinclination to utilise military force to resolve the hostage situation was influenced by the 
twin concerns about the hostages’ safety and his conviction that the utilisation of force would 
likely lead to the deaths of innocent civilians which he found morally difficult to justify.89 
Negotiating the safe release of the hostages remained Carter’s preferred course of action for 
the time being. Initial diplomatic efforts did not, however, look promising as a United 
Nations mission to Iran, headed by Kurt Waldheim was, in the president’s words ‘a complete 
failure.’90 In the assessment of Hamilton Jordon, Waldheim had been ‘apologetic, defensive 
and at points obsequious’ in his discussions with the Iranian Revolutionary Council which 
only undermined American efforts to convince the Ayatollah to safely release the American 
hostages.91 Internationally the president looked for political support and he naturally turned 
to London. Rhetorical support was forthcoming as Thatcher provided a series of damning 
speeches whereby she condemned the kidnappings and urged the release of the American 
hostages. Similarly, in private communication the prime minister assured the president of her 
full support.92   
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Anglo-American solidarity was evident in the public sphere so much so that Carter 
retrospectively reflected that Thatcher ‘was strong and wholly supportive’ of his handling of 
the Iranian hostage crisis.93 This was certainly the case publically but privately Anglo-
American diplomacy was much more complicated. Over the course of the following weeks it 
became evident in Washington that the Thatcher government would not support more 
vigorous action against Tehran. Thatcher herself concluded that economic sanctions would 
only fuel the increasingly anti-Western rhetoric emanating out of Tehran and increased the 
probability that the American hostages would be physically harmed. Military action, such as 
implementing a blockade of Iran, would lead to similar consequences. A hostage rescue 
mission was deemed incredibly risky if not impossible to successfully accomplish. 
Diplomacy between Washington and Tehran was reminiscent of the dialogue of the deaf. As 
one analyst noted, ‘How does a born-again Christian deal with a Born-Again Moslem?’94 As 
Thatcher privately recognised, the options available to Carter left him in ‘an impossible 
position.’95  
The imposition of economic sanctions, which were currently being proposed by the 
United States in the United Nations Security Council, especially troubled London. Mirroring 
concerns in relation to debate about economic sanctions against Moscow, the British 
government feared that such action would actually hurt the western position more than it 
would damage Tehran. As a tool of coercive diplomacy London believed economic sanctions 
would not actually convince Tehran to release the American hostages. Following a meeting 
with Lord Carrington, Thatcher instructed her foreign and commonwealth secretary to 
assume the position that if the United Nations failed to approve the current economic 
sanctions against Iran then the United Kingdom would not support the implementation of 
them on an Anglo-American basis.96 
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Events in Afghanistan, however, convinced Thatcher that both the United States and 
United Kingdom could improve relations with the Ayatollah and help lead to the successful 
release of the American hostages. With Afghanistan bordering Iran, and Moscow having 
invaded Afghanistan to ostensibly quell the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, London believed 
that this would convince the Iranian regime that it had to avoid risking the ire of Moscow. 
Intelligence reports at the beginning of 1980 indicated that Soviet forces were indeed taking 
up positions on the Afghanistan border with Iran. Consequently, if the Iranians were made 
aware of this fact, the Iranians would seek allies to signal to Moscow just how costly an 
invasion of Iran would be.97 As the FCO were informed: ‘The prime minister has expressed 
particular interest in using the crisis [in Afghanistan] to get the Ayatollah to come closer to 
the Western point of view.’98 Central to this task then was convincing the Carter 
administration that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan actually provided an opportunity to 
repair relations with Tehran.  
Thatcher was to be quickly disappointed. On meeting with Warren Christopher, the 
prime minister learned that Washington did not see how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
could be utilised in relation to the Iranian hostage situation.99 Instead, Christopher focused 
upon winning British support for a series of economic sanctions to be implemented against 
Tehran. This placed Thatcher in a difficult predicament for she personally sympathised with 
the president’s position but fully understood that economic sanctions would hurt British 
interests and kill any immediate hope of improving relations with Tehran. More to the point, 
Thatcher believed that economic sanctions would have little effect in convincing Tehran to 
release the American hostages. Thatcher therefore carefully reiterated her support for the 
president but also made it clear that such support did not at this point in time extend to 
implementing economic sanctions against Iran. Instead, the prime minister again suggested 
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that Washington had to exploit the recent invasion of Afghanistan to their advantage vis-à-vis 
Tehran.100 
These two competing ideas as to how to successfully release the American hostages 
spilled over into in the broader international arena as both London and Washington undertook 
efforts to convince their mutual allies to support their respective approaches towards Tehran. 
A rivalry between London and Washington was therefore emerging at this point. Washington 
sought international support for implementing economic sanctions against Iran. London, 
meanwhile, sought to convince these same states that they should seek to negotiate the 
release of the American hostages by convincing Iran that the recent invasion of Afghanistan 
meant that Tehran required friendlier relations with the West. To make her case, Thatcher 
discussed the predicament with Helmut Schmidt and informed him that Carter’s proposals 
would not work and could not, for legal reasons, actually be implemented by the British 
government. Schmidt, also conscious that the proposed sanctions would hurt significant West 
German economic interests agreed with the prime minister’s position.101 With Thatcher and 
Schmidt deciding not to support Carter at this point it crucially undermined the president’s 
efforts to impose multinational economic sanctions against Iran. In turn, it demonstrated 
Carter’s political weakness vis-à-vis his most important allies and highlighted the complexity 
of alliance relations.  
As this diplomacy continued, Vance met with Thatcher in February 1980 where he 
requested that London support the proposed economic sanctions against Iran. It was during 
this meeting, however, that Vance revealed a number of important developments that had 
occurred bilaterally between Washington and Tehran. Vance informed Thatcher that contact 
with Iran indicated that Tehran would release the American hostages on condition that a 
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Commission would be established that would produce a study on the Shah’s time in power. 
Vance explained how this would work:  
When the document was complete, the Commission would meet the 
Revolutionary Council in Tehran and tell them that before the document could be 
taken back to New York [the UN], the hostages would have to be handed over to 
the custody of the Iranian Government and lodged either in a hospital or in the 
foreign ministry with Mr Laingen. The Commission would not return to New 
York until the hostages had been handed over. Once the hostages had been 
handed over, the Commission would return to New York and communicate the 
preliminary document to the Secretary General. It would be published within two 
days. The hostages would be released by the Iranian Government on the day that 
the document was published.102 
 
Vance was hopeful that this approach would lead to the successful release of the hostages and 
even predicted that ‘…the hostages might be released within about two weeks.’103 As history 
informs us, Vance was wrong to have been so optimistic at this stage as the American 
hostages remained captive in Iran for nearly another year. In Washington the pressure on 
Carter to resolve the hostage situation was mounting from all directions. Media coverage of 
the hostage crisis was particularly intense as nightly television and newspaper comment 
turned sharply critical of Carter’s handling of the crisis. As Jody Powell recalled in a rather 
bitter lament, journalists were ‘busy…kicking Carter’s teeth in every time he opened his 
mouth.’104 
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Unfair or not, the media coverage accurately reported the growing division amongst 
the president’s advisers on how to solve the hostage situation. Indeed, the State Department 
was invested in a diplomatic solution whereas others within the administration were calling 
for a more forthright approach, i.e. economic sanctions followed by a recuse attempt. This 
spilt in the administration was personified in the ever-deepening feud between Vance and 
Brzezinski. Their bureaucratic rivalry had steadily worsened during the previous three years 
but would come to its finale in 1980 as Brzezinski’s advocacy of a harder line towards both 
the Soviet Union and in responding to the hostage situation in Iran triumphed. In large 
measure Brzezinski’s line of argument was successful not least because the president himself 
had grown increasingly frustrated with what he saw as the State Department’s ‘inertia’ and 
the almost ‘total lack of initiative or innovation’ in policy creation or execution.105 The 
institutional rivalry between Vance and Brzezinski was finally settled with the national 
security adviser emerging victorious. As Madeline Albright, (U.S. secretary of state 1997-
2001) who at the time worked for Brzezinski’s national security council laconically noted 
‘the only time the NSC and State Department worked together well was when Henry 
Kissinger was in charge of both.’106 
By March 1980 the president was now contemplating whether or not to authorise a 
rescue attempt of the hostages. More serious military proposals, such as introducing a naval 
blockade or the mining of Iranian waters were also being considered. But undermining all of 
these military options was the simple fact that none would actually deliver what the president 
wanted, i.e. the safe return of the American hostages. The rescue mission was the ‘best of a 
lousy set of options’ Harold Brown suggested.107 Vance, fearful that any military moves 
would likely lead to the hostages being murdered in retaliation argued that diplomatic efforts 
should persist. As Vance had told Thatcher in December 1979 ‘the consequences of any other 
course of action [other than continued negotiations with Tehran] both for the hostages and for 
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everyone else could only be very grave.’ 108 Vance’s influence with the president was, 
however, waning. On 8 April 1980 Carter announced that the United States was formally 
severing diplomatic ties with Iran and would implement a series of economic sanctions. Yet, 
as Warren Christopher recounts, whilst this ‘seemed to us the right approach…others in 
government…had something more dramatic in mind.’109 In fact the president had concluded 
that negotiations would not result in the safe release of the American hostages. ‘We could no 
longer afford to depend on diplomacy. I decided to act’ Carter remembered.110 Following 
further deliberation, and advice from Brzezinski, Brown, Stansfield Turner (Director of the 
CIA), David Jones (Chairmen of the JCS) and vice president Mondale, the president 
authorised Operation Eagle Claw. This would involve the infiltration of Iran by U.S. Army 
Rangers that would attempt to free the hostages.111  
Operation Eagle Claw was given the go-ahead even though Vance urged the president 
to abandon the mission. Such was Vance’s opposition to the proposed mission he offered to 
resign his office if the operation was given the go-ahead. Carter concluded that the rescue 
mission was worth attempting even if it led to Vance’s resignation and on 24 April 1980 the 
operation began. However, the mission soon encountered difficulties. In keeping with 
Vance’s warning that during such operations ‘something always goes wrong’ one of the eight 
helicopters being utilized in the operation encountered technical trouble.112 A second 
helicopter flew into a sandstorm which caused it mechanical difficulties. A third helicopter 
then suffered problems and on the advice of the Commanding Officer, Colonel Charles 
Beckwith, the president aborted the mission. Magnifying this calamity was the fact that on 
leaving the mission area a helicopter collided with one of the C-130 refuelling aircraft which 
led to the loss of eight American personnel.113 All that Carter could do now was to lament in 
his diary that ‘The cancellation of our mission was caused by a strange series of mishaps, 
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almost completely unpredictable.’114 Given the ramifications of the failed rescue mission, it is 
little wonder that Carter remembers 24 April 1980 as ‘one of the worst of my life.’115  
All London could do was express sympathy with Carter’s predicament. As the prime 
minister wrote in her retirement, ‘I felt America’s wound as if it were Britain’s own; and in a 
sense it was, for anyone exposed to American weakness increased ours.’116 Maybe so, but 
aside platitudes there was to be little meaningful British action in support of the United 
States. Only following ‘pressure’ from Washington did Thatcher agree to limited sanctions 
against Iran.117 Tellingly these sanctions were only enacted on 23 April 1980, one day prior 
to the hostage rescue mission, which suggests that the Carter administration did not expect 
these sanctions to lead to the release of the American hostages.118 
The Carter administration had originally decided not to provide London with prior 
notification of the American recuse mission. However, British military personnel stationed in 
the Oman had detected U.S. aircraft landing in the area and began to raise questions as to the 
American military activity in the region (London guessed correctly that this was a build up 
for a hostage rescue). Fearing that if London probed this matter further it would raise 
unwarranted attention as to American intentions vis-à-vis Iran, the president ordered Warren 
Christopher to personally visit the prime minister and to inform her of the impending 
mission. Christopher arrived in England and met with Thatcher at the prime minister’s 
country residence at Chequers. Confronted with this information, Thatcher and Carrington 
(also present at the meeting at Chequers) wished Christopher good luck and informed him 
that the British would cease communication as to why U.S. planes were moving through 
Oman.119  
This episode is revealing in that it is demonstrates both the diminished importance of 
the Anglo-American relationship and its continued relevance. If it had not been for a British 
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officer in Oman witnessing the American military presence the Thatcher government would 
have remained oblivious to the U.S. rescue mission. This demonstrates that Washington did 
not believe the British significantly important to warrant prior notification. This was quite a 
marked fall given that even during the Nixon-Kissinger years where Washington had 
routinely ignored London, the Nixon administration had usually informed London about any 
major military undertakings it was planning.120 Britain’s diminished importance in the last 
decade had obvious ramifications to the amount of communication it could now enjoy with 
Washington.  And with the British government excluded it could not advise Washington on 
other courses of action. In essence, Britain’s international decline meant that the opportunity 
to influence the U.S. government was now much diminished and undermined the traditional 
idea in British elite policy making circles that London could ‘guide’ U.S. foreign policy. 
There was a political and strategic cost to dwindling international influence which the U.S. 
hostage rescue mission ably demonstrated. 
Efforts at further mediation throughout the summer of 1980 failed to release the 
American hostages. The Iran-Iraq war which erupted in September 1980 was seen as 
something which could be exploited to help release the hostages. In particular, Iran’s military 
relied upon American hardware that had been sold to Iran during the Shah’s rule. Thus, Iran 
would require replacement parts and material for the damaged sustained in the increasingly 
violent war with Iraq. Exploiting such reliance, however, proved ineffective as the Iranian 
leadership accused the U.S. government of in fact provoking Iraq’s attack against Iran. 
Consequently, it would not be until Carter left office on 31 January 1981 that the hostages 
were finally released.121 The entire episode had poisoned Carter’s last year in power and 
contributed to his heavy defeat by Ronald Reagan in the November 1980 election. The level 
of support offered by London to the Carter administration throughout the hostage crisis 
disappointed and irritated policy makers in Washington. As Walter Mondale recalled, the 
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Iranian hostage situation ‘exposed the difficulties of international cooperation against an 
extremist threat. Our ability to press for a peaceful, effective resolution with the radicals 
turned in part on the willingness of other Western nations to help us bring pressure on Iran, 
and we never got the cooperation we needed.’122 As Warren Christopher reflected, America’s 
allies had very publically distanced themselves from the hostage recuse effort.123 Indeed, 
London had ensured that its support for the Carter administration was limited to public 
speeches of sympathy. Again then, Thatcher was strong on rhetorical support but was less 
forthcoming in providing material assistance.  
Trident agreement 
The chapter has thus far examined the American and British responses to moments of 
international crisis. As shown above, considerable disagreement existed between the two 
governments. Yet, considerable cooperation between the two countries continued 
simultaneously. In the realm of nuclear weapons cooperation the two countries reached 
agreement in the summer of 1980 for the United States to sell the British government Trident 
C4 as a replacement to its ageing force of Polaris SLBMs. It is to this decision which the 
chapter now turns.   
During Thatcher’s premiership, matters related to Britain’s nuclear weapons were 
dealt with by an exclusive group of ministers within the British cabinet. Membership of the 
‘Restricted Ministerial Meetings’ included, Peter Carrington (foreign and commonwealth 
secretary), Francis Pym (defence secretary), Geoffrey Howe (Chancellor of the Exchequer) 
and Willy Whitelaw (home secretary). Thatcher’s approach to British nuclear weapons policy 
followed a tradition set by Clement Attlee (prime minister 1945-51) whereby an exclusive 
group of ministers within the cabinet would discuss nuclear related matters. A group, named 
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‘MISC 7,’ was established and it was here that deciding on a successor system to Polaris was 
deliberated.124 
That Thatcher accepted Britain needed to find a successor system to Polaris was never 
seriously questioned. For the prime minister, Britain’s possession of strategic nuclear 
weapons was intrinsically linked to upholding Britain’s international security. Thatcher 
accepted the argument that ‘NATO’s strategy is above all one of deterrence, in which the 
possession of nuclear weapons plays a key part. If we ever have to face using them, the 
strategy will have failed in its prime purpose.’ The MOD advised the prime minister that 
British possession of nuclear weapons was vital because ‘Britain commits all its nuclear 
capability to NATO in conformity with concepts of collective deterrence worked out in [the] 
joint forum of the Nuclear Planning Group. The decisive consideration in favour of a British 
capability that is ultimately independent is the contribution it makes to NATO’s strategy of 
deterrence and thus to our own national security.’ Along with such considerations, the British 
government deemed it essential to retain an ‘independent’ strategic nuclear weapons 
capability not least because it could act as an insurance policy against the United States 
‘backing down’ in a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union and leaving the United 
Kingdom to fend for itself against the Soviet behemoth.  As the MOD outlined to the prime 
minister:  
A Soviet leadership-perhaps much changed in character from today’s, 
perhaps also operating amid the pressures of turbulent internal or 
external circumstances might believe that at some point as a conflict 
developed the determination of the United States might waver…The 
nuclear strengths of Britain or France may seem modest by 
comparison with the superpower armouries but the damage they could 
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inflict is in absolute terms immense. (A single Polaris submarine 
carries more explosive power than all the munitions used in World 
War II). An adversary assessing the consequences of possible 
aggression in Europe would have to regard a NATO defence 
containing these powerful independent elements as a harder one to 
predict, and a more dangerous one to assail, than one in which nuclear 
retaliatory power rested in United States hands alone.125 
 
It was this type of argument that Thatcher accepted and informed her decision to obtain a 
successor system to Polaris. Updating Britain’s strategic nuclear weapons capability was 
never in question. The only thing to debate in Thatcher’s mind was determining the preferred 
successor system.126  
There were several viable choices available for replacing Polaris. The MOD explained 
the options open to the prime minister in a long briefing memorandum where the possibilities 
included the creation of some sort of Anglo-French system, the introduction of a new air 
launched force, the building of a land launched system or purchasing a new SLBM system 
(such as Trident C4). Following extensive deliberation the Thatcher government endorsed 
Callaghan’s earlier decision that Trident C4 was the preferable replacement for Polaris for it 
provided the most credible deterrent at an acceptable financial level.127 
Callaghan had already obtained a ‘private agreement’ with Carter to purchase Trident 
C4 but its sale was now complicated by a number of interrelated factors; not least the 
perennial concern within British circles that the Carter administration would allow the Anglo-
American nuclear relationship to be undermined by Washington’s ambition of finalising a 
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SALT II agreement with Moscow. British fears were based upon the fact that President 
Carter appeared to be reneging on his October 1979 assurance that he would react in an 
‘affirmative’ manner which was ‘fully in keeping with our traditional relationship of close 
cooperation in the strategic nuclear field’ to any British request to purchase a successor 
system to Polaris.128 In December 1979, however, Carter informed Thatcher that whilst he 
remained committed to providing a ‘positive response’ to any British request for a successor 
system to Polaris, he would delay giving his approval until the successful Senate ratification 
of the SALT II Treaty. Evidently, the British were justified in their concern that broader U.S. 
geopolitical and domestic factors could negatively infringe upon the Anglo-American nuclear 
relationship.129  
In the weeks that followed there was a growing suspicion in British circles that the 
Carter administration was ‘stringing along’ London. By this it was implied that the Carter 
administration would continue to discuss the possibility of selling the British various 
successor systems but would not actually publically commit to any such sale for fear of 
complicating the ratification of SALT II (on agreeing a sale of nuclear weapons technology 
the president and the prime minister had traditionally exchanged a letter announcing the sale 
publically). Little wonder that Thatcher would describe this as a period where ‘troublesome 
and annoying complications’ began to affect the Anglo-American nuclear relationship. 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1980 it became an overriding priority for the British 
government to obtain a public commitment from the Carter administration to sell London a 
successor system to Polaris.130  
 British suspicions about Carter’s intentions would prove largely irrelevant as over the 
course of the summer of 1980 the ratification of SALT II languished amidst the fallout from 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. British fears that SALT II would fatally undermine the 
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Anglo-American nuclear relationship never materialised.131 As Vance retrospectively argued, 
the decision to sell Trident C4 to the British government demonstrated that the Carter 
administration ‘would not allow SALT to hobble our traditional defense cooperation with our 
NATO colleagues.’132 Harold Brown thus wrote to Francis Pym confirming that the United 
States would sell Trident C4 to the British government contingent on the fact that the 1963 
Polaris Sales Agreement remained as the foundation of cooperation for Trident C4 and, 
secondly, that the United Kingdom would pay a contribution to the research and development 
costs for Trident C4 (set at a 5% premium on the net cost). These conditions were accepted 
and in the following weeks the necessary agreements were reached between the two sides.133 
Though the Carter administration had approved the sale of Trident C4, Washington 
looked to exploit this agreement to advance its other security interests with London. Thus, 
when discussions over Trident C4 took place, U.S. officials pressed the case that the British 
government had to agree to purchase the Rapier missile system from the United States. 
Harold Brown argued that this was essential if possible Congressional opposition to the sale 
of Trident was to be overcome. London, unwillingly to complicate the Trident agreement at 
this point, reluctantly accepted that they would have to purchase the Rapier system. Second, 
the United States utilised the Trident C4 sale as further leverage in ensuring that the British 
government approved the extension of U.S. base rights on the British sovereign territory of 
Diego Garcia. Projecting greater American military power throughout the Persian Gulf and 
Indian Ocean was central to the Carter Doctrine so bases such as Diego Garcia had assumed 
greater importance in U.S. strategic thinking. Obtaining British agreement to extend U.S. 
base rights upon Diego Garcia had assumed higher priority in U.S. circles than otherwise 
might have been. Thatcher would deny that the two agreements had any connection writing 
that ‘it made sense on its own merits and had nothing to do with the Trident decision.’134 Yet 
it was hardly a coincidence that when Brown and Pym discussed the sale of Trident C4 that 
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the U.S. defense secretary also broached the subject of Diego Garcia. Whilst there may have 
been no explicit quid pro quo and, indeed, Thatcher supported the extension of U.S. base 
rights on Diego Garcia for broader security and strategic reasons, it can hardly seem feasible 
that the British government could have rejected this American request over Diego Garcia 
whilst at the same time finalising agreement on the sale of Trident. Thatcher’s account within 
her memoir therefore obfuscates this important point.135  
It is suggestive from this episode that the Anglo-American nuclear relationship was 
not something which could completely transcend the broader strategic and political 
relationship. The Carter administration sought, successfully as it would turn out, to promote 
its other interests with the United Kingdom.136 However, the Carter administration never 
undertook the type of coercive diplomacy that had been practiced by the Nixon-Ford 
administrations against the British government in the nuclear realm in order to achieve its 
other political ambitions with London.137 At a time when the British government was looking 
to Washington for additional support whilst concurrently pursuing policies that were irritating 
to Washington in relation to the implementation of economic or political sanctions against 
both the Soviet Union and Iran it at least worth pondering why Washington never pursued a 
more robust approach with London. First, the Carter administration had a very different 
world view than that possessed by the administrations of Nixon and Ford. Coercion, linkage 
and leverage were the very essence of U.S. foreign policy during 1969-77 and applying 
pressure against foes and allies was the leitmotif of U.S. grand strategy during this period. In 
contrast, Carter was not prepared to be as forceful in dealing with America’s allies that his 
immediate predecessors had been.  
Second, the extent of the disagreement between London and Washington during this 
period was really not all that serious. Thatcher had carefully ensured throughout the year that 
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she remained resolutely in support of the president in her public speeches and carefully 
orchestrated the impression that she only differed with Washington on the tactics to employ 
against the Soviet Union and Iran. Thatcher also approved Carter’s NATO improvement 
policies, which would include the stationing of ground launched nuclear capable cruise 
missiles on British soil, even though it was likely to create enormous domestic political 
difficulties for the prime minister.138 Under Thatcher’s leadership the British government 
carefully maintained the impression that Britain was ‘generally seen to be pulling her weight 
in the alliance.’139 As such, the nuclear relationship was never seen by Washington as a 
viable tool to persuade London to pursue alternative policies in relation to the Soviet Union 
or Iran. There were clearly limits to American power but these were as much imposed by 
Carter’s unwillingness to exploit the Anglo-American relationship to obtain leverage in 
pursuing his other ambitions with London. When Nixon, Ford and Kissinger had ruthlessly 
exploited Britain’s nuclear and intelligence relationship with London, they had been able to 
extract political concessions from the British government. In some ways, Carter was not as 
politically shrewd as his two Republican predecessors. Yet, Margaret Thatcher was also far 
more astute than her Conservative predecessor in Edward Heath. Her strong rhetorical 
support for Washington allowed her to credibly claim that she was in fundamental alignment 
with the Carter administration and merely differed on the tactical approach to common 
problems. Carter was no Nixon, but Thatcher was no Heath.      
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7 
Conclusion 
 
When analysing the Anglo-American relationship during the presidency of Jimmy Carter it is 
evident that disagreement between the two countries on a number of international topics of 
mutual interest was a prominent aspect of the relationship. Much of these differences can be 
explained by virtue of the fact that the United States was a global power and the United 
Kingdom was simply not. As one author has suggested: ‘Small powers have a whole set of 
different priorities in their foreign policies than great powers.’1 Such logic helps to explain 
why Anglo-American differences during the period under examination here were so 
considerable. Taking the example of the SALT II Treaty, for instance, the Carter 
administration’s decision to pursue discussions with Moscow bilaterally was the only 
reasonable way in which to bring about an agreement in the timeframe afforded to the 
president. Yet by operating bilaterally and raising difficult questions about arms limitations it 
created considerable apprehension in London. The conduct of foreign policy often involves 
balancing competing interests and in this regard, the promotion of U.S. interests was 
perceived in London as potentially damaging to British interests.   
Though Carter had come to office declaring that he wanted to improve America’s 
alliance relations, the SALT II negotiations remained the exclusive superpower domain that 
they had originally been during the presidencies of Nixon and Ford. In the Middle East peace 
negotiations, Carter charted his own course independent of London. The creation of the 
Camp David Accords that established a formal Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement was 
exclusively negotiated between Egypt, Israel and the United States. The British role was 
largely restricted to providing a neutral location for the discussions at Leeds Castle in July 
1978.2 As one British official noted, ‘throughout the history of Arab-Israeli negotiation, [the 
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United States] have always found their position to be more flexible and pressure to be more 
effective when they are working on their own.’ Carter did not alter this position throughout 
his time in office.3 The diminished international influence and power of the United Kingdom 
had an impact on the Anglo-American relationship in that London could not foster the levels 
of cooperation with Washington that it once had been able to simply because Britain was not 
as important, or powerful, as it once was. 
Differences in power also help to explain why London largely ceded to Washington’s 
wishes in regards to settling the question of majority rule in Rhodesia; why the British 
government engaged in the discourse of international human rights promotion, and supported 
American proposals for overhauling the NATO alliance, even though American plans were 
seen in all three cases as either naïvely optimistic or as an expensive waste of resources. The 
Callaghan government, however, realised that America’s predominant position within the 
western alliance afforded the president the opportunity to chart the course that he largely 
wanted in spite of any opposition encountered from London. But whilst appreciating the 
dynamics of power within the Anglo-American relationship, the Callaghan government 
believed that personal diplomacy could allow the British government to exercise a profound 
level of influence over the course of U.S. foreign policy. 
By and large this approach did not lead to the level of influence which Callaghan 
hoped for. Yet it did have a number of notable and more subtle successes. To be sure, in the 
majority of instances where London advised Washington to alter course, such as with SALT 
II or in pushing a human rights agenda with Moscow, Carter had already decided to change 
trajectory anyhow. London’s greatest influence, therefore, was in helping to cement changes 
in Carter’s policy direction after he had already decided to change course. But in other fields, 
Callaghan certainly exerted a level of influence over the president. This is most clearly seen 
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with regards to the discussions relating to international monetary reform and trade policy. 
Throughout the negotiations of 1977-79, Callaghan had consistently argued for less 
protectionist policies to be pursued and for constant dialogue to be conducted between the 
members of the G7. Callaghan’s influence may have not been decisive in convincing the 
president to refrain from implementing new protectionist policies but again the British prime 
minister’s weight was added to the advice proffered in Washington against protectionism. 
Careful and professional diplomacy could therefore lead to beneficial results for the British 
government. Power political explanations are only so useful in better understanding the 
dynamics of the Anglo-American strategic, diplomatic and political relationship in this 
period.  
Carter’s decision to approve the sale of Trident C4 to the British government ensured 
the continuation of the Anglo-American nuclear relationship for the foreseeable future. Given 
that the nuclear relationship between London and Washington was well established Carter’s 
decision to sell Trident C4 to the British government could be considered as an inevitability. 
Perhaps so but this was certainly not how British policy makers viewed things at the time.4 
Securing Carter’s agreement to sell Trident C4 ensured that Callaghan or any successor to 
him would be able to purchase a replacement system for Polaris on preferential terms. 
Thatcher’s decision to take up Carter on his private offer guaranteed the continuation of the 
Anglo-American nuclear relationship. Whilst the Carter administration had initially decided 
to re-examine whether the British government deserved continued access to the most 
sensitive intelligence material, the relationship endured. Anglo-American institutional 
cooperation was so well entrenched that it could overcome transitional political differences. 
When coupled to the continued cooperation in the realm of nuclear weapons, the most 
intimate and ‘special’ aspects of the Anglo-American relationship remained relevant during 
the Carter presidency.5 
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The Carter-Thatcher relationship has often been overshadowed by the more intimate 
one which followed it during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. This has not been helped by 
Thatcher’s criticism of Carter within her memoirs which historians have taken as indicative 
of a relationship beset by disagreement.6 Certainly London and Washington disagreed over 
how to react to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Anglo-American cooperation was 
decidedly absent and strained as it pertained to implementing economic sanctions against 
Moscow, partaking in a boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games and in dealing with the rise 
of Islamic fundamentalism inside Iran. Disagreement may have existed but in other areas of 
mutual interest between the two countries, remarkable cooperation existed. Thus, London 
agreed to support Carter’s plans for overhauling the NATO alliance and signed up to the 
Duel-track decision of September 1979. Thatcher ensured that she provided political 
legitimacy to the president in her public speeches and supported Carter’s efforts to rescue the 
American hostages held in Iran. Finally, the sale of Trident C4 was agreed under Carter and 
Thatcher. The Carter-Thatcher relationship, however brief, had significant longer term 
strategic and political consequences for both countries.     
Once out of office, Carter wrote that ‘as president, I hoped and believed that the 
expansion of human rights might be the wave of the future throughout the world, and I 
wanted the United States to be on the crest of this movement.’7 Carter’s ambition was never 
achieved to the extent that he may have wished for but as recently demonstrated by James 
Cronin, the adoption by American and British policy makers of the discourse of promoting 
international human rights (even if the actual practice of American and British foreign policy 
fell short on this front) meant that legitimate governments had to be ‘democratic’ and 
publically adhere to certain standards of human rights (if not actually practise them) over the 
course of the next forty years of international relations. It was this rhetoric of human rights 
promotion which therefore encouraged major international institutions to place the promotion 
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of human rights at the heart of their global missions following the end of the Cold War. 
Likewise, Carter’s legacy was an enduring one in the domestic sphere given that ‘the U.S. 
executive branch has not found it easy to ignore norms and laws that had been put in place’ 
under Carter’s administration.8 When this is coupled to the nuclear agreements between 
London and Washington, the Carter presidency, though short in duration had profound and 
long lasting consequences for both the Anglo-American relationship and international 
relations more broadly.      
 What also becomes apparent on observing the previously classified government 
documentation is that Thatcher was far more practical in her dealings with the United States 
than she has tended to suggest in her public writings and speeches. Cementing the impression 
of being the closest ally to the United States has been a consistent and clear message 
throughout Thatcher’s writings which her adherents have keenly promoted.9 As Carrington 
suggested, Margaret Thatcher’s personality has led to her often being caricatured and this 
equally applies to her handling of the Anglo-American relationship.10 Thatcher’s engagement 
with the Carter administration demonstrates that she was cold blooded in the pursuit of 
British interests. Moreover, she appears far less of a Cold Warrior than she has presented 
herself as being in her memoirs and post-premiership speeches. In regards to the Soviet 
Union, Thatcher’s rhetoric was damning yet her actions were often reticent and cautious. For 
all of her bombast, Thatcher in the first years of her premiership appeared to be little different 
from her predecessors when it came to handling the Soviet Union. Caution and restraint was 
thus the essence of Thatcher’s advice to Washington as the Carter administration struggled to 
formulate a coherent response to the breakdown of superpower détente and establish policies 
for fighting the Second Cold War. 11  
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The entire period of détente was a difficult for the Anglo-American relationship as 
Washington sought to galvanise its international position following its extrication from 
Vietnam and as it confronted enormous economic and energy related challenges. For the 
United Kingdom, successive British governments tried to cope with the duel problems of 
international decline and economic stagnation. Given these external factors it should come as 
little surprise that London and Washington were often in disagreement. As Henry Kissinger, 
who was no stranger to experiencing difficulties with London, wryly noted: ‘Nobody ever 
said that the special relationship precluded disagreements.’12 Indeed, the Carter presidency 
experienced its share of difficulties with London but it was also marked by considerable 
cooperation between the two sides. No better example can be found than the diplomacy 
which surrounded the implementation of a majority rule settlement in Rhodesia. Of course 
Anglo-American cooperation was not harmonious and critical differences of opinion existed 
between Washington and London. But the level of consultation and the joint Anglo-American 
plan is revealing of an intimate and cooperative relationship which can shape international 
relations decisively. As the Second Cold War began the Anglo-American relationship would 
again become more important to both countries and to international affairs more broadly. Yet 
the hardening of U.S. national security and foreign policy and the galvanising of the Anglo-
American relationship had begun under the Carter presidency. 
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